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FOREWORD 
Within the context of action taken following the Council Resolution on the 
promotion of employment for young people (1), the Commission decided to 
find out more about the policies and practices of companies vis-à-vis 
young people in order to identify trends and the reasons behind them on 
the one hand and to promote and support social innovation on the other. 
This second aspect is the subject of a large bi-annual programme of regional 
consultations between innovative companies for which an intermediate report 
will be published early in 1986. As regards general trends and the influence 
the relative level of young people's wages can have on them, it was im-
portant : 
- to gather together all the scientific literature available, 
- to carry out some additional research in this field. 
This was carried out in 1984 (2). The way was then open for a comparison 
between points of view based on sound factual data. The seminar held in 
Farnham Castle (U.K.) from 19 to 21 June 1985 enabled 25 top level experts 
(employers, trade unionists and university experts) to discuss matters in 
a relaxed atmosphere. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the work of this seminar covered 
the basic points of what today can be said, scientifically speaking, on 
this difficult matter which is all too often the subject of cut and dried 
statements. The quality of the debate and the results owe a lot to the 
excellence of the preparatory work, entrusted to David Marsden. 
While waiting for specific action to be taken as a follow-up to this, it 
seemed useful to publicise the results of this work. Given the volume of 
(1) O.J. C 29/1 of 4.2.84. 
(2) In particular see Studies 83/8 and 83/6 relating to the youth/adult 
wage differential. 
-2-
papers presented, it was necessary to separate their publication. Certain 
articles will appear in the next edition of the British Journal of Indus-
trial Relations, and in this special edition of Social Europe, you will 
find the summary of the proceedings, all the statements made by the two 
sides of industry and some contributions which could not be included in 
the B.J.I.R. because of lack of space. 
The Social Europe editorial staff thereby hopes to provide food for thought 
and will be pleased to receive any reaction from its readers to these 
documents (3). 
M. LAINE 
Commission of the European Communities 
(3) Send to Mr. LAINE (ARCH.I - 2/11). 
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YOUTH PAY AND EMPLOYERS' RECRUITMENT PRACTICES FOR YOUNG WORKERS 
IN WESTERN EUROPE 
David MARSDEN 
London School of Economics and Political Sciences 
The high levels reached by unemployment among young people give cause 
for concern for many reasons, including the distress caused to young 
people, the restriction of opportunities open to them, and the impact 
upon youth training and the future supply of skilled labour. In a 
number of countries demographic factors have been associated with an 
increase in the supply of young workers. This paper deals mostly with 
measures affecting the demand for their labour, looking both at re-
lative pay, and at recruitment policies. Few observers doubt that the 
depth of the recession after 1979 has been one of the major causes 
of the increase in youth unemployment in absolute terms, but there 
remains the important question as to why young people should have been 
hit especially hard. Certain features of youth employment, such as 
higher rates of job changing among young workers, "last-in-first-out" 
rules, and policies to cut recruitment rather than lay-off adult labour 
could make youth employment more sensitive to recession than that of 
other age groups. Increased pay relative to adults may also have caused 
youth to be seen by employers as in a more marginal position in their 
labour forces than previously. But it is worth remembering that in the 
last great recession in the 1930s, youth did not bear the brunt of 
unemployment to the extent that they have done in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In the 1930s, in Britain, at least, adult manual workers did not bene-
fit from the same employment protection they do today from the law 
and from collective agreements, and youth relative pay was markedly 
lower (1). This raises a number of important questions which have been 
(1) In 1935 manual male workers under 21 received weekly earnings of 36% 
of those of their adult male counterparts. After a long rise between 
about 1955 and 1975, it reached a peak of 56%. Department of Employ-
ment. British Labour Statistics. Historical Abstract, and Earnings 
of Manual Workers in October. 
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addressed either explicitly or implicitly in recent policy measures, 
notably whether the pay and conditions of employment of youth compared 
to adults have contributed to the problem. 
To examine these questions in a European context, a small conference 
was held in Farnham Castle in June 1985 inviting people from European 
employers' and trade union organisations and academic and government 
researchers. This paper provides an analysis of the written contributions 
and of the discussions. The proceedings can be divided into six broad 
headings: recent developments in youth pay, and in the cost of appren-
ticeships; evidence on the relationship between youth relative pay and 
youth unemployment; employers' training and recruitment policies; col-
lective agreements to promote youth employment; and the impact of public 
policies. 
1. Developments in youth pay relative to adults 
A number of the speakers from the employers argued that the increase 
in youth relative pay during the 1960s and 1970s had contributed to 
the current high levels of youth unemployment (Lobban and Ingram, 
Mariani, and Zedier). Table 1 summarises trends in youth relative pay 
between 1966 and 1978 for six major EEC countries. 
Except in FR Germany, and for manual women in Britain, youth to adult 
hourly paid increased in all countries between 1966 and 1978, although 
the pace and the size of increase varied considerably, the biggest 
changes, of about 10 percentage points occurring for male youth in 
Belgium, the Netherlands and the U.K. the increase in relative pay 
has mostly been accompanied by a decline in the youth employment share 
in industry. Paradoxically, the biggest change in youth employment share 
occurred for manual women whose pay relative to adult women had increased 
the least. This is partly because of the increase in participation by 
older women. 
For changes since 1978, the papers by Crone, Kane, and Wells showed a 
decline in youth relative pay in the Netherlands and the U.K., while 
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Table 1. Relative earnings of manual workers under 21 in industry 
1966 - 1978 (NACE 1-5) 
(Hourly earnings, October) 
Year Earnings of workers <21 as % of: 
Males Females 
BELGIUM 
1966 
1972 
1978 
FRANCE 
1966 
1972 
1978 
FR GERMANYa)a 
1966 
1972 
1978 
ITALY 
1966 
1972 
1978 
NETHERLANDS 
1966 
1972 
1978 
11 £ 
78. 
79. 
81. 
76. 
UNITED KINGDOM b: 
1966 
1972 
1978 
Notes 
iges 
3 
1 
.1 
6 
I 
Φ 21 
69.7 
70.6 
78.6 
71.9 
77.7 
75.7 
77.1 
78.2 
η.a. 
η.a. 
77.0 
77.9 
84.8 
50.9 
54.0 
59.1 
=>21 
51.2 
53.3 
61.6 
all ages 
84. 
85. 
85, 
83, 
.0 
.5 
.1 
.7 
=>21 
83.7 
79.2 
83.3 
77.9 
86.4 
86.1 
81.8 
83.9 
n.a. 
n.a. 
84.4 
84.3 
89.9 
63.6 
63.3 
68.8 
=>18 
66.4 
63.3 
65.8 
Workers 
<21 % of 
all ages 
M 
10.2 
10.1 
7.7 
10.8 
9.6 
6.2 
6.3 
5.2 
4.4 
F 
29.1 
27.4 
17.0 
30.4 
20.8 
13.0 
14.0 
12.1 
12.2 
4.9 
4.2 
3.3 
12.4 
9.1 
10.0 
<21 
10.1 
8.2 
9.0 
19.9 
16.8 
9.4 
51.6 
34.8 
26.0 
<18 
11.5 
10.8 
8.1 
a) Estimates of hourly earnings derived 
mates were made for those aged 18-20. 
18-20 group worked same hours as<18, 
=>18. 
b) Includes apprentices. 
Sources : Belgium, France, Italy, and the 
Germany, Eurostat SEI 1966 and 
from monthly averages. Hours esti-
higher earnings estimate assumes 
and lower estimate, same hours as 
Netherlands, Eurostat SEI, FR 
1972, and GLSE for 1978; UK EMO. 
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that by Tessaring showed a modest increase in FR Germany, especially 
for apprentices. 
Understanding the causes of these changes is important to understanding 
the causes of the increase in youth unemployment, and thus the kinds 
of policy that can help. If the causes were institutional in origin 
rather than the result of an increase in demand relative to supply, 
then policies to reduce the employment cost of young workers are more 
likely to help. Similarly, even if the cause of the increase in the 
1960s had its origin in excess demand, institutional pressures might 
nevertheless stop youth relative pay falling to market clearing levels. 
In fact, the evidence suggests that institutional causes have predomi-
nated, especially since the early 1970s. 
A number of causes can be identified for these changes. The argument 
that the increase in youth relative pay has been due to institutional 
factors rather than excess demand has been most thoroughly presented 
for Britain by Wells, who showed that the increase continued, and was 
indeed at its most pronounced after the youth labour market had moved 
into conditions of excess supply. The levels of youth unemployment in 
most countries, except West Germany during the 1970s suggest that 
similar conditions of excess supply were also present there. 
In Britain, the institutional pressures took the form of a reduction 
in the age at which workers move onto adult rates, and an increase 
in the remaining youth rates in a large number of collective agreements. 
A similar movement can be seen in a number of West German wage agree-
ments with the elimination of or the raising of rates for unskilled 
youths. In France, youth rates in national agreements were raised 
after the Grenelle agreement in 1968 and government intervention in 
1971, which took the rate for those aged 16-17 to 80% and for those 
aged 17-18 to 90% of the full adult rate. 
In Italy, Mariani stresses the interaction of two sets of factors : 
Article 37 of the Italian Constitution which established the principle 
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of equal pay for work of equal quality and quantity, and which does not 
recognise age as a factor, and so discourages special youth rates; and 
union policies which have been designed to reduce wage inequalities 
generally by reducing differentials between skilled and unskilled, and 
through the action of the indexation system. The latter became a major 
equalising influence after 1977 when it switched from percentage to flat 
rate compensation for point changes in the price index. Again, the in-
fluence on youth pay was indirect, nut nonetheless significant. 
In the Netherlands, it would be tempting to point to the influence of the 
minimum wage for young workers effective from 1974, and which applied to 
the rates of a considerable proportion of young workers, but Crone shows 
that its influence in the 1970s was more questionable, as rises in the 
minimum wage followed movements in youth pay. Nevertheless, van Rintel 
suggests that it has been a factor in the decline of youth relative pay 
since 1983, although its impact may have been permissive rather than a 
direct cause. 
The reasons why the unions pushed for an increase in youth relative pay 
are not entirely clear and may have been the consequence of a wider at-
tack on wage inequalities. Commonly cited reasons include a desire to 
attract young persons into joining trade unions, but equally it could 
be to discourage employers from substituting young for older workers, 
but this is unlikely to be applicable to all types of employment. Nor 
are the reasons why employers agreed to it altogether clear. Mariani 
suggests that during the 1970s the Italian employers were in a relative-
ly weak bargaining position vis-à-vis the unions. In addition, if youth 
rates are fixed at the industry level, conceding a little extra for young 
workers has a much smaller effect upon employers' overall wage bills 
than the overall increases being negotiated for all workers. 
The downward pressures on youth relative pay in the 1980s may appear less 
surprising in view of the increased levels of youth unemployment. Nevei— 
theless, it would seem that if youth pay is responding to market pressures, 
it is also coming under heavy pressure from public policy measures. The 
British Youth Training Scheme offers young workers a training allowance 
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fixed at a level well below youth pay rates (for those who get jobs), 
and in July, the government announced that it was removing young workers 
from the coverage of the Wages Councils which provide sectoral minimum 
wages. In France, the TUC scheme, providing socially useful jobs, pays 
young workers an allowance of 33% of the minimum wage (Barbier, Magniadas) 
In the Netherlands, the minimum wage was reduced in 1983. Similarly, in 
Italy, some of the new measures, such as the initiation wage (salario 
d'ingresso) offer lower rates for young workers (Garonna, and Mariani), 
but as Mariani suggests, the conditions firms have to meet in order to 
take advantage of the measures appear to outweigh any cost saving. 
The discussion so far has dealt estensively with manual workers, and 
includes apprentices, some indication of comparative levels for manual 
and non-manual workers, with adjustments for apprentices in Britain 
and Germany, the two countries making most use of them, are given in 
Table 2. 
One of the striking features about youth compared to adult pay in a 
number of EEC countries is its broad similarity in France, FR Germany 
and the UK. When apprentices and trainees are excluded, among manual 
male workers, earnings of workers aged under 21 are about three quar-
ters of adult monthly pay; among manual women the equivalent figure 
is about 85 per cent; among non-manual men, about 45 per cent, and 
among non-manual women, between 60 and 70 per cent. Of the four countries 
in Table 1, only the Netherlands stands apart with significantly lower 
levels of youth relative pay. 
Differences between the countries emerge once apprentices and trainees 
are brought into the picture, as youth relative pay in West Germany 
drops considerably, and in Britain a little less so on account of the 
lower rates of pay for apprentices, on which more later (Jones, Wiederhold-
Fritz) (2). The inclusion or otherwise of apprentices highlights an 
important feature of youth employment, namely that there are several 
different types of employment relation into which they may enter: the 
(2) The Netherlands data for 1978 include apprentices. This does not 
fully account for the lower levels of relative pay there as can 
be seen from Table 2. 
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Table 2. Relative monthly earnings of young workers in industry in France, 
FR Germany, the Netherlands and the UK in 1978. 
(Earnings of workers under 21 as a percentage of earnings of all ages, 
full-time. Production industries excluding construction.) 
FRANCE 
(Oct 78) 
Manual workers 
Men 75.8 
Women 87.3 
Non-manual workers 
Men 47.5 
Women 67.8 
All workers 
Men 
Women 
61.2 
77.9 
FR 
GERMANY 
(Oct 78) 
76.9 
83.3 
47.9 
67.6 
68.4 
(39.6)c) 
76.6 
(63.0)c) 
NETHER 
-LANDS 
(Oct 79) 
(a)' 
59.1 
67.6 
41.9 
59.1 
50.1 
62.6 
UNITED 
.b) KINGDOM 
(Api 79) 
apprenti ces 
included excluded 
63.7 c) (i) 74.1 c) 
85.8 d) (ii)68.0 c) 
46.1 d) 
76.3 d) 
59.0 c) 
81.4 d) 
(i) 65.4 c) 
(ii)61.8 c) 
NOTES 
a) - including apprentices and trainees. 
b) - New Earnings Survey 1979 (Great Britain only). 
c) - including apprentices ONLY INCLUDED IN GERMAN DATA FOR COMPARISON 
WITH THE UK. 
d) - numbers of female and non-manual apprentices in industry are very 
small. 
e) - upper and lower estimates of effect of excluding apprentices. 
SOURCES: SEI 1978: France - INSEE/SSIS; FR Germany - Statitisches Bundes-
amt GLS; Netherlands, Eurostat SEI; IK Dept. of Employment NES. 
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traditional employment relation in which they benefit from the standard 
conditions and protection for normal adult workers; the apprentice and 
trainee relation which is often for a fixed period, and in which remun-
eration may take the form of an allowance, as it does in West Germany, 
and the special employment relations envisaged under employment schemes 
for young workers, examples of which are discussed later. Often, the 
remuneration received under the latter two types of relation is markedly 
below the wages paid to people of an equivalent age. The principal reason 
for the lower pay of apprentices is that they are receiving training 
from the employer, but because of the transferable nature of the skills 
they acquire, employers who provide training cannot be sure of getting 
a return on their investment, so the lower age is intended to offset 
part of the cost of the training. 
2. The costs of apprenticeship training 
Apprenticeships are important because they have been one of the major 
channels through which young workers enter the labour market, and 
through which they gain their vocational training. They also highlight 
one of the biggest problems of assessing the net cost of employing 
young people, namely the balance between the costs borne by employers 
in the form of trainee pay and direct training costs, and the value 
of the trainee's output. Apprenticeships play an important role in the 
youth labour markets in FR Germany, Italy and the UK although they are 
believed to vary greatly in the quality of the training received, and 
in the net cost borne by employers. 
Estimates of the net cost of apprentice training in FR Germany and in 
Britain were presented by Casey, Jones and Wiederhold-Fritz. Assessing 
of the value of trainees' output is the most difficult part of the 
analysis, and requires certain assumptions notably about the price to 
be attributed to their work. Hence the controversy surrounding this 
question. 
Jones showed that although the net cost of apprentice training was similar 
in Britain and FR Germany, its composition, and hence its quality was 
different. In FR Germany, a greater proption of the total outlay went on 
training than in Britain where it went on trainee wages. 
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Casey dwelt more on the differences between training in the handicraft 
and the industrial sectors of the West German economy, arguing from the 
higher net cost of training in the industrial sector as compared with 
the handicraft sector, that many employers in the latter sector used 
apprentices as a form of cheap labour. Wiederhold-Fritz made a similar 
observation, arguing that it was otherwise hard to understand why this 
sector should so persistently train apprentices beyond its own require-
ments. 
Garonna argued that apprentices played a similar role in the small firm 
sector in Italy. In Italy a much higher proportion (about 76 per cent) 
of apprentices are engaged in the artisan and services sectors than in 
either West Germany or Britain. Their pay rates are however a considerably 
higher proportion of adult pay rates (about 95%) than in either Britain 
(about 60-70%) or FR Germany (about 30-40%) (Jones). 
One of the problems encountered especially in recent years has been the 
undermining of the link between apprentice training and skilled jobs by 
the high levels of youth unemployment. In some countries this has been a 
long term problem, as Germe showed for France where a high proportion 
of school trained apprentices remain in unskilled jobs several years 
after the completion of their training. To some extent this might be 
understood in France by the absence of a discount on the employment of 
newly qualified apprentices in France (as adult rates become effective 
at 18), and teh fact that apprenticeship training is based less in the 
workplace than in Britain or Germany so that newly qualified apprentices 
need to gain work experience. Because of this, Germe argues that on 
completion of their apprenticeships, many young French skilled workers 
start work in unskilled jobs in small firms where they gain experience 
before progressing into larger firms, often in other sectors. High 
unemployment has also produced problems of transition from apprentice-
ship into full skilled jobs in West Germany as Casey shows. 
Marsden and Ryan took up the problems of both cost and of access to jobs 
in different sectors for young workers. Their statistical analysis of the 
distribution of youth employment between industrial sectors in six EEC 
countries echoed Germe's and Casey's observations that many young workers 
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are likely to gain their training and initial work experience in certain 
sectors, and then work as adults in others. Certain sectors had persisten-
ly higher youth employment shares than others, and generally they also 
had lower levels of adult pay. 
3. The relationship between youth-adult relative pay and youth employment 
The primary aim of the conference was not to discuss detailed econometric 
work on youth pay and employment. Nevertheless three papers bore directly 
on the question, those of Crone, Junankar, Marsden and Ryan, and of Wells. 
Wells presented the results of his earlier study (Welles 1983) showing 
that the increase in youth pay during the 1970s in Britain had adversely 
effected youth employment, but not during the 1950s and 1960s. A critical 
factor, he argued had been the shift in labour market conditions for young 
workers from a position of excess demand up to about 1969-70 to one of 
excess supply thereafter. It was in these conditions, that the continued 
rise in youth relative pay had had an adverse effect - the causes of the 
increased realtive pay lying in institutional pressures. 
Crone reported results of a small study by Crone and Westra (1984) on the 
Netherlands which purported to show the definite effect of an increase in 
youth relative pay on youth unemployment. This contrasted with Marsden 
and Ryan's results for the Netherlands. Magniadas also reported a study 
of France by Martin (1983) which, using a more sophisticated model than 
Crone and Westra, showed the increases in the French minimum wage had 
not adversely affected youth employment, although, as Martin pointed out, 
it could be misleading to extrapolate outside the range of variation 
in the SMIC to make broader judgements about the effects of minimum wages 
on youth employment. From a study of a small sample of firms' recruitment 
policies for young workers in France, Constantin reported that relative 
pay had not been a factor which the companies had felt to inhibit recruit-
ment of young workers. However, he did quote one case in which the agree-
ment had fixed a fairly high starting wage, which attracted a wide range 
of applicants from whom the company usually selected those with more 
experience. 
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Marsden and Ryan found a price effect on youth employment shares between 
industrial sectors in FR Germany, and Netherlands and Britain, but not 
in Belgium, France or Italy. The reasons for this they suggested should 
be sought in the institutional methods of fixing youth pay: did they allow 
a discount on youth employment, as for example with the wage for age sys-
tems used for apprentices, and were there established channels to good 
jobs that could be used by young workers? To some extent the two problems 
are interrelated as the institutional channels could wither if they proved 
too expensive to employers. Industrial apprenticeships in Britain and FR 
Germany provide such channels, and these also ensure a more even distribu-
tion of young workers between sectors than in France, Italy or Belgium. 
The cost of employing young workers is not simply a function of their pay 
rate, nor even of expenditure on training, but also of the conditions 
under which they are employed. There ahs been a good deal of debate as 
to whether employment legislation and rules designed to protect adult 
workers in fact work to the exclusion of young workers. This raised two 
sets of questions: what are the problems posed by these rules; and what 
is being done within collective bargaining to relex conditions on young 
people's employment. 
4. Conditions of employment and youth jobs 
The problems posed to the employment of young workers by employment con-
ditions designed initially to protect adult workers was raised in a number 
of papers. Of particular importance were the indirect costs of offering 
the normal unlimited duration contracts of most adult workers to young 
workers. If employers took on extra young workers to help combat youth 
unemployment, would they then find themselves committed to employing more 
people than their production levels warranted? Would they find that they 
could not dismiss trainees who subsequently failed to attain the level 
of competence required, and by taking on extra young workers now would 
they be building future increases into their labour costs as these people 
attained adult rates of pay? These questions were raised especially by the 
employers from several countries. 
It was raised mostly strongly for Italy. This partly reflects specifical-
ly Italian conditions, notably the system of job placement under which 
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employers have to take people from the placements lists in a particular 
order, and so have relatively little choice in whom they recruit, coupled 
with tight regulation of individual dismissals (as opposed to redundancies) 
Mariani argued that the implicit costs of such employment rules with res­
pect to the recruitment of young workers outweighed the subsidy element 
in many of the Italian authorities' schemes to promote youth employment. 
Nevertheless, the issue of restrictive conditions was implicit in a num­
ber of the employment measures in which the limitation of the time com­
mitment by an employer to a young worker recruit was more important than 
the relative wage cost. One example of this can be found in the 1982 
Netherlands National Accord. 
Under this National Accord, among the measures proposed for young people 
were special familiarisation contracts, and expansion of apprenticeships, 
and accelerated entry schemes. The first two of these, the familiarisa­
tion and the apprenticeship contracts, proposed fixed term employment 
relations. Even on the accelerated entrey schemes, which envisage part­
time working for young workers, the commitment to subsequent full time 
work was conditional. 
In West Germany, under the Employment Support Act, from May 1 1985, employ­
ment contracts can be limited to 18 months duration. Zedier suggests that 
this may facilitate employment of apprentices after termination of their 
initial training contract, but also facilitate the development of tempo­
rary work. Nevertheless, it is still too early to assess any benefit to 
young workers. 
Such measures, however, put unions in a very difficult position. First, 
they can be seen as the "thin end of the wedge" in a more general attack 
on the advantages gained from their members by collective bargaining and 
by legislative action during the 1960s and 1970s. Such suspicions are 
intensified by more general pressures from free market economists, and 
politicians influenced by them for a more general "deregulation" of the 
labour market, as expressed by Kane. Secondly, unions fear that concession 
in this area for the benefit of young workers could, in the absence of a 
more general reflation of the economy, easily lead to substitution of 
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young for older workers, producing an overall reduction in standard employ-
ment conditions, while the potential second round benefits from greater 
competitiveness are uncertain, and may be slow to materialise. 
5. Union employer initiatives 
Governments can only work effectively in employment policy if they have 
the support of employers and unions, so it is natural to ask what has been 
the role of private initiatives to help young workers. The most prominent 
example discussed was that of the 1982 National Accord in the Netherlands 
described by Casey and by van Rintel. Casey and Zedier were also able to 
point to examples in West Germany, and to a much smaller extent in Britain. 
Morevover, one should not overlook the extent to which employment and 
training contracts, and the solidarity contracts in France and Italy rest 
also on a form of agreement albeit between individual employers and the 
public authorities. What have been some of these initiatives, and what 
have they achieved? 
The Netherlands National Accord, reached between the employers' and trade 
union federations represented in the Foundation of Labour in 1982 envi-
saged three main elements in its policy towards youth. First, there were 
to be special familiarisation contracts of short duration designed to 
provide work experience to young persons. Secondly there should be an 
expansion of apprenticeships limiting the duration of the contract to that 
of the apprenticeship, and the establishment of special branch-wide funds 
designed to spread the cost of training, and into which both employers 
and trainees would contribute. Thirdly, there would be special provisions 
for accelerated entry of workers by means of special part-time contracts 
with hours of between 50% and 89% of normal working. 
The 1982 accord was a frame agreement setting guidelines for negotiations 
at branch level. During 1983, 41 agreements covering some 1.1m workers 
were made putting these into practice, but according to van Rintel, emp-
loyers have found them hard to put into practice because of commercial 
pressures. In July 1984, the Foundation of Labour called upon the parties 
to make additional efforts to fulfill the original accord, and negotiations 
have been continuing to this end during the summer of 1985. 
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Both Casey (1984) and Zedier (1985) reviewed similar schemes in West 
Germany, although these were mostly confined to initiatives within indi-
vidual branches or individual firms, so that their coverage was more 
limited than in the Netherlands. The idea of worksharing as a way of 
increasing the number of jobs available to young workers has many attrac-
tions, but also encounters a number of difficulties. One such difficulty 
is how to fit part-time work into already established patterns of working. 
A second is that unions fear that as many of these workers will not be 
taken on permanently, competition between workers will be enhanced with 
the young part-time workers being tempted to give a full day's work for 
part-time pay. This of course raises fears that young workers will then 
be used instead of adults where work schedules and skill requirements 
permit. Hence, one of the key negotiating problems to arise in a number 
of Casey's case studies bore on the proportion of part-time young workers 
who were to be kept afterwards by the company. In other words, it can be 
difficult in practice to ensure that work-sharing among young workers 
does not extend to work-sharing between young and adult workers. Indeed, 
the proportion of young workers being kept on afterwards, appears to have 
the main bone of contention in the Federal German Railways. 
6. Employers' training and recruitment practices 
Studies of employers' recrtuiment practices shed further light on the 
question of youth employment, pay and training. These were hinted at in 
a number of interventions, especially by those from employers' organi-
sations, but two studies of youth intensive industries in France and 
Italy presented by Constantin and by Thibault raised a number of issues. 
Both showed that young workers' relative pay was not foremost in indi-
vidual employers' minds in deciding whether or not to recruit young workers. 
But two points should be borne in mind: first the recession has generally 
been the dominant factor in recruitment decisions and this may have weighed 
more heavily in the minds of those interviewed; and secondly, in view of 
the steep increase in youth unemployment, employers would find that the 
quality of their young recruits had increased, so that the price for a 
given quality of recruit would in fact have fallen. The apparent insen-
sitivity to relative pay at the plant level may not be at odds with the 
aggregative econometric evidence quoted earlier, as neither Martin nor 
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Marsden and Ryan found a strong relative wage effect on youth employment 
in France. 
Thibault highlighted two types of recruitment pattern: one in which emp­
loyers seek experienced and trained workers, for which the discount on 
youth employment did not compensate for the additional costs of training; 
and one in which employers sought adaptable workers, for example for new 
industrial processes, in which case they sought young workers even if 
there were no discount. 
Constantin also noted a preference among employers for younger workers 
on account of their ability to learn faster where greater adaptability is 
neede, as with new technology. His study also brought out the preference 
among a number of French employers for fixed term contracts for their 
young recruits as a means of limiting their risks. This may be an im­
portant element in employment costs not reflected in relative hourly 
of monthly wages. 
The practical importance of restrictive conditions on youth employment 
and their effect upon recrtuiment practices is hard to assess because 
differences between sectors, and the possibility that collective agree­
ments and legal provisions may be uneven in their enforcement. One 
implication of the concentration of young workers in lower paid sectors 
of industry, as observed by Marsden and Ryan, is that in these sectors, 
in the early 1970s at least, they provide a cheap and fairly flexible 
labour force. A similar conclusion flows from the arguments of Casey 
and of Wiederhold­Fritz that apprentices can be used, especially in the 
handicraft sector, as a source of cheap labour which can be easily ex­
panded or run down. Similarly, in France, Germe's observation that young 
workers typically enter certain sectors and enter unskilled jobs even 
when they have completed their vocational training suggests their use 
as a low cost flexible workforce in the youth intensive sectors (an 
advantage which has to be set against their lesser experience). 
Garonna argues a similar case for Italy: that the public policy measures 
designed to "deregulate" the youth labour market have in fact had less 
effect than might be thought because attempts to regulate the labour 
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market by the public authorities were widely evaded. He goes on to argue 
that the critical factor was the growth of union power in the early 1970s, 
and that where the unions were strong they were able to make a number of 
these measures effective, such as the legal protection of young workers, 
and their inclusion in the public job placement system and to limit their 
use as a source of cheap and flexible labour. Hence it was not the measures 
of "deregulation" brought in by the tripartite "Scotti agreement" in 1983 
which were responsible so much as the weakening of the unions. He further 
argued that the fall in the number of unemployed first job seekers has, 
in fact, been offset by a corresponding increase in unemployment among 
young workers who have already had jobs. 
7. Public policy measures and the youth labour market 
Public policy has come to plan an ever larger part in the transition 
between school-based vocational training and work, to the extent that, 
according to Barbier, it has now established a distinct transitional 
phase in France, There is no longer a direct link between vocational 
training and the labour market. But in taking on such a responsibility, 
the state has only resolved part of the problem. 
Public policy to help young people has still to contend with established 
patterns of labour mobility which have not usually developed as the 
result of a conscious plan, but instead from the interaction of a number 
of policies, and a number of levels of decision making. The evidence 
quoted by Germe for France suggests that it has been unable to alter the 
established pattern of youth entry into the labour market, and the transi-
tion from the schemes into full adult work remains difficult. Magniadas 
made a similar observation, expressing fears about the transition from 
the schemes into proper jobs. The French problem merits closer examin-
ation, as there are a number of elements which are relevant to other 
countries. 
The education system has long sought to link educational streams to types 
of employment. But it is better at providing general theoretical training 
than practical experience, and it adapts rather slowly to changing emp-
loyment demands. Consequently, employers seek experienced workers, although 
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they are unwilling to pay for its acquisition. Large firms, and firms 
in better paid sectors can afford to cream off the experienced skilled 
labour, while small firms have difficulty retaining their highly skilled 
workers. As a result, they have to take on the young inexperienced work­
ers, but they also place them in less skilled jobs. For some young work­
ers, this progression occurs, but others remain in dead­end jobs. 
Recent policies to help young workers have sought to do so in a general 
way, but in practice, their effect has been greatest in the sectors and 
occupations traditionally employing large numbers of young workers. Of 
the many current measures in France Germe picks two important ones as 
examples: the "stages 14/18" (work experience for 16­18 year olds) and 
the "contrats emploi­formation" (employment and training contracts for 
those aged 18­26). The first takes unemployed school leavers, and seeks 
to bridge the gap between school and work experience, taking mostly un­
qualified young workers. The contrat emploi­formation takes people with 
a limited amount of vocational training, and aims to give them training, 
mostly of a firm specific nature, for which the firm receives a subsidy. 
In theory the position should lead to a permanent job, but the scheme 
does not commit the employer in the same way as an ordinary employment 
contract. Both types of scheme have had most success in those sectors 
and types of job into which young workers have traditionally gone, and 
have not opened up new areas for young workers. 
The rise in unemployment has brought about an increased polarisation 
between those sectors receving young workers and those not. This has 
slowed the progression ofeven qualified young workers from the sectors 
which receive them initially towards the better ones. 30% of qualified 
young workers entering an unskilled job in 1976 are still in unskilled 
jobs. 
One important new initiative is intended to reduce this polarisation is 
the "contrats en alternance" (providing alternate spells of work train­
ing and replacing the older contrats emploi­formation), which greatly 
reduces the remuneration of young workers, and their employment cost. 
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The aim is to lower the cost of the adaptation of young workers' school 
qualifications (where they have them) to the skills needed in industry, 
but not to create a new sector of low paid jobs for young workers. 
Such problems are not confined to France, and in FR Germany, not only has 
the transition from apprenticeship to full adult work become more diffi-
cult, but as Casey observes, young workers enter different sectors, and 
get a poorer quality of training during recession, and experience great-
er difficulty in the transition to better jobs. He argues that the steady 
supply of apprenticeship places over the last decade in fact conceals two 
quite distinct processes of recruitment which have fluctuated inversely 
with one another. In large firms apprenticeship places are mostly linked 
to the firms' investment plans and their expected future skill needs, 
and hence fluctuates pro-cyclically; but in small firms apprenticeship 
places are to a greater extent a source of cheap labour, young workers 
would prefer places with the better training schemes, but in recession 
their choice is limited, and they have to make the best of places in the 
small firms, hence the countercyclical fluctuations in the number of ap-
prentices in this sector. The combination of these two movements helps 
to explain the steadiness of the supply of apprentice places, and the 
relatively small divergence between supply and demand for places over 
the years. 
8. Conclusions 
The purpose of the conference was to promote an exchange of ideas rather 
than to reach particular policy conclusions. Nevertheless, certain con-
clusions would seem to follow from the logic of the arguments, at least 
as they have been presented in this paper. 
The principle conclusion would seem to be that employment costs of young 
people, be they in the form of pay relative to adults or the implicit 
costs involved in providing certain employment guarantees to young work-
ers are an important element in determining their overall share of emp-
loyment. How far these factors also affected their access to good jobs 
with prospects was less certain. What policies could work towards this 
end? 
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Reductions in relative pay have been widely discussed in Britain, and are 
an element implicit in a number of policies providing low levels of allow-
ances for young workers on special schemes. Almost all of the econometric 
work on relative pay has been done on Britain, and this suggests the in-
crease in youth relative pay has been an important influence (although 
smaller in overall terms than the recession). The work of the Netherlands 
has been more limited, and although Crone found no relative pay effect, 
we must await confirmation from studies based on a larger number of ob-
servations. Perhaps important, were Marsden and Ryan's findings of a 
significant relation for three countries, Britain, Germany, and the Nether-
lands, but no relation for Belgium, France and Italy. These results also 
await confirmation on other years than 1972, but they suggest that dif-
ferences in labour market organisation between the countries may affect 
the influence of relative pay, and they affect the distribution of young 
workers between sectors of industry. 
Of course, finding that relative pay is influential does not of itself 
imply that policies to reduce relative pay should be allowed: it equally 
suggests that a policy of selective employment subsidies could be effect-
ive. 
Perhaps one of the most important points to emerge was the other element 
of employment cost, namely the cost of providing certain employment gua-
rantees to young workers, notably offering the indeterminate duration 
usually offered to adults. Mariani's paper indicated the problems of 
trying to tackle such costs by means of subsidies. In essence, a fixed 
amount of subsidy is offered to an employer who is asked to take a risk 
in employing someone whom it may prove difficult to fire. Constantin 
picked up the same sentiments in company level interviews in France. 
This problem might be tackled in three ways. The first is by simply offei— 
ing contracts of new recruits which are of fixed duration, and which ex-
clude benefits going to other workers already employed. In a time of high 
unemployment, some employers may be able to force this on their workforces, 
but it is likely to breed a tough attitude from the workforce and their 
representatives should the fear of unemployment weaken, reinforcing a 
cycle of adversarial industrial relations. 
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A second alternative is to pursue such special contracts through public 
intervention, and there have been several examples mentioned in this 
paper. Again, however, the danger is that this can be seen as an inter-
vention by a hostile government intent upon "rolling back" the gains of 
collective bargaining, and on weakening the rules by which employees 
gain some control over their working lives. 
A third alternative is to pursue such policies through collective bar-
gaining itself, or through other established forms of employee represent-
ation. Here the Netherlands national agreement is particularly interesting. 
In a sense it can be seen as an example of "concession bargaining" under 
which certain rights of employees are given up in order to help solve a 
particular problem, but by pursuing through collective bargaining emp-
loyees and their unions maintain a greater degree of influence over the 
process, and may be better placed to ensure that such measures do not 
become part of a wider attack on collective bargaining. The Dutch National 
Accord has not been a unqualified success, and negotiating the industry 
and firm level agreements has proved very tough, as van Rintel's evidence 
showed. But it offers a challenging third alternative to reasserting uni-
lateral managerial authority, and to greater state intervention in the 
labour market. 
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THE EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS SITUATION OF YOUNG WORKERS IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Manfred TESSARING 
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit - Nuremberg 
1. Starting situation 
The training and employment situation in the Federal Republic of Germany 
has been influenced in the last few years primarily by : 
- the increasing number of births up till 1965/66 and the subsequent down-
turn (Demographic factor); 
- the increasing popular demand for education; 
- growth of the potential labour force - due to demographic developments; 
- the influx of foreign labour and its consequences; 
- the increasing participation of women in the labour market. 
To these influences on the labour supply side we must add influences on 
the demand side such as : 
- the slow growth of net investment and gross domestic product; 
- economic growth rates at least matched by increases in labour product-
ivity; 
- decreasing scope for changes in the distribution of income and 
- the increasing segmentation of the labour market. 
At the same time the growing skill requirements of jobs and professions as 
a result of technological and social change mean that young people need 
to start their working lives with better and wider-based qualifications. 
Nobody questions the fact that it will be almost impossible to find a 
permanent solution to the employment crisis without state intervention. 
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All longer­term labour market forecasts (1) show the present job deficit 
lasting until well into the 1990s. This is bound to affect in particular 
young people, people starting work and unskilled labourers. 
Most young people in the Federal Republic of Germany start their working 
life in one of three ways. After their compulsory education all young 
people, with the exception of those entering the labour market directly 
as "unskilled labour" without any formal qualifications, go on to either 
in­plant vocational training or vocational training in educational estab­
lishments. Currently, just under 2/3 of any age group opt for in­house 
vocational training; about 30% choose outside vocational training (some­
times in addition to in­plant training) and just under 10% start their 
working life without any training at all. 
o 
o 
­£Z (-> 
[O 
Ι ­
Ο 
(Λ 
D 
Q . E O 
non-quali f i ed 
vocational 
training 
(in­plant) 
M/ 
vocational 
schools 
7^ 
c 
Ol 
E 
O 
3Ζ 
un­
employ­
ment 
Fig. 1 : Transition patterns from school to labour market 
Table 1 illustrates these paths in condensed form. In recent years bottle­
necks in training opportunities have led to young people at the start of 
their vocational training either accepting training courses other than 
those they originally wanted to take or being prepared to wait a long time 
for the courses of their choice. And at the beginning of their working 
(1) Cf. W. Klauder, P. Schnur, M. Thon: Arbeitsmarktperspektive der 80er 
und 90er Jahre. Neue Modellrichtungen für Potential und Bedarf an 
Arbeitsmärkten, in: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt­ und Berufs­
forschung 1/1985, pp 41 ff. (*) 
(*) English and French language summaries available. 
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lifes young people without specific work experience are again particularly 
at risk in times of recessionary developments on the labour market. They 
are the first victims of hiring stops in both the private and public sector 
and ­ if they do find a job ­ they have little protection when it comes 
to lay­offs. 
2. Employment situation 
Once training is completed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to find 
a job (2). In 1984 14% of all young people found themselves unemployed 
after finishing in­plant training (cf. 8% in 1982). The way unemployment 
statistics for young people under the age of 20 has been handled to date 
in the Federal Republic of Germany gives an inadequate picture of the 
extent of youth unemployment. The problem is beginning shift towards the 
20­25 age group. At the end of 1985 600,000 persons under the age of 25 
were unemployed, of whom as many as 435,000 were aged between 20 and 25. 
Overall, the unemployment rate of persons under the age of 25 increased 
between 1975 and 1985 from 6.4% to 11.5% and the rate for the 20­25 age 
group from 6.5% to 14.0%. 
This can be seen clearly when welook at the structure of youth unemploy­
ment (see Table 1). On the one hand it has been possible to reduce the 
number of younger members of this group (under 20) by, for example, in­
troducing training schemes, increasing the number of students and imple 
menting employment policy measures to relieve pressure on the labour 
market. At the same time, though, we observe that the unemployment pro­
blem is shifting towards the older members of this group. 
What is more, the official unemployment statistics do not reflect the 
true extent of youth unemployment. This is because all those young people 
who, for example, because of imminent or actual unemployment, take part 
in additional training schemes or who stop looking for work because of 
the hopeless situation on the job market, even though they would really 
(2) Cf. for data below: K. Schober : Jugend im Wartestand: Zur aktuellen 
Situation der Jugend liehen auf dem Arbeits­ und Ausbildungsstellen­
markt, in: Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt­ und Berufsforschung 
2/1985, pp 247 ff. (*) 
(*) English and French language summaries available. 
Table 1. Unemployed persons below the age of 25, 1975-85, in absolute and percentage terms, with breakdown 
into age groups and rates of change (yearly averages) 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
*** 
Unemployed pe 
below 25 
Total 
287 373 
250 486 
262 592 
243 241 
194 692 
216 293 
296 318 
457 657 
562 837 
569 747 
594 392 
Un-
emp-
loy-
ment 
rate 
6,4 
5,2 
5,5 
5,1 
4,0 
4,3 
5,8 
8,7 
10,7 
10,8 
11,5 
rsons 
As % 
of 
total 
in-
emp-
loy-
ed 
26,8 
23,6 
25,5 
24,5 
22,2 
24,3 
23,3 
25,0 
24,9 
25,1 
24,0 
Unemployed pe 
between 
Total 
171 620 
154 456 
161 873 
153 931 
123 709 
143 526 
184 676 
292 625 
370 599 
403 565 
^35 400 
20 an 
Un-
emp-
loy-
ment 
rate 
6,5 
6,0 
6,2 
5,8 
4,5 
5,1 
6,6 
9,6 
11,9 
12,8 
14,0 
rsons 
d 25* 
As % 
of 
total 
un-
emp-
loy-
ed 
17,1 
17,2 
17,8 
17,8 
16,8 
17,4 
14,5 
16,0 
16,4 
17,8 
17,6 
Unemplo) 'ed persons 
below 20** 
Total 
115 753 
96 030 
100 719 
89 310 
70 983 
72 767 
111 642 
165 032 
192 238 
166 182 
158 992 
Un-
emp-
ploy-
ment 
rate 
6,2 
4,3 
4,7 
4,3 
3,3 
3,2 
4,9 
7,7 
9,1 
7,9 
7,7 
As % 
of 
total 
un-
emp-
loy-
ed 
10,8 
9,1 
9,8 
9,0 
8,1 
8,2 
8,8 
9,0 
8,5 
7,3 
6,4 
Unemp-
loyment 
rate 
(all 
age 
groups) 
4,7 
4,6 
4,5 
4,3 
3,8 
3,8 
5,5 
7,5 
9,1 
9,1 
10,0 
Chan je (1975 = 100) 
Unemployed 
persons 
20 to 
Below Below Below 
25 25* 20** 
100 
87 
91 
85 
68 
75 
103 
159 
196 
198 
207 
100 100 
90 83 
94 87 
90 77 
72 61 
84 63 
108 96 
171 143 
216 166 
235 144 
254 137 
Total unemployed 
persons 
100 
99 
96 
92 
82 
83 
118 
171 
210 
211 
230 
l\J o 
I 
*) till 1980, including September figures 
**) till 1976, including September figures 
***) end March 1985 
Source : K. Schober : Jugend im Wartestand, in: Mitt. A.B. 2/1985, p. 249. 
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L i ke to work, are not included in the statistics. The size of this "hidden 
reserve" was estimated by the IAB in 1982 at around 300,000 persons (3) 
and has in all likelihood increased since then. In other words, official 
data on youth employment represent only the "tip of the iceberg". 
One thing remains clear : the reduction of pressure on training facilities 
due to demographic factors is being replaced by increasing problems in 
starting work, presenting a new and specific danger as regards the per-
manent incorporation of the coming generation into the workforce in line 
with their skills and qualifications. Policy measures in the labour market 
should not stop at preaching higher mobility and a lowering of profes-
sional horizons. The full brunt of finding a new balance on the employ-
ment market cannot be borne by young people finishing their vocational 
training alone. 
I shall now go on to discuss one of the various solutions currently under 
discussion, i.e. increasing the number of vocational training and work 
vacancies by either freezing or reducing training allowances and youth 
earnings, based on concrete data on earnings. 
3. Young persons' earnings 
The level of earnings of employed persons in the Federal Republic of 
Germany is governed exclusively by wage agreements negotiated between 
employers and trade unions. These agreements also cover training al-
lowances. There is no such thing as a minimum wage, even though this 
has been discussed once again in recent years. When comparing the 
earnings of young people with those of adults, we must bear in mind 
that the earnings of the former are subject, in differing amounts, 
to discounts according to age. 
The data used here is taken from special evaluations of the micro-
censuses (1% population sample) carried out in 1978 and 1982. These 
(3) Cf. IAB : Quantifizierung und Strukturierung des Erwerbspersonne-
potentials 1960-1982. Unpublished manuscript. Nuremberg 1983, 
Overview 6. 
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give the net monthly earnings of employed persons after deduction of taxes 
and social security contributions. To minimize distortions, we will deal 
exclusively with persons in full-time employment. 
3.1. Comparison of earnings of young people with those of adults 
Average net monthly earnings of all persons in full-time employment 
amounted to 1,777 DM in 1978, increasing to 2,091 DM by 1982 (men only). 
During the same period, women's earnings increased from 1,142 to 1,376 DM, 
i.e. still remaining less than 2/3 of those of men (Table 2). 
At 800 DM (1978) and 962 DM (1982) the earnings of young men under the 
age of 20 (excluding apprentices) were less than half the average earnings 
of the male employed population as a whole. Young women in this age group 
earned approx. 64% of average female earnings (not forgetting the gene-
rally low level of female earnings) whilst the earnings of young women 
between the ages of 20 and 25 are very close to the average for employed 
women as a whole, whilst young men in this age group still earn a third 
less than the average for all employed men. 
In both years the average earnings of apprentices was about half that 
of regularly employed persons of the same age of 1/3 of that of persons 
between 20 and 35. Compared with the workforce as a whole, male appren-
tices earn around 20% and female apprentices around 30% of average earn-
ings for their respective sexes. 
Table 2. Income (1) of employed persons (2) by age and sex 1978 and 1982 
Income 
Average income in DM (3) 
Standard deviation in DM 
Coeff. of variation in % 
Average income in DM (3) 
Standard deviation in DM 
Coeff. of variation in % 
Apprentices 
male 
357 
220 
61,5 
473 
245 
51,7 
female 
350 
201 
57,3 
454 
208 
45,9 
Young employed persons (excluding 
apprentices) 
15-20 
male 
1978 
800 
379 
47,4 
1982 
962 
489 
50,8 
female 
738 
308 
41,7 
874 
360 
41,2 
20-25 
male 
1 164 
432 
37,2 
1 347 
560 
41,5 
female 
1 060 
297 
28,0 
1 229 
365 
29,7 
Total employed persons 
male 
1 777 
962 
54,1 
2 091 
1 067 
51,0 
female 
1 142 
591 
51,7 
1 376 
710 
51,6 
(1) Average net monthly income 
(2) Only persons in full-time employment 
(3) Arithmetic mean 
r\j 
ι 
Source : Micro-census 1978, 1982, Author's calculations. 
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Here we should add that, owing to uniform wage agreements, there are only 
minimal differences in earnings between male and female apprentices. It 
should also be noted that the 30% increase in earnings between 1978 and 
1982 for apprentices is greater than that of employed young persons (16%) 
and the employed workforce as a whole (21%). 
Relative differences in earnings are greater in the case of young men 
(including apprentices) than in the case of young women. Whilst the dif-
ference between young employed persons and apprentices decreased betw-
een 1978 and 1982, the differences within the young working population 
in fact increased. 
In summary we can say that apprentices earn considerably less than emp-
loyed young persons, and that in turn employed young persons earn consi 
derably less than the employed population as a whole. One exception are 
employed women in the 20-25 age bracket, whose earnings are only margin-
ally less than those of the female employed population a whole, which 
though, remain very low compared with those of the male employed popu-
lation. By the age of 20-25 most women have reached their earnings limit. 
The only way a woman can earn more is by additional characteristics 
such as professional qualifications. This will be demonstrated in the 
following section. 
3.2. Earnings of qualified young employed persons 
The earnings of young persons discussed in the previous section showed 
a relatively high overall dispersion, due, among other things, to dif-
fering levels of professional qualifications. If we go on to break down 
earnings data according to educational qualifications we arrive at some 
very interesting data (cf. Table 3). 
Table 3. Income (1) of employed persons (2) by age, education and sex 
(1982 in DM; 1978 = 100; Comparison with Standard Group (3) 
15 - 20 
Men 
20 - 25 25 - 30 
916 
123 45 
1 243 
116 62 
1 652 
119 82 
1 714 
120 85 
1 495 
107 74 
2 111 
I 19 105 
­
­ ­
1 456 
100 72 
2 281 
114 113 
3 600 
112 178 
15 - 70 
440 
132 22 
553 
116 27 
(853) 
(115) (42) 
473 
132 23 
2 699 
120 134 
_^_Age t 
Qualification 
~Γ 
^Apprentices^ 
15 - 20 
1 071 
120 53 
1 384 
116 69 
1 813 
117 90 
2 019 
120 100 
Æ Unqua l i f i e d ^ 
­
­ ­
1 559 
115 77 
2 358 
123 117 
3 252 
.115 161 
4 
4 
4 
Completed 
apprenti ce­
ship or voca 
tional training 
Techni cal 
College 
diploma 
Polytechnic 
degree 
► 
a-
nin 
► 
^University ^ 
^degree r 
Women 
20 - 25 
1 557 
124 77 
,i Average net monthly income 
2> Only persons in full-time employment 
Standard Group; male employed persons with completed apprenticeship or vocational training 
Boxes 1982 income inDM 
lhange I harmngs 
in earn-of stand 
ings197qard group 
1982-108) U$?8=1U(. 
25 - 30 
815 
123 40 
1 097 
115 54 
1 236 
118 61 
1 231 
121 61 
964 
117 48 
1 249 
116 62 
1 455 
117 72 
1 449 
120 72 
(997) 
- (19) 
1 394 
114 69 
1 655 
116 82 
1 749 
118 87 
1 808 
122 90 
Figures in brackets: of limited use because of restricted sample size 
Source : Micro.census 1978, 1982: Author's calculations 
15 - 70 
423 
130 21 
546 
108 27 
(754) 
- (37) 
454 
130 22 
1 962 
119 97 
-
- -
1 393 
114 69 
2 022 
111 100 
2 502 
115 124 
I Ul 
I 
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This table shows a clear and positive inter-relationship between earnings 
levels and qualifications of persons in employment (4). At the bottom 
of the scale we find unskilled workers and workers with completed appren-
tice ships or vocational training. Employed persons with a full education 
(polytechnic or university) obtain above-average incomes. Women's earn-
ings remain well below those of men at all levels of qualifications. 
Apprentices' allowances (primarily training allowances) amount to only 
28% (men) and 37% (women) of those of unskilled workers and 23% (men) 
and 31% (women) of those of workers who have completed their apprentice-
ships or vocational training. 
Increases in earnings between 1978 and 1982 were pretty similar for all 
sub-groups at between 15 and 20%. Above-average increases were recorded 
by apprentices (23% - men, 22% - women), and below-average increases 
by female university graduates (up to the age of 30). This means that, 
at least in the case of women, a university degree commands a relative-
ly low salary. This factor was not so marked in 1978. It can be assumed 
that this relatively low increase in starting salaries is due to the in-
creasing market supply of university graduates. However, this development 
is not limited to university graduates. Demographic developments and the 
expansion of education have led to a general tendency towards lower rel-
ative starting pay. 
Finally, we have included an earnings comparison, permitting the compa-
rison of earnings by different qualification levels as well as by age 
and sex. 
In this comparison the earnings of the different sub-groups are compared 
with those of the standard group, defined as "male employed persons 
with a completed apprenticeship or vocational training" (i.e. basically 
"skilled blue collar workers" and "skilled white collar workers"). 
The average earnings of this group amounted in 1982 to 2,019 DM. This 
(4) Cf. on this problem M. Tessaring : Qualifikation und Einkommen. 
Materialien aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 7/1984. 
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particular group has been chosen because it is on the one hand the nume-
rically largest group on the labour market and also because of the large 
amount of time and space devoted to public debate on the "skilled worker 
problem". 
a) Men's earnings 
Members of this standard group reach the standard earnings level only later 
in life. Male skilled workers between 20 and 25 earn only 70% and workers 
in the 25-30 age group only 90% of these standard earnings. 
The earnings of unskilled young workers in all age groups is below that 
of the standard group. More highly qualified persons begin to earn more 
than standard income between the ages of 23 and 30. Apprentices up to the 
age of 25 only approx. 1/4 of standard earnings. 
The 1978 figures (not shown in the table) present a similar picture, 
though the earnings of persons starting work with higher educational 
qualifications were considerably higher compared with the standard group 
than in 1982. This again demonstrates, as mentioned earlier, that the 
levelling of earnings is taking place primarily at the level of job start 
level but that (so far) this has had little effect on earnings differ-
entials of older employed persons. 
b) Women's earnings 
The earnings of women at all stages in their careers are considerably 
lower than those of the male standard group and the relation of these 
earnings to those of the male group hardly changes. Skilled female workers 
earn only approx. 70% of the earnings of the equally qualified male 
standard group. Only women with a polytechnic or university degree reach 
or exceed the income of the standard group, and then only later in life. 
In other words there is clear proof that women, depending on age group, 
need to be two to three steps higher up the qualification ladder than 
men in order to attain the same level of earnings. 
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Only in the case of apprentices, where earnings are governed by industrial 
agreements on training allowances, is there widespread earnings parity 
between men and women. 
In the public services the rule of equal pay for equal qualifications 
generally applies. This means that the inequalities of earnings would 
appear even greater if the public services were excluded from the present 
review. 
4. Summary 
Youth unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is currently at 
above-average levels, as in most European countries, and is likely to 
increase in coming years unless massive employment policy measures are 
taken. The expressions "youth" and "young persons" have been used here 
for persons up to the age of 25. This is because the number of young 
employed persons under the age of 20 is going down due to various train-
ing and qualification schemes (withdrawal and demographic effects). 
An analysis of earnings by age and qualifications confirms the hypothesis 
that neither training allowances nor the earnings of young employed 
persons are unduly high compared with those of adultes. This means that 
employment costs alone can hardly be the decisive factor for companies 
in deciding whether or not to provide training and work openings. Train-
ing allowances are often higher in some branches of activity than others 
for completely different reasons (e.g. investing in good staff for coming 
years, enphasis on specific skills) (5). 
Whilst in isolated cases the earnings levels of young people may appear 
relatively high, this occurs in areas with low overall earnings levels 
and in which income harldy grows with age (e.g. unskilled workers, 
labourers and in particular women). 
(5) Cf. U. Beicht, S. Wiederhold-Fritz: Tarifverträgliche Ausbildungs-
vergütungen im Jahre 1982, in BWP 1/1983, pp. 11. 
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A common pattern in all the data evaluated is the discrimination against 
women with respect to earnings. This discrimination is relatively low 
in the case of apprentices and younger employed persons, but increases 
with age. Women need to be two or three steps higher up the qualifica-
tions ladder in order to attain the same level of earnings as men. 
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"IS THERE A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COST OF IN-COMPANY 
VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND OFFER OF TRAINING PLACES 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY?" 
Suzanne Wiederhold-Fritz 
Bundersinstitut fur Berufsforschung 
Bonn 
The main issue to be discussed in this conference is whether there is a 
connection between payment for young people and their job opportunities. 
Referring to the situation in West Germany the following two levels have 
to be distinguished : 
- first : the young people wanting to start vocational training in the 
Dual System before entering the labour market; this level is 
called "market of training places" 
- second: those having accomplished vocational training or those without 
formal qualification who are looking for their first employment; 
this level is the labour market in its true sense. 
I have been asked to give you some information about the main aspects 
of the market of training places - the first level as I told - especially 
some facts about the cost of in-company vocational training. 
To begin with, it is indispensable to go into some details of our voca-
tional education and training system, the so called Dual System. 
1. Particulars about the Dual System 
The distinction between the market of training places on the one hand and 
the labour market on the other hand is due to the «/ocational training 
system in Germany. In most of the other western countries young people 
normally obtain an initial occupational qualification at school or in 
college and then pass over to the labour market immediately. 
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In Germany, however, the Dual System is the link between school and labour 
market. "Dual System" means the combination of vocational education and 
training in companies and vocational part-time schools. Apart from ter-
tiary education it represents the traditional approach to a first occu-
pational qualification. In 1984 about 706 000 young people started in-
company vocational training. That is approximately 70% of one years' 
school leavers. Vocational training at full-time vocational schools play 
an insignificant role only. 
Young persons can undergo in-company training in one of the 430 government-
recognized occupations throughout the economy, e.g.: in traditional crafts, 
industry, trade, administration, public services, health system and so on. 
46% of the apprentices are trained in the industry and commerce sector, 
another 395 undergo training in forms belonging to the craft sector. 
The trainee concludes a private contract with the company. The duration 
of training varies from two years to three and a half years according to 
the occupation he or she has chosen. The main part of the training takes 
place in the company under legal regulations set up by the government. 
Generally once a week the trainee has to attend the public part-time school 
After passing the final examination the young persons are qualified for an 
employment as skilled workers. 
In opposition to the pupils attending full-time vocational schools the 
trainees have the status of an employee during the training period. 
In accordance with the chosen occupation and the training year they re-
ceive remunerations which, in most cases, are negotiated by trade unions 
and employers by collective bargaining. It can be said that remunerations 
are seen as payment for the productive work done by trainees. The remun-
eration is about 20 to 40% of initial wages as a skilled worker. In 
addition the trainees are integrated in the social security system, e.g.: 
unemployment insurance, health insurance. 
The cost of in-company training is - as a rule - financed by the training 
company itself whereas the vocational schools are financed by the federal 
States (Länder). 
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2. Survey of the cost of in-company vocational training 
Which cost is incurred by training companies? 
In order to answer this question the Federal Institute for Vocational 
Training carried out a representative survey of more than 2 000 com-
panies involved in training. By means of a detailed questionnaire data 
were collected about the cost of in-company training in 45 heavily-
frequented training occupations. The cost data colelcted relates to 1980. 
About 75% of all trainees are undergoing vocational training in the 
occupations covered by the survey. It is true to say that the whole 
range of jobs requiring training - with both high and low training costs 
- is represented in the survey. 
The summary of our report was handed over to you. Therefore I shall 
mention the most important data only. 
A firm involved in vocational training in one of the 45 occupations inves-
tigated incurred total costs of approximately 17 000 DM (4 250 £) per 
trainee in 1980. The net cost per trainee is markedly affected by the 
amount of "apprentice created value". This value is called "revenue", 
it amounted to more than 6 700 DM (1 675 £). Thus, the average net costs 
per trainee were about 10 300 DM (2 575 £). These average data vary from 
occupation to occupation, from branch to branch and depend on the size of 
the company. 
Several examples will illustrate this : the training occupation incurring 
the highest gross costs, namely 30 700 DM (7 675 £), is the industrial 
occupation of a turner. The lowest gross costs concern an occupation in 
the craft sector, namely the hairdresser with 11 400 DM (2 850 £). 
In the case of net costs the telecommunications technician, trained in 
the sector of public services, tops the list with 25 200 DM (6 300 £). 
The lowest net costs of 2 400 DM (600 £) fall to the agricultural 
training occupation of a gardener. 
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If we take a look at the distribution of the training companies to net 
costs intervals you see that in the case of 6.5% of the companies only 
the apprentice created value (revenue) exceeds the training costs. In 
more than 50% of the companies the net costs vary between 1 DM and 
10 000 DM (2 500 £). With another 30% of the firms the net costs are in 
the 10 000 to 20 000 DM (2 500 to 5 000 £) range. Net costs exceeding 
20 000 DM (5 000 £) are found in the case of 8% of the companies only. 
There are considerable differences between the two most important training 
sectors: industry and commerce which comprise among others the large 
companies on the one hand, and the craft sector with its small and medium-
sized firms on the other hand. In industry and commerce the average net 
costs amount to 12 500 DM (3 125 £). They are by more than 50% higher 
than in the craft sector where the net costs come to 8 000 DM (2 000 £). 
If we take an overall look at the structure of the training costs, we 
come to the following findings : 
- the biggest cost element with 48% of the total training costs (8 200 DM/ 
2 050 £) are the personnel costs for the trainees. They comprise the 
trainees' remuneration with a share of 35% and the employers' social 
security contributions with a share of 13% of the total costs. 
- the cost of the training staff (6 900 DM/1 725 £) has a share of 41%. 
- materials and facilities (1 100 DM/275 £) amount to 6% only. 
- other costs, e.g. teacing aids, vocational clothing (800 DM/200 £), 
have a share of 5%. 
According to the training occupation the structure of the total costs 
varies considerably. 
The share of the personnel costs of the trainee ranges from 70% in the 
case of the retailer to 32% in that of the dental technician. 
As for the cost of thr training staff the shares vary from 57% in the 
industrial training occupation of the turner to 21% in the case of the 
retai 1er. 
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Extrapolating the net costs to all the training companies in Germany you 
come to a figure of about 18 billion DM (4.5 billion £) in 1980. In that 
year the number of apprentices amounted to 1.7 millions. If you sum up 
the average net costs per trainee in 1980 to a 3 years' apprenticeship, 
a company will have to afford 31 000 DM (7 750 £) for training one young 
person. 
Both figures do not include the expenditure on vocational schools financed 
by the federal states (Länder) which amounted to 6.4 billion DM (1.6 bil-
lion £) in 1980. 
In addition, the federal government and the federal states provide grants 
for group training centres outside companies, where trainees mainly from 
small and medium-sized firms can obtain practical tuition off-the-job. 
Moreover, there are schemes financed by public authorities for the pro-
motion of training places for disadvantaged young people. These expenses 
came up to 558 million DM (139 million £) in 1980. But in the main the 
training companies have to defray the costs of apprentice training by 
themselves. 
Considering the large amount of training costs it may be surprising that 
companies in Germany are so much engaged in training young people. Es-
pecially if you take into account that companies are free to train or not 
to train. But corresponding to the growing number of young people asking 
for training places the total number of new training contracts has risen 
by more than 40% since 1976. 
Why do German companies train after all? 
3. The influence of the training costs on the attitudes of companies 
towards vocational training 
3.1. Assessment of the findings of the survey 
I would like to point out that the survey of the Federal Institute did not 
aim at finding out in which way the training costs determine the companies' 
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training attitudes. The main issue was to find out which input factors, 
such as training staff, equipment and so on, are involved in training 
and to determine the value of these input factors. The values of the input 
factors have been summed up for each firm investigated by the same prin-
ciples. 
Training costs defined this way can in many cases not be equated with 
additional costs incurred by a company. A decisive factor for additional 
costs incurred by training is the organisation of training. In this 
respect you can principally distinguish between small to medium-sized 
firms and large companies. 
In the case of small and medium-sized firms the trainees are instructed 
on-the-job. Actually neither extra staff nor extra equipment are required. 
There is no or only a neglectable decline in the productivity of the staff 
and productive means. Moreover, the trainees can be incorporated at an 
early stage into the production process. Thus the additional cost incurred 
by training mainly consist of trainees' remuneration and social security 
contributions payed by the employers. 
In large companies, however, instruction often can not take place on-the-
job. In that cases companies install special workshops for their trainees. 
The first and second training year and quite frequently also the third 
are run here. In addition, full-time training-staff is required. Conse-
quently considerable additional costs are incurred by training. Apart from 
higher costs it can be said that training in special workshops prevents 
the youngsters from working productively. 
Moreover, in order to analyse the findings of the survey the following 
methodical aspects are important: 
- The results partly reply on the interviewees' estimations. They tend to 
see the costs of the training-staff higher than they actually are and 
vice versa to underestimate the trainees' productive work. 
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- The determination of the trainees' productive contributions (revenue) 
is based on a concept of alternative costs. This involves working out 
which percentage of the output of a skilled worker is equivalent to 
the productive work done by a trainee measured by the payroll costs of 
a skilled worker. The business profits as a result of the goods and 
services produced by trainees remain out of consideration. Consequently 
there is a tendency of underestimating the firms' revenue from trainees' 
work and of overestimating the net costs. 
- You have to take into account that training costs as well as firm 
expenditures are deducted from the business profit and reduce income 
taxes. 
3.2. Aspects of the companies attitudes towards training 
In addition to what I already said, you will see that German companies 
involved in training do not act contrary to reasonable business principles 
since they take into account cost-benefit-considerations. 
Additional costs incurred by training are at any rate the trainees' remun-
erations and the firms' expenditure for the trainees' social insurances. 
Especially in the Last two or three years the employers required a freeze 
of trainees' remuneration emphasizing that in this case the number of 
training places could be increased. Since 1976 the average trainee 
remuneration actually has risen from 390 DM (97.5 £) per trainee and month 
to 602 DM (150.5 £) in 1984. Thus their percentage increase is higher 
than that of the wage scale. The percentage increase of the average trainee 
remuneration is 52% and that of the wage scale 46.7%. But you have to 
take into account the relatively low level of the trainees' remunerations. 
As a result of this claim the remunerations - on an average - rose by 
3% in 1983 and by 2.6% in 1984 only, whereas from 1976 to 1982 their 
increase varied from 5% to 7%. And in fact in some parts of the economy 
an increase of training places above average is being observed. 
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The benefit of apprentice training is at any rate a high quality labour 
force. But there is no doubt that a cost-benefit-analysis reveals funda-
mental differences of training attitudes between large companies on one 
hand and small to medium-sized firms on the other hand. 
- It is in the larger companies where the training of skilled workers to 
their own needs is of major importance. Approximately 15% of the total 
number of apprentices are trained in companies employing more than 500 
persons. 
Among the trainees the company can select the best because having 
passed the final examination apprenticeship and employment terminate. 
The corresponding independence from the labour market promises the 
saving of recruitment costs and costs of vocational adjustment of 
employees coming from outside the company. The long-range-pay-off is 
why the larger companies put up with the relatively high costs of 
apprentice training. 
- As far as small and medium-sized firms are concerned - which after all 
train about two-thirds of the youngsters - there is of course also a 
demand for qualified employees. Due to the increasing mechanisation 
and specialisation a growing number of smaller firms can no longer 
provide the whole range of occupational qualifications required by 
the particular training regulations. Especially in the draft sector this 
has led to an expansion of group training centres mainly run by the 
local chambers. Similar to the workshops of large companies in various 
occupations specific courses supplementary to the firms'on-the-job 
training are offered here. The firms are - as a rule - obliged to send 
their trainees to the centres and to pay their fees. 
Since the high investment and running costs can not be defrayed by the 
firms and chambers alone considerable subsidies from public funds are 
provided. In a few branches especially in the construction trades there 
is a levy-grant-system. The money raised by the funds helps the train-
ing firms to meet the relatively high costs of having their apprentices 
trained in the group centres. 
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On the other hand you have to take into account that quite a part of the 
small and medium-sized firms have always given training above their needs. 
In these cases the main enphasis is not a selection of personnel. It is 
understood that training investments in skilled workers would be econ-
omically unreasonable when the trainees leave the firms after having 
passed the final examination. Consequently you can assume that apprentice 
training itself pays off : the productive work done by the trainees 
exceeds even the trainees' payroll costs. This is the so called short-
range-pay-off. In this respect I would like to hint at the following 
development in the craft sector where nearly 50% of all firms are train-
ing : a high increase in the number of apprentices corresponding with 
a stagnation respectively a decrease of the total number of employees can 
be observed. 
In addition to the above-mentioned cost-benefit-considerations aspects of 
market, branch and region play a role. 
Let me just briefly summarize additional factors which influence the 
companies' training attitudes : 
- tradition 
- demand for training places (number of young people having to be supplied 
with training places) 
- social obligation on the one hand and social pressure on the other hand 
- possibility of a future lack of skilled workers 
- framework of regulations concerning in-company training together with the 
possibility of governmental interventions in the existing Dual System 
(more public control, increasing influence of the trade unions, levy-
grant-system) . 
4. Conclusion 
The well functioning German Dual System is the reason why youth unemploy-
ment has remained low by European standards. Today, however, the situation 
of the youth who have finished their training programme becomes more and 
more difficult. At that stage the labour market in its true sense is 
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concerned. The percentage of skilled young people without jobs has been 
considerably increasing in the recent years. In 1984 the total number of 
young people having passed their final examination came up to 560 000. 
Nearly 10% (55 000) were unemployed immediately afterwards. 
It is true that the unemployment rate of youngsters under the age of 20 
amounts to 8.3% only but as far as the youth at the age between 20 and 
25 is concerned it increases to 18.9%. 
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Supply of training places and forms of employment for unemployed 
young people in the Federal Republic of Germany 
Reinhard Zedier, Μ.Α. 
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Cologne 
Present situation 
Youth unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany is considered to 
be a particular problem for training and social policy. Youth unemploy­
ment is generally taken to mean difficulties in the training or employment 
of young people. Unemployment can occur at various stages in the work 
history of young people: 
­ in the period of transition from general education to vocational 
training; 
­ in the period of transition from vocational training to the first job; 
­ during the training and employment phase. 
Young people may be at risk of unemployment relatively early in their 
work history or much later, up to the age of 20, depending on the type 
of training chosen. 
In April 1985, there were 139,596 unemployed people under the age of 20 
in the Federal Republic of Germany; this represented 6.7% of the total 
number of 2,034,638 unemployed. At the end of September 1984, there were 
176,844 unemployed people under the age of 20. 116,700, or 66%, of these 
unemployed young people had not completed a course of vocational 
training (1). If the unemployment figures are broken down by age group, 
the highest proportion of unemployed people, 12.9%, is found in the 20 
to 25 age group. One of the fundamental reasons for the relatively high 
levels of unemployment among this age group is the difficulty that 
(1) Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, vol. 33, 1985, 
no. 3, p. 176. 
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young people find in getting their first job. In September 1984, there 
were 83,500 young qualified workers without a job. Moreover, young 
workers are more likely to lose their jobs for a wide variety of reasons, 
On the one hand, young workers have a greater tendency to give up their 
jobs, while on the other, young people are more likely to be dismissed 
than older workers. 
The questions to be asked 
New approaches are being discussed in the Federal Republic for solving 
the problem of youth employment. The relationships between the costs of 
training and employing young people and the number of training 
opportunities and jobs available figure prominently in these discussions. 
Two particular questions arise in connection with this general theme: 
1. What is the relationship between the cost of vocational training and 
the number of training places available? 
2. What is the relationship between wages and the employment and 
promotion prospects of young workers? 
Regardless of these specific questions, measures are certainly needed 
to promote the training and employment of young people. 
Training costs and training opportunities 
The position in the market for training places in the Federal Republic 
is still very tight. It is true that a record number of places were made 
available last year; for the first time, more than 600,000 trainee 
contracts were concluded. Yet it is expected that the demand for places 
will be even higher this year. The Federal government estimates that 
between 745,000 and 765,000 places will be required to meet this 
increased demand. Thus firms, and other training institutions, will once 
again have to increase the number of training places they make 
available, if all applicants are to be given a training opportunity. 
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As a consequence, firms will have to take on more trainees than their 
own manpower requirements would suggest is appropiate. There are many 
factors that determine the number of training places available within a 
firm: legal stipulations, the demand for qualified workers, training 
costs, the training capacity available and the length of the training 
period. If the firm has to take on more trainees than it is likely to 
need, cost becomes one of the most important factors. 
The gross cost of training a young person is made up of various types 
of cost: the employment costs of the trainees, the costs of plant and 
materials and the employment costs of the trainers. According to 
estimates by the Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, the employment costs 
of trainees account for the highest proportion (44%) of the total 
training cost. Next come the employment costs of the trainers (43.4%), 
and finally the cost of plant and materials (11.8%) (1). 
Trainees' wages are the largest single item in total training costs. As 
an investigation by the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung has shown, 
trainees' wage costs account for 35% of total training costs (2). 
According to the rates laid down by the Federal Ministry of Labour, the 
average monthly payments to trainees are currently: 
- 566 DM in the first year of training, 
- 650 DM in the second year of training, 
- 745 DM in the third year of training and 
- 789 DM in the fourth year of training. 
Current wage levels for trainees are thus much higher than in 1976 
(see table 1). 
(1) Rüdiger Falk, Reinhold Weiß: Streitsache: Ausbildungsplätze, 
Cologne 1984, pp. 47 et seq. 
(2) I. Noli et al: Nettokosten der betrieblichen Berufsausbildung, 
Berlin and Bonn 1983, p. 43. 
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The significance of wage levels for the supply of training places is 
made particularly clear in the following example. In 1983, the trade 
union representing workers in the chemical, paper and ceramics industries 
and the Federation of Chemical Industries Employers agreed not to 
increase the wages of trainees. After this agreement, training places in 
this sector increased by 16.3%. This was far in excess of the average 
increase of 7.3% in the number of training places in the economy as a 
whole (1). This is a classic example of the fact that a reduction in 
training costs can lead to an increase in the number of training places. 
Table 1 
Changes in trainees' wages between 1976 and 1984 
Year of Average monthly wages Percentage 
training for trainees in 1984 change compared 
in DM with 
1983 1976 
1st year 566 
2nd year 650 
3rd year 745 
4th year 789 
+2.0 
+1.6 
+ 1.8 
+1.8 
+49.7 
+48.0 
+47.0 
+44.8 
Note: Wages for the fourth year of training are not included in 
all wage agreements. 
Source: Federal Ministry of Labour. 
In view of the increasing demand from young people for training places, 
it is necessary to improve the conditions under which firms conduct 
vocational training. Both sides of industry have a particular 
responsibility not to allow the wages paid to trainees to rise 
unnecessarily. 
(1) Rüdiger Falk et al: Ausbildungsplätze, Strategien und Maßnahmen, 
Cologne 1984, p. 20. 
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Employment costs and employment levels 
Three developments characterise the labour market in the Federal 
Republic of Germany: 
- Employment has continuously declined in recent years. Since 1983, the 
number of employees has declined from around 23 million to about 
22 mi Ilion. 
- Despite continued growth, the labour market has hardly reacted, as 
unemployment figures of over 2 million show. 
- The number of those seeking work is continuing to increase; it is 
estimated that there will be an increase of between 200,000 and 
300,000 people seeking work by 1988. 
In view of these developments, it is often asked how employment opportun-
ities, especially for young people, can be increased. Many proposals have 
been put forward in the intensive debate on how to combat unemployment. 
Thus Professor Hans Karl Schneider, chairman of the expert committee 
for the assessment of economic development, has referred to the upturn 
in the economy, which should alleviate the problem of unemployment to a 
certain extent. In addition, Schneider has urged firms to increase 
investment and thus create new jobs. He has also urged the Federal 
government to reduce additional employment costs and to take measures 
to increase flexibility in the labour market (1). 
Labour costs have long figured prominently in the debate on labour 
market policy. Ralf Dahrendorf said some time ago that the industrial 
society was running out of work. In contrast, many people today believe 
that there is no lack of work, but that it cannot be paid for because 
wage and additional employment costs are too high. 'It is not the case -
as Dahrendorf said - that we are running out of work. There is enough 
work. But labour is too expensive' (2). How high are present labour costs 
in the Federal Republic? 
(1) Schmerzhafte Argumente, in Wirtschaftswoche 1985, no. 18, p. 32. 
(2) Martin Posth, Erich Staudt, Ernst Zander: Personalwirtschaft in 
Zeiten des Umbruchs, Cologne 1983, p. 57. 
-54-
Labour costs are the expenditure incurred by firms in paying wages and 
salaries, social security contributions, holiday pay, special payments 
and so on. They increase regularly each year in the Federal Republic (1). 
In 1984 they reached a new record level of 53,700 DM per employee, which 
represented an increase of 1,600 DM over 1983. The increase in 
additional employment costs are an important factor in the rise of total 
labour costs. Additional employment costs include all expenditure not 
connected with actual work. A distinction should be made between 
expenditure that is legally required, expenditure arising out of 
collective agreements and voluntary payments made by the firm. Examples 
of the first category are employers' social security contributions, paid 
holidays and sick pay. The expenditure arising out of collective agree-
ments is different in each sector. The most common items are extra paid 
holidays, special payments and contributions to employees' savings plan. 
The third category includes, among other things, company pension schemes. 
A long-term survey for the period between 1966 and 1984 shows how much 
additional employment costs have increased labour costs as a whole 
(cf. table 2). 
- Employment costs in this period rose by 30.5% from 13,232 DM to 
53,700 DM. 
- Wage costs tripled during the same period from 9,230 DM to 29,900 DM. 
- Additional employment costs per employee rose by almost 600% from 
4,002 DM to 23,800 DM. 
Thus as labour costs have risen over the past 18 years, there have been 
particularly sharp increases in the costs to employers arising out of 
legal requirements and collective agreements. However, it is difficult 
to restrict the inexorable rise in employment costs. Since about 45% of 
all additional employment costs are legal requirements (mainly social 
security contributions), any action in this area must be taken by 
government. The highest proportion of the remaining additional employment 
(1) Edmund Hemmer: Personalzusatzkosten im Produzierenden Gewerbe, 
in: iw-trends 1/1985, Cologne 1985. 
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costs is accounted for by collective agreements. Thus this is a matter 
for both sides of industry. A quick solution to the problem cannot thus 
be envisaged. Already, however, a loosening of the legislation governing 
employment and entitlement to social security benefits is helping to 
improve the employment position for young adults. 
Table 2 
Development of employment costs 
Year 
1966 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1984/ 
1966 
Total employment 
costs 
DM 
13,232 
48,355 
50,300 
52,100 
53,700 
+ 305% 
Wage 
I DM 
9,230 
27,236 
28,300 
29,200 
29,900 
+ 224% 
costs 
% of total 
costs 
69.8 
56.4 
56.2 
56.1 
55.7 
Additional 
employment costs 
DM % of total 
costs 
4,002 I 30.2 
21,119 43.6 
22,000 
22,900 
23,800 
+ 494% 
43.8 
43.9 
44.3 
Source: Federal Statistical Office; from 1982 onwards 
IW-Berechnungen. 
Types of employment for trained, unemployed young people and young adults 
In the past two years, firms in the motor, electrical, chemical, 
mechanical engineering and insurance sectors have developed a series 
of measures aimed at keeping all trained employees in some form of 
employment within the firm. Three basic forms of employment have emerged 
from this: 
- Permanent jobs: young skilled workers are taken on in a job area 
related to their training (as at Hoechst AG and Siemens AG). In many 
firms, the offer of a job is linked to a specific qualification. 
- Temporary jobs: in this form of employment, young qualified workers 
are taken on for a specified period either in one job or in a variety 
of jobs in the production process. Thus AEG-Telefunken takes on trained 
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workers for a minimum of 6 months and a maximum period of 12 months 
in a job in an area comparable or similar to that in which training 
has been received. 
- Part-time jobs: many firms, such as Siemens AG, Hoechst AG, Merck and 
BASF AG, have had good experiences with flexible employment forms, 
mostly part-time jobs for 20 or 32 hours per week. 
The introduction of an earlier retirement age also creates more jobs for 
young people. As a result of the so-called 59 or 58 ruling of 1983, 
Bayer AG were able to offer a permanent job to all trainees who wished 
to remain with the firm after successful completion of their training (1). 
The various measures taken by firms have been supported by legislation 
enacted by the Federal government. Thus the Early Retirement Law of May 
1984 should make it easier for older workers to take early retirement, 
and at the same time help the young unemployed find their first job. 
Under the Employment Support Act, employment contracts can, since 1 May 
1985, be limited to 18 months. In addition, part-time and contract work 
will be made easier. When a new employee is taken on, or an apprentice 
employed after the termination of his initial contract, it will be 
possible to limit the employment contract to 18 months. The question still 
remains as to how the Employment Support Act will work in practice and 
what effect it will have on the employment of young people. Herr Blüm, 
the Federal Minister of Labour, maintains that it is better to have even 
temporary work than to be permanently unemployed. 
(1) Hans-Jürgen Podzun, Reinhard Zedier: Nach der Lehre, Cologne 1985. 
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Summary 
1. There is no quick solution to the problem of youth unemployment, nor 
indeed to the general problem of unemployment. Nor is there any deus 
ex machina or miraculous innovation that, over and above the strategies 
mentioned above, can offer a simple remedy for youth unemployment. 
2. Yet 'young people must be integrated into the world of work if we are 
to avoid the double threat of a lack of skilled labour in the 1990s 
and an unacceptable burden on the social fabric as a result of the 
disintegration of the present pool of skilled labour' (1). 
3. There is one fundamental insight that must underlie any attempt to 
reduce unemployment through labour market policy. This is that the 
demand for labour is dependent on the cost of labour. This relation­
ship cannot seriously be doubted. There is a lot of empirical evidence 
to confirm the link between an excessively high real wage level 
relative to productivity and a negative employment effect. 
4. It would be possible to achieve the aim of making it cheaper for 
firms to employ people currently without a job if the problem of 
additional employment costs were tackled (2). Additional employment 
costs have now become the major factor in the rise in total labour 
costs: for every DM paid in wages, approximately 80 pfennigs are paid 
in additional employment costs. 
5. This is an area in which the state could act to alleviate the burden 
of those costs arising out of legal requirements, for example 
employers' social security contributions and sick pay. 
(1) Dieter Mertens: Gegen das Krebsübel Arbeitslosigkeit hilft nur 
eine konzertierte Beschäftigungsstrategie, in: Handelsblatt 
2Ó./27.4.1985, p. Β 8. 
(2) Rolf Kroker: Richtige Diagnose, in: Informationsdienst des 
Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft, vol. 11, 1985, p. 2. 
-58-
NEW FORMS OF STATE INTERVENTION IN THE CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT 
FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IN FRANCE 
J.M. BARBIER 
Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers - Paris 
Getting a first job for young people, making the transition from the 
school situation, where the individual is taken care of and devotes most 
of his activities to developing his own abilities, to a work situation, 
where on the contrary the individual is responsible for producing his 
means of existence and devotes most of his activities to this, is 
certainly not a new problem in French society. It can even be considered 
as a correlation of the extension of paid work and the accompanying 
development of the large modern educational systems. 
With the first great employment crisis of the 30s, the problem took a 
particularly sharp turn since significantly this is when a State educa-
tional and vocational guidance system started to be set up, (specialised 
committees, guidance cycles, school psychologists). This is one of the 
first forms of State intervention designed to manage the linking of the 
training and work processes for young people. 
Until the start of the 70s, however, management of the transition between 
the school and work was predominantly a private matter, undertaken by the 
individuals themselves and especially by their families, and which more-
over varied according to the social groups. 
Since 1973-1974, we seem to have entered a qualitatively different stage : 
- unemployment among young people leaving the education system has reached 
levels which have never been witnessed before and is having dramatic 
social consequences ; based on figures from the French National Employ-
ment Agency, it is currently estimated that one young school-leaver out 
of two has no job to go to, whereas in 1974 the figure was only one in 
five ; in figures between 1974 and 1983 the number of unemployed under 
25 quadrupled to 800,000 , out of an overall figure of 2 million jobless 
(in other words 40%); most of these unemployed have no work experience. 
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- the various French governments, both before and after the 1981 Presiden-
tial elections, have taken an equally large number of measures to combat 
this situation. 
Financial resources : "Social and professional integration" of young people 
has easily received the largest share of government money spent on contin-
ued vocational training (which represents about 1% of the State budget). 
Since 1976, the State has even forced companies to devote part of the 
statutory contribution for staff training towards financing this activity, 
which is presented as being of national importance (in other words 0.2% of 
a minimum contribution of 1.1% of aggregate remuneration). 
Moreover, overall this affects several hundred thousands of young people 
since the government's aim is that "every young person under the age of 
26 should bave a job, a training or an activity by the end of 1985" 
(statement from the Ministry of Work to the press on 12 December 1984). 
Institutional means : Since 1974 the government has been continuously 
developing new ways and acquiring new tools able to affect the various 
stages of the process involved (formation, recruitment and employment 
of the youth work-force). There are currently no less than 17 measures 
directed at the different parts of this process and which vary according 
to the legal status of their target-group (employee, under a special 
work contract, trainee on an educational or vocational training scheme). 
Although they were initially presented as totally temporary measures 
drawn up in response to the prevailing economic climate, today they 
have all the features of lasting measures. 
Considered as being heterogenous, today they have all the characteristics 
of coherent, homogenous measures. 
It is as if, with massive State intervention, what J. ROSE (1) calls a 
phase of "professional transition" has arisen within French society which 
exists independently of anything else and of which the duration has got 
(1) "Enquête d'emploi" - Paris : Eds Economica, 1984 - several references 
will be made to this work in this article. 
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progressively longer. This expression, which will be subject to specific 
social recognition, will come to mean a complex confusion of training, 
work and unemployment periods, and the State and the Regions will play a 
dominant role in the organization of it. 
Based on the most recent work carried out in France on this question, in 
particular the important synthesis (1) made by the economist and sociolo-
gist J. ROSE of the Research Group into Education and Employment from 
Nancy, our hypothesis is that these different forms of State intervention 
in the conditions of access to employment for young people correspond 
in fact to the appearance of a new programme, which could be called a 
programme of socialized management of the professional transition. 
Two aspects of this will be discussed in this article : 
- its principal forms 
- the general issues et raises. 
I. PRINCIPAL CURRENT FORMS OF STATE INTERVENTION 
If we put the various State programmes in order according to the exact 
stage of the transition process between the education situation and the 
work situation that they principally affect, starting by the measures 
at the top of the process, it is possible to distinguish six types of 
measures : 
A. First of all the measures aimed at maintaining the supply of jobs, if 
not increasing it. 
These measures are not the most specific of the various schemes since 
they do not only concern first-time job-seekers, but they are implemented 
by the State with the specific aim of checking the fall in the number of 
jobs available to young people. 
(1) Cf. note above and recommended bibliography in conclusion. 
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They can be divided into two categories : 
- measures of economic policy in the strict sense of the word, directly 
oriented towards the creation and development of productive activities 
liable to create jobs. This is particularly true in the case of the 
various aids for setting up businesses and the various economic develop-
ment aids : general aid and aid for the agricultural and craft industry 
sectors, regional development, conversion poles etc ... This is also 
the case with tax relief. These measures entail great State expenditure, 
but it is difficult to analyse them as a result of the absence of cen-
tralised data. 
- the measures affecting just the level of the labour market and designed 
to reduce the pressure of labour demand by organizing early exists 
from the labour market, by slowing down entries into the market and 
maintaining insecure jobs. 
Among these measures is the recent system of solidarity contracts, whereby 
the community defrays the cost of early retirement for employed persons. 
However, this system effectively only has the same aim as the life severance 
allowance for agricultural workers. 
This is also the case with the measures to encourage the immigrant workers 
to return home or partial unemployment benefit (temporary jobs) which is a 
considerable outlay for the State. 
B. Measures aimed directly at reducing the cost of recruiting the youth 
work force 
In this case the measures more specifically affect those first-time 
job-seekers. They can be regarded as State responsibility for defraying 
part of the costs entailed by the hire of a young person "in normal 
conditions" and are designed to encourage employers and potential employers 
to recruit workers, especially young people. These measures are above all 
used by small companies. 
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The measures mainly involve temporary exemption from social security contri-
butions for those hiring young people or apprentices. In 1980 these exemp-
tions cost the State around FF 1.3 billion. The measures also include, 
more generally, various bonuses to promote job creation and the hire of 
first-time employees. 
C. Measures based on the creation of temporary jobs 
These measures are today developing in a very special way. They consist 
of creating opportunities for young people to engage in activities produc-
ing real goods and services although they do not have the status of employ-
ed persons. 
These situations have three main features : 
- the periods of employment are very short, generally three months 
extendible to four months, 
- there is no real work contract between the organizing body and the young 
people, who remain State trainees, 
- no wages are paid but there is a relatively low State allowance. 
A monitoring system may be set up by the local bodies responsible for 
employment. 
This type of measure is presented as giving young people access to a first 
work experience that may eventually lead to a real job. However, in 
France some people have a certain number of reservations about them since 
they look upon them as measures which in the long-term might make the 
youth work force an insecure, unskilled and mobile work force which costs 
little to employ. 
Included in these measures are : 
- the Community Interest Works (Travaux d'Utilité Collective), set up at 
the end of 1984. The activities carried out under this scheme are 
theoretically of public interest and they meet social needs which could 
not otherwise have been fulfilled. The payment made is roughly equal 
to a third of the French legal minimum wage. 
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- the Initiation Courses to Working Life also set up recently (in 1984) 
which, on the other hand, take place within a company. They are designed 
to give the trainee an introduction to work within a company and initiate 
him in one or two work activities. They last from three to six months, 
and entail 25 hours' presence per month in a monitoring body (collective 
guidance sessions, personalised aid), the state is responsible for most 
of the payment (from 500 F to 1600 F), with the company making an addition-
al contribution that varies from 17 to 27% of the minimum wage. 
- the voluntary courses for young people, a scheme which has been in opera-
tion a little longer than the Community Interest Works (1982) but like 
the latter involve community interest work which is paid at half the 
minimum wage. 
It should be pointed out that these various measures follow on from two 
similar experiences carried out between 1975 and 1980 : the temporary 
creation of community interest jobs, and the temporary access to public 
sector jobs in the form of three-monthly contracts which may be renewed 
three times. 
D. Measures based on the combination of a job under contract and a training 
activity 
The main feature of these measures is the contractual commitment between 
three types of partners (the employer, the interested party and the State) 
which must comprise two parts : a traditional work contract between the 
employer and the young person, and a contract between the employer and the 
State concerning the aims and means of the training process. 
These measures arouse the greatest interest from employers and the interes-
ted parties. Moreover, there were nearly 300,000 cases in 1984. 
- The first of these schemes was developed following the Second World War 
but between 1975 and 1985 there has been a revival in interest in them : 
it is the apprenticeship contract scheme. The apprenticeship contract 
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also implies a long training commitment (three years) that should lead 
to a specific qualification, namely the CAP (Certificat d'Aptitude 
Professionnelle), which is the first professional diploma in France. 
It is still important in certain sectors such as construction. There 
are currently 225 000 apprentices as opposed to 180 000 at the start 
of the 70s. 
- The second scheme was developed more recently, in 1977 : it concerns 
the job-training contracts which currently affect 30,000 young people. 
They are a little shorter in length and do not necessarily lead to a 
real qualification. This scheme is presently tending to be replaced by 
qualification contracts, introduced in 1984, which have the same aim 
except that financing of the training is different (the company itself 
pays for it out of the share it is obliged to contribute for youth 
activities) and greater emphasis is laid on the qualifications obtained 
from the training (a qualification that is recognized or in the process 
of being recognized in the form of a diploma, an equivalent qualifica-
tion, or a classification in the collective agreements). 
E. Measures aimed at setting up alternance courses between the education 
system proper and the employment sector 
These are the most spectacular measures of the scheme and have developed 
most quickly. They are essentially based on the notion of alternation, 
in other words the combination on a given training scheme of training 
in a company and in a training institute. This should as far as possible 
include a certain number of pedagogical guarantees. For example, monitor-
ing of the trainees in the company mainly through instructors, applica-
tion in the training centres of activities carried out in the companies, 
bilateral relations between the company and the training institution 
regarding the trainees' progress. These courses are available to all 
young people "that come out of the educational system with no qualifica-
tion" who have a specific status of "vocational training apprentice". 
They have basically led to two types of courses : 
- the courses of the National Pact for Employment before 1981 ; 
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- the alternance courses since 1981 (in particular courses for 16-18 yr 
olds) 
The implementation of these measures comprises three main phases : 
- a reception and guidance phase provided by new institutions : reception, 
information and guidance offices run by the local authorities, local 
missions under the Interministerial Mission for the Employment of Young 
People in Difficulty with individual monitoring, group guidance courses 
and information on existing courses or the design of new courses. This 
phase dates mainly from 1981. 
- A training phase proper with classes in a public or private centre. 
This phase naturally takes different forms depending on whether the 
priority is to provide a job or a qualification. Special efforts have 
been made in the direction of the latter since 1981. Worthy of mention 
in this area are the experiences carried out by the AFPA and the "youth 
and technology" network linked to the la Vi lette centre. 
- An obligatory period in a company. This phase currently involves a 
detailed description of activities including, in particular, the 
presence of an instructor among the company staff. 
F. Measures tending towards the transformation of the education system 
itself 
These measures are obviously only of minor relevance to us, although they 
are nonetheless very significant, as is, on a more general level, the 
tendency towards making the education system more vocational. 
Throughout the same period there have been a certain number of initiatives 
affecting the education system itself which have specifically tended to 
prepare integration into the working world. 
These mainly concern in-company courses, of six months duration, for 
pupils from technological schools, and 10-week educational courses for 
pupils from vocational secondary schools. These courses are subject 
to an agreement between the educational establishment and the company ; 
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the trainees keep their status as pupils and therefore receive no payment 
or allowance. 
For the last six months there have also been some attempts at linking 
educational establishments with companies. 
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE SCHEMES 
As a result of the recent implementation of many of the measures already 
mentioned, of the fact they have multiplied and have become superimposed, 
of the disparate nature of the information available, of the time necessary 
to calculate the effects or results of a particular training scheme, we 
are unable to make an exhaustive assessment (1) of the schemes in the light 
of their original aims. Based on the data available on how they are work-
ing, in the eyes of analysts and observers there are a certain number of 
problems that raise questions over how they really work, beyond the aims 
and resources used. 
A. The target groups of the schemes and how they are identified 
The general impression given is that the aims of the State and of the 
professional people involved in the schemes were structured around an 
overriding image of the target groups which is effectively a value judge-
ment and a negative one at that. This target group is generally described 
in terms of failure, difficulties, marginalisation, under-training. 
Whether it is a question of the young people themselves, their attitudes, 
their aspirations, their characteristics or of the educational system 
from which they have come, emphasis is always laid on their lack of 
suitability but no details are gone into. The name chosen by the mission 
set up by the government to put forward solutions in this area is signifi-
cant, since it is entitled the "mission for the integration of young people 
in difficulty ". 
(1) Certain partial assessments have been made concerning in particular 
the sandwich courses for the 16-18 yr olds by the Centre de Formation 
de Formateurs du Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers, ef 
"Observation et évaluation du dispositif de formation des jeunes de 
16 à 18 ans" - 02 CNA" 2 rue Conté - 75003 PARIS. 
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In addition to the fact that such a type of negative identification hardly 
favours the creation of a training project or a development project adapted 
to this target group's specific features, this identification is base on 
preconceived ideas which are often incorrect. Contrary to this image, 
however, the young people are currently coming out of the educational system 
with an increasingly higher level of training, their chances of being 
unemployed are therefore reduced with this level of training and moreover 
their level of employability is the highest among all age groups. 
B. The resources implemented by the programmes and the role played by the 
various categories of people involved 
Although, as we have already seen, in financial terms these resources are 
considerable, if we analyse how they are used we see however that a consi­
derable share of expenditure is not devoted to financing the training pro­
grammes themselves or developing the people on them but goes towards the 
trainees' subsistance in the absence of income from a paid job. This 
makes the various programmes look more like a social project than a trai­
ning activities. 
In addition, these means are very unstable : they are generally used for 
short duration activities subject to agreements and involve the hiring 
of training or guidance staff on a relatively unstable basis. 
As regards the roles of the people involved, there seems to be a shift in 
the monitoring of the programmes towards the production system, which is 
having an increasingly greater say in structuring the courses. This 
mainly takes the form of direct financing of training in the case of the 
job­training contracts, and developing temporary jobs. 
C. The results 
Of course this is the decisive criterion for judging all the programmes in 
the light of their aims. 
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Th ree types of analyses have been made on this level : 
1. The skills obtained on these programmes are not professional skills 
or qualifications but rather characteristics of a social nature. 
As we have seen there are important differences between the various 
measures, in particular as regards the length of the courses, the 
presence or not of training bodies, the intention or not to follow up 
a qualification and these differences are also noticeable in the results. 
Nonetheless, if we take the scheme overall and look at its results, its 
most obvious effect does not seem to be the acquisition of skills of a 
technical or vocational nature. For example, with the alternance courses 
for 16-18 yr olds, which are an important part of this scheme, it has 
been estimated (1) that only 10 to 15% of the young people have been 
able to obtain, at the end of the course, all or part of the CAP whereas 
the aim was that in 1985 no young person should enter the labour market 
unless he had a vocational training backed up by a diploma. 
There is every reason for thinking that, on the contrary, the results 
obtained by the greatest number more likely concern the acquisition of 
social characteristics such as respecting schedules and work rates, 
getting used to the working environment and conditions or being able to 
form an integral part of a work unit. In other words, it is as if 
basically the aim of these programmes was to produce "employabi lity" 
features or to make the young people good job-seekers. 
However, this employability is only very partially translated into a 
genuine job. 
(1) Observation et évaluation du dispositif de formation des jeunes de 
16 à 18 ans. Op. Cit. - Doc. n° 3 - Fonctionnement du dispositif 
et strategies des jeunes. Feb. 1985 - p. 376. 
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2. Once again, a difference should be made between the various programmes 
depending upon their efficiency in terms of jobs : for example there is 
no doubt that the schemes which involve a contract are much more likely 
to lead to a job, if only beacause the contractual commitment is a sign 
of the employer's potential capacity to hire a young person. 
However, overall the programmes designed to get young people functioning 
socially in the working world, especially the alternance courses and the 
temporary employment systems, are in reality only of limited effect. 
The Centre for Studies and Research on Qualifications has calculated (1) 
for example that only 20% of the young people on alternance courses got a 
job at the end (results in May 84). For all the programmes (including 
job-training and apprenticeship contracts) only 36% have been hired, of 
which roughly half are in the company where the training period was spent. 
Moreover, it seems that the hire rate of those young people who have been 
on one of the schemes is lower than the rate of those who were not on any 
of the programmes. 
It has also been noted that the skill level at the time of employment is 
low : the trainee generally does unskilled jobs, which is also contrary 
to the aims of the programmes. 
3. Finally, when someone is really hired, it is generally in relatively 
specific economic and employment sectors. 
It seems that the youth employment programmes are basically used by two 
types of companies : 
- Small firms, employing young people for limited jobs, with relatively 
low skill and wage levels. 
- or, on the other hand, large companies which base their recruitment 
policy on these programmes. 
(1) Survey for trainees between 16 and 18 years old : initial results, note 
of 14 December 1984 presenting a synthesis of the report drawn up by 
the CETRQ : young people from 16 to 18 years ; training programmes and 
the situation at the end of courses - Oct. 84 
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The latter have the following particular features : 
- systematic recourse to the external Labour market, 
- great work force instability, 
- relatively low wage level, 
- relatively low unionisation, 
- possibly the use of part time work. 
In both cases, it is as if the use of these employment schemes by these 
firms effectively replaces a recruitment policy based on qualifications 
and an internal training policy. To bear this out, for example, it is 
noticeable that the use of these employment measures is inversely propor-
tional to the percentage of aggregate remuneration devoted to training. 
CONCLUSION 
These observations and analyses, of course, still need to be confirmed 
and validated. 
However, as they appear, they give rise to two questions : 
- If the results of the employment measures studied, taken together, have 
the results mentioned above, if they are structured around an image of 
those they are designed to help which reduces their value, shouldn't 
questions be asked as to the overall social function these measures play, 
beyond their aims ? Shouldn't we wonder, as J. ROSE does , if they are 
all not different means of an overall function of the programmes, namely 
the channelling of the mobility flows of certain discriminated categories 
of the work force (young unskilled workers in this case, but also women 
and unemployed workers) towards companies with a dominant position either 
on the product market or the labour market and which, thereby, benefit 
from indirect State aid in the management of their work force ? 
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In the short term don't they run the risk of contributin to the segrega-
tion of the labour market into two types (and, beyond that, two types 
of wage-earners) : 
= one characterized by qualifications, job stability and a satisfactory 
wage level. 
= the other characterized on the contrary by insecure employment, 
mobility and a lack of skills ? 
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TRAINEE PAY AND THE COSTS OF VOCATIONAL TRAINING 
IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY 
Ian S. Jones 
(NIESR) 
INTRODUCTION 
In this paper I present evidence on the relative pay of apprentices and 
on the structure and level of apprentice training costs in Britain and 
West Germany. I begin by examining how closely matched are the content 
and duration of training programmes in the two countries. In comparing 
the pay of so-called apprentices, to what extent are we actually comparing 
like with like? 
APPRENTICE TRAINING IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY 
In a survey of apprenticeship in Europe in the early 1960s, Gertrude 
Williams drew attention to certain disparities between arrangements in 
Britain and on the Continent (Williams, 1962). In particular, she noted 
that whereas most British apprenticeships were of 5 years' duration, in 
the rest of Europe, including Germany, a 3-year training period was the 
norm. In Britain, many apprentices were denied the opportunity to attend 
courses of further education on day-release, with the result that rela-
tively few obtained any F.E. qualifications during their apprenti ceshipsd) 
In Germany and most continental countries, the right of trainees to attend 
F.E. courses on day-release was legally guaranteed. Whilst the achieve-
ment of minimum standards of practical and theoretical competence in 
public examinations or trade tests was normally required for trainees 
to be recognised as skilled workers in the rest of Europe, in Britain 
most trainees acquired skilled status simply by virtue of having served 
that time. 
(1) An EITB survey conducted in 1973 found that nearly two thirds of 
engineering craftsmen then aged between 35 and 44 had obtained a 
further education qualification (EITB, 1980). 
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Earlier surveys of apprenticeships by Lady Williams herself (1957) and 
Liepmann (1960) had drawn attention to the wide spread of standards which 
persisted in Britain under this highly informal system of accreditation. 
In the intervening 20 years, British practice has moved closer to that 
observed in West Germany in several important respects. The duration of 
apprenticeships has been greatly reduced so that engineering and elec-
trical craft apprenticeships are now completed in 3 1/2 years in both 
countries; in the construction trades, British apprenticeships may now 
be completed in 3 years (or even less under new standards-based arrange-
ments), compared to 2 1/2-3 years in Germany. Most British apprentices 
now spend one-day per week throughout their training attending further 
education courses leading to recognised qualifications. The activities 
of the Industrial Training Boards have led to widespread changes in the 
organisation of practical training, so that in many British training 
schemes, a first year of off-the-job training in an apprentice work-
shop, technical college, or group training centre, is followed by a 
structured programme of so-called module training in the workshop (EITB, 
1972). These arrangements are very similar to German practice, at least in 
the large manufacturing establishments, although in many smaller work-
shops, German trainees tend to be closely integrated into production 
at an earlier stage of training. 
There are still some major differences between the two countries espe-
cially in respect of certification. In Britain, as in Germany, most of 
those currently completing apprentice training will have acquired an 
F.E. qualification, if the results of a 1973 Engineering Industry Train-
ing Board (EITB) sample survey of engineering craftsmen hold for other 
sectors (EITB, 1980)(2). German trainees however are also required sit 
publicly examined tests of practical competence, whereas in Britain ar-
rangements for practical testing are of a more informal nature (3). Con-
sequently, comparisons of training standards in the two countries have 
(2) The survey showed that only 9% of engineering craftsmen aged under 
25 in the sample had no F.E. qualification. 
(3) It is also still the case in Britain that an apprentice may acquire 
skilled status simply by serving his time, without having had to pass 
any sort of external examination at all. 
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relied mainly on the evidence of the F.E: syllabuses customarily undei— 
taken by apprentices (Prais and Wagner, 1983). On the basis of such comp-
arisons across five training occupations, Prais and Wagner concluded that 
"on the whole, a re-assuring similarity has been found in the standards 
demanded at the main level of qualification attained in both countries in 
the age range 18-20, by those who have followed an 'apprenticeship' 
I conclude from this discussion that the term "Apprentice" represents a 
very similar category of labour input from the employers' point of view 
in the two countries. A comparison of apprentice pay relative to that of 
other broad categories of employee should therefore assist in under-
standing intercountry differences in the structure and levels of training 
cost and in the incidence of apprentice employment. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRAINEE AND ADULT PAY IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY 
In both Britain and Germany, basic or minimum rates of trainee pay (which 
in Germany are referred to as training allowances) are set in collective 
agreements made between trade unions and employers' organisations. Table 1 
sets out these basic or minimum rates of trainee pay (or allowance) as a 
proportion of the basic or minimum pay of craft or skilled employees in 
corresponding British and German collective agreements. 
Under the German agreements, trainee allowances are set according to the 
year of training. In the majority of British agreements, pay is still set 
according to age, although there are clear signs of a shift towards pay-
ment by year or stage of training and it is likely that a majority of 
British apprentices will shortly be paid on this basis (4). 
For purposes of comparison, it is assumed that the representative British 
trainee enters the apprenticeship at age 16 1/2 and completes after 3-3 1/2 
years' training at age 19 1/2 or 20. On this assumption, it can be seen 
(4) The two most important national agreements (in engineering and cons-
truction) both embody payment by stage of training. 
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that, on average, a British apprentice paid the minimum rate specified in 
the agreement, would have received some 50% of the minimum rate of a 
skilled worker even in his first year of apprenticeship, which, in many 
cases, is now spent entirely in offrthe-rjob training. His German counter-
part, who would probaly spend a somewhat higher proportion of his time 
in productive work, would have received about 20-30% of minimum adult 
skilled rate. In the fourth training year, the British apprentice would 
receive about 90% of the adult minimum rate, compared to about 30-45% 
in Germany. Thus, with the exception of the trainee building craftsman 
in Germany, whose pay roughly doubles between the first and third year 
of apprenticeship, German trainees receive a more modest rate of pay 
increase than British trainee over the term of their training and more-
over start from a very much lower base (as a proportion of the minimum 
adult skilled rate). Over the term of the apprenticeship, a British ap-
prentice paid the minimum rate specified in the collective agreement 
would receive about three quarters of the minimum skilled rate compared 
to perhaps 30-35% in Germany. 
The relationship between the earnings of trainess and adults 
The relationship between the earnings of trainees and adults reflects other 
factors as well as the basic rates of pay negotiated in collective agree-
ments, In particular, apprentices work less overtime,(5) and spend a 
smaller proportion of their working time in direct production activities 
than do non-trainee employees.(6) They therefore receive proportionately 
less overtime pay and production bonus payments of all kinds than do their 
adult colleagues, and so their basic pay (or allowance) is a higher pro-
portion of their total earnings than is the case for adults. 
(5) According to the 1974 NES (1974 being the last previous occasion on 
which data on apprentice pay was collected in the survey), adult male 
manual employees worked approximately three times as much overtime 
per week (6.5 hours) as male apprentices (2.2 hours). 
(6) According to unpublished data from the 1974 NES, male apprentices 
weekly earnings were then some 14% higher than their basic pay. At the 
same time, adult male manual employees weekly earnings were some 43% 
higher than their basic pay. 
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The net effect of these factors in modifying basic pay relativities ap-
pears to have been very similar in Britain, and Germany if the data on 
trainee and adult earnings in the two countries in Table 2 is compared 
with the earlier information on collective pay agreements. 
According to these data the weekly earnings of British apprentices in the 
1984 New Earnings Survey (NES) sample (Department of Employment, 1984A) 
were some two and a half times higher as a proportion of adult male manual 
workers' earnings than those of German trainees in 1981, a remarkably 
siimilar relationship to that observed earlier between the basic pay or 
allowance of apprentices and skilled adult workers in the two countries. 
Table 1 
Basic or standard trainee rates of pay as a percentage of the basic rates of pay of adult skilled workers in 
certain British and German collective agreements, 1984. 
Agreement Britain Germany 
1.Chemical industry 
2.Engineering/Metal industry 
3.BuiIding 
4.Textiles 
5.Clothing manufacture 
6.Motor mechanic 
7.Electric.supply 
8.Painter 
9.Gas/Water Installation 
10.Butcher 
11.Baker 
, 12.Hai rdresser 
Age 
16 
56 
47 
43 
43 
67 
43 
35 
33 
50 
70 
55 
47 
of a 
17 
65 
60 
70 
58 
83 
50 
47 
55 
60 
80 
64 
52 
pprent 
18 
82 
75 
90 
72 
100 
65 
54 
75 
75 
85 
78 
100 
i ce 
19 
88 
90 
-
87 
85 
71 
85 
80 
-
82 
-
Average over 
apprenticeship 
period (2) 
75 
65 
68 
68 
86 
63 
56 
66 
69 
80 
72 
66 
App 
1st 
31 
29 
24 
32 
30 
21 
17 
17 
26 
27 
23 
26 
Year of 
renticeship 
2nd 
36 
32 
37 
37 
33 
22 
21 
20 
28 
29 
29 
30 
3rd 
41 
35 
47 
42 
38 
25 
24 
21 
32 
35 
38 
36 
(3) 
4th 
46 
40 
-
46 
-
-
28 
-
36 
-
-
-
Average over 
apprenticeship 
period 
37 
33 
36 
38 
34 
23 
22 
19 
30 
30 
30 
31 
I 
OO 
Sources: Britain: Department of Employment, (1984B). 
Germany: Munch, J, Jung, E, (1980). 
Noll, I, Beicht, U, Wiederhold-Fritz, S. (1980) 
Williams, S et al, (1981). 
Notes: (1) For details of British collective agremeents, see Jones (1985A). 
(2) Assumes apprentice enters training at age 16 and completes after 2 1/2-3 l'/2 years as appropriate. 
(3) Apprentice training formally commences at age 15 or 16. 
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Table 2 
Male Trainee earnings as a proportion of the earnings of adult male manual 
workers in Britain and Germany. 
Germany 1981) Britain (1984) 
Monthly Weekly 
1. Manufacturing 19 55 
2. All industries 20 54 
Sources : 
Britain: Department of Employment (1984A), Parts C (Table 54) and F 
(Table 190). 
Germany: Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (1981). 
APPRENTICE TRAINING COSTS IN BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY 
Apart from apprentices' payroll costs, employers' decisions on the quan-
tity of apprentice training to offer also depend on the other costs which 
they incur in providing training (which may include the provision of shel-
tered workshop facilities, either in the company or in centres operated 
jointly with other firms, and the costs of supervising trainees as they 
gain work experience), and on the trainees' productive contribution 
during training (7). 
(7) Unless the skills acquired by trainees are purely general in charac-
ter and skilled labour in perfectly elastic supply to the firm, the 
volume of training employment also depends upon the post-training 
benefits in the form of a reduced cost of hiring skilled labour. 
See Jones and Hollenstein, 1983. 
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In West Germany, a major official report on apprentice training costs and 
finance (the so-called Edding report (1974)) has stimulated much subse-
quent research including a large scale survey of training costs carried 
out by the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) in 1980 
(Noll et al, 1983). 
Apprentice training in Germany is organised according to training occu-
pation and there are no tabulations available from BIBB which analyse 
training costs both by occupation and industrial sector. I therefore 
concentrate on the BIBB estimates of training costs in a group of en-
gineering occupations (8) which correspond most closely with those fol-
lowed by trainees in British surveys of training costs. Although most 
German apprenticeships are completed after 3 years, these occupations 
all involve a 42-month term of apprenticeship - very similar to the 
average duration of engineering apprenticeships in Britain. 
No equivalent large scale survey of apprentice training costs across a 
range of industries and training occupations has been undertaken in 
Britain, although there have been several smaller scale studies mostly 
of training costs in the engineering industry (EITB, 1972, Emmerton and 
David, 1976). The most recent of these was a small sample enquiry into 
the net costs of engineering apprentice training in both engineering 
and process industry establishments conducted by the National Institute 
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in September-October 1984 (Jones, 
1985B). Despite the relatively small sample size (10 establishments) the 
estimated gross training costs at engineering firms in the NIESR sample 
were similar-to those reported in previous British surveys, and are used 
in the comparisons of training costs in Britain and Germany which follow. 
Table 3 sets out the estimated gross costs of apprentice training in 
engineering occupations in the NIESR and BIBB samples. The German data 
have been updated from 1980 to the third quarter of 1984 using indices 
of hourly earnings in manufacturing (OECD, 1985) and converted to 
£ sterling using the average value of the Sterling-DM exchange rate 
for that quarter (DM 3.8 : £). 
(8) Mechanic (mechaniker); mechanical fitter (maschinenschlosser); elec-
trical and electronics specialist/fitter (energieanlagenelektroniker) 
and toolmaker (verzeugmacher). 
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We see that the proportion of training outlays represented by trainee 
payroll costs was nearly 50% higher in the NIESR sample establishments 
than in the German establishments surveyed by BIBB. Because statutory 
social security oncosts were a higher proportion of trainee earnings in 
German than in British establishments, the disparity in the share of 
trainee remuneration in total outlays was even wider. Conversely, costs 
of training centre provision, supervision and administration were a 
much higher proportion of training outlays in German than in British 
establishments. 
Table 3 
Engineering apprentice training costs in British and German establishments 
(£ per trainee, third quarter 1984 earnings) 
Cost Item Britain (NIESR sample) Germany (BIBB sample) 
16. 
2. 
.3 
.4 
(72. 
(10. 
,4) 
,3) 
10. 
6. 
.8 
.9 
(49, 
(31, 
.1) 
.4) 
(1) Trainee payroll 
(2) Off-the-job training, 
F.E. fees, administration, 
etc. 
(3) Costs of supervising 
on-the-job training 4.0 (17.2) 4.3 (19.5) 
(4) Cross costs (=1+2+3) 23.2 (100.0) 22.0 (100.0) 
(5) Productive contribution 11.3 (48.7) 6.3 (78.6) 
(6) Net costs (= 4-5) 11.8 (51.3) 15.7 (71.4) 
Source : Jones, 1985B. 
Relative to costs of workshop supervision, costs arising from off-the-job 
training were much more important in Germany than in Britan. This differ-
ence may have been partly due to the fact that the BIBB report distin-
guished between trainee productive contribution "in the workshop" (arbeits-
platz) and under sheltered conditions (Lehrwerkstatt) either in the training 
centre or in training areas set aside from the main workshop (9). Off-the-
job training costs (item 2) included the cost of supervising sheltered 
production which in Britain would be covered under the heading of module 
training supervision (item 3). 
(9) Sheltered production accounted for approx. a fifth of total trainee 
output. 
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Further insight into the significance of the differences in the structure 
of training costs in Britain and Germany revealed in the NIESR and BIBB 
samples is gained by expressing the average cost of training an apprentice 
as a proportion of the annual payroll cost of a skilled worker in each 
country at the time of the respective surveys (Table 4) (10). 
Table 4 
Apprentice training costs relative to the annual payroll costs of a skilled 
worker in Britain (1984) and Germany (1980). 
Trainee payroll costs 
Other training outlays 
Cross costs 
Productive contribution 
Net costs 
Britain 
NIESR sample 
1.87 
0.71 
2.58 
1.26 
1.31 
Germany 
BIBB sample 
0.87 
0.92 
1.79 
0.51 
1.28 
Source : Jones, 1985B. 
The results of Table 4 indicate that the "normalised" gross cost of 
training in NIESR sample establishments was nearly 50% higher than in the 
BIBB sample of German establishments. This was because normalised trainee 
payroll costs in Britain were over twice as high as in Germany - a result, 
broadly in line with the estimates reported earlier of apprentice earn-
ings relative to those of ther employees in the two countries. The higher 
level of other training outlays in Germany partly offset the difference in 
trainee payroll costs. 
Trainee Productive Contribution and Net Costs 
Estimates of trainee productive contribution were obtained in a broadly 
similar fashion in both the NIESR and BIBB surveys. Trainee performance 
or productivity at different stages of training was estimated relative 
to that of an experienced or qualified worker and these "equivalence 
factors" were then multiplied by the payroll costs of the reference 
employee. For reasons discussed in Jones (1985B), this approach may 
(10) See Jones, 1985B. 
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generally be expected to underestimate the "true" productive contribution 
from gross costs will also tend to be upward biased estimates of the 
"true" net cost. However there is no reason to suppose that the degree 
of bias involved differs systematically between the two surveys. 
According to tha data in Table 4, normalised net costs in the two countries 
were very similar despite the much higher gross costs in British estab-
lishments, because th,e normalised output contribution of British trainees 
was more than twice as high as that of German trainees. 
Institutional differences between the two countries may have contributed 
to these different cost structures. In particular, the more rigorous 
German arrangements for controlling the quality of output, which require 
trainees to pass theoretical and practical tests of competence on com-
pletion of training in order to qualify as skilled workers, may help to 
explain both the relatively higher costs of training supervision (the 
need to ensure trainees reach the required standards) and the relatively 
lower output contribution of German trainees (trainees have to spend 
more time preparing for exams). Thus, in the training occupations on 
which attention has been focussed, output contribution during the final 
six months of training was considerably lower than would have been pre-
dicted given the performance profile during the earlier stages of train-
ing. This effect was especially marked for the electrical and electronics 
occupation where the rate of trainee output in the final six months was 
significantly less than half that achieved during the previous year. 
Economic analysis of the firm's trainee employment decision also throws 
light on these results. If the cost of employing trainees is relatively 
high then few may be employed, but the average and marginal revenue 
products of those that are would be correspondingly high. In other words, 
given the relatively high costs of employing trainees in Britain, British 
firms find it profitable to employ fewer of them and to use those that 
they do employ more intensively in production than do firms in Germany. 
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SUMMARY 
The evidence presented in this paper may be summarised in the following 
way. From the employer's point of view, apprentices represent a very 
similar type of labour in put in Britain and Germany. Despite the pos-
sibility that a more rigorous concern with certification in Germany may 
impose some additional costs on employers there by comparison with the 
relatively informal arrangements prevalent in Britain,(11) it still costs 
considerably more (as a proportion of the payroll costs of skilled emp-
loyees) to employ and train apprentices in Britain than in Germany. This 
is because the pay of apprentices is a much higher proportion of adult 
pay than the training allowance received by German apprentices. 
There is evidence from econometric studies that apprentice recruitment in 
Britain has varied inversely with apprentices' relative pay, as theory 
would predict (Lindley, 1975; Merrilees, 1983). Extending these results to 
cross-country differences it therefore seems very likely that the rela-
tively high costs of employing and training young people in Britain have 
contributed to the much lower level of apprentice employment observed 
here than in Germany even in those sectors of the British economy where 
there is a strong apprenticeship tradition (Prais and Wagner, 1983) (12), 
and also to the much smaller proportion of young people in employment in 
Britain receiving any form of systematic vocational training. 
(11) There may well of course be offsetting benefits which we have not 
considered in this paper. 
(12) For further analysis, see Jones, 1985A. 
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YOUNG AND OUT OF WORK : THE LABOUR MARKET FOR YOUNG PEOPLE (1) 
P.N. JUNANKAR 
Institute for Employment Research 
Warwi ck 
1. Introduction 
Every year about three-quarters of a million children reach school-leaving 
age (in England and Wales) and decide whether to stay on at school or 
whether to enter the "real world" of employment and unemployment. In 1983 
about 44% stayed on in school and about 56% (433,000) entered the labour 
market (2). The past few years have seen a dramatic collapse of the labour 
market for young people with a decreasing proportion finding work and an 
increasing proportion being unemployed. The collapse of the labour market 
for young people is primarily, in my opinion, due to the recession in 
Britain. Some economists and supporters of the Tory Government have as-
cribed the collapse to increased relative wages of young people, to the 
"pernicious" influence of trade unions and to allegedly "generous" social 
security benefits. The Government has intervened in this labour market 
on a massive scale by the introduction of various Special Employment 
Measures, notably the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) and the Young Workers 
Scheme (YWS). In 1983, of the 16 year olds not remaining in full-time 
education, 48 per cent entered the YTS! (3) 
Before we turn to an analysis of the collapse of the labour market for 
young people, it is worth noting that young people are normally unskilled 
and enter non-professional occupations and non-career grade jobs. They 
enter jobs which are often "dead-end" jobs which require little in the 
(1) I am grateful to Ruth Hermitage for research assistance and Pat Dutton, 
Peter Elias and Rob Wilson for helpful comments. I am responsible for 
errors and prejudices. A longer version of this paper is available 
from the author on request. 
(2)(3) De Gazette October 1984 p. 445. 
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form of skills, which provide little training "on the job" and a very small 
percentage of them are unionised. A high proportion of them enter part-time 
poorly paid jobs. Partly as a result of the nature of the jobs and partly 
due to the young being more mobile (by location, by industry, by firm), 
they have a relatively high turnover and search for better, more satis-
fying jobs. In an uncertain environment employers may prefer to hire young 
people as they are paid less, they are non-unionised and their high quit 
rate makes it easier to adjust their labour stock to meet cyclical move-
ments in demand. However, they are also less experienced and employers 
may think of them as being less reliable and trustworthy. The high turnover 
is reflected in the higher rates of inflows into, and outflows from the 
unemployment stocks. For example, in January-April 1984, the likelihood of 
becoming unemployed was 10.5 per cent for the under 18s and 3.2 per cent 
for the 30-34 year olds. The likelihood of ceasing to be unemployed was 
52.3 per cent for the under 18s and 33.4 per cent for the 30-34 year olds. 
According to agreed industrial relations practice, firms fire workers on 
a last-in-first-out (LIFO) basis : the young with short job tenures (al-
most by definition) suffer disproportionately. Employment protection legis-
lation reinforces this : employees with longer job tenures are more expen-
sive to fire or make redundant. The young provide a convenient reserve 
army of labour to be hired and disengaged (fires or quits) according to 
the level of economic activity. 
This paper, in Section 2, outlines the scale of the problem; Section 3 
reviews some of the explanations; Section 4 discusses the consequences 
of increasing unemployment; Section 5 reviews some of the policies to 
combat the problem; Section 6 concludes the report. 
2. The Scale of the Problem 
Almost all data sources confirm a collapse of the labour market for young 
people with a decline in employment and a rapid rise in unemployment. In 
addition, long term unemployment has been rising and we are fast approach-
ing a situation where some school-leavers may have to face a lifetime of 
unemployment. A recent feature has been a massive intervention in this 
market by an allegedly laisser faire Government : there has been an enoi— 
mous growth of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) as a means of alleviating 
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the problem. For the purposes of our discussion, we define young people 
as those below 25 years of age. 
Table 1 
First Employment of Young People (England & Wales) 
(of those reaching school-leaving age) 
Percentages 
1978 (1) 1979 (2) 1980 (3) 1983 (4) 
(a) Employed (by end Dec) 
(b) Staying on at school 
(or entered full-time 
higher education or 
training) 
(c) Unemployed (or not in 
labour force) 
(d) Entering YTS 
53 
40 
45 
50 
33 
50 
17 
21 
44 
8 
27 
Table 1 illustrates some aspects of the changes in the labour market for 
those reaching school-leaving age in England and Wales. In the space of 
five years (1978 to 1983) employment falls from 53 per cent to 21 per cent 
(a fall of 60 per cent). From 1979 to 1980 unemployment (or not in the 
labour force) increases by over two hundred per cent! If we include those 
in YTS as being in the unemployed (or not in the labour force) category -
which is how they are treated in official statistics - there is an increase 
of 400 per cent between 1978 and 1983! It is clear that the bottom has 
dropped out of this particular labour market over the space of five years. 
Estimates for 1984 suggest a continuation of this trend. 
Sources : 
(1) DE Gazette, Dec. 1980 (pp. 1201 - 1203) 
(2) " " March 1982 (pp. 117 - 120) 
(3) " " May 1984 (pp. 230 - 234) 
(4) " " Oct. 1984 (pp. 445 - 448) 
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Using the General Household Survey (GHS) data for Great Britain (Diagrams 
1 and 2) we can see a fall in employment of young males and females 
(except the 18-24 females) from onwards. The relatively good showing of 
the 18-24 females reflects in part the growth of the services sector 
which has expanded by hiring part-time workers. A similar picture emerges 
if we look at youth unemployment (Diagrams 3 and 4) which is rising from 
1973 with a fall for 16-17 year old males between 1982-83 (4). This latter 
"blip" is presumably due to the big expansion in YTS/YOP. The increasing 
unemployment of 18-24 females (and more-or-less stable employment) reflects 
the increasing participation rate of that group. 
The Department of Employment (DE) data for the United Kingdom on unemp-
loyment (Diagrams 5 and 6) show similar trends to the GHS although the 
age categories are different. The Break (and lower levels after) in the 
fourth quarter of 1982 reflects the change in the data series from regis-
tersed unemployed to claimant unemployed. Strictly speaking, the data before 
and after 1982 are not comparable. However, the diagrams make clear that 
the change-over gives a different (and perhaps misleading) view of the 
labour market. Diagrams 7 and 8 based on DE data are the best indication 
of the scale of the problem; long term unemployment (duration greater 
than 52 weeks) has been growing throughout the period (5). The proportion 
of the young who have been unemployed for more than a year has increased 
to over thirty per cent for males and over twenty per cent for females. 
This provides an especially worrying feature of the labour market for 
young people. It is hard to believe that those people are voluntarily 
unemployed, refusing wage offers because their reservation wage is too 
high! 
To conclude this section, we see that the available evidence suggests 
that the young are facing a serious problem in the labour market. In 
the next section we consider some explanations for the growth of unemp-
loyment . 
(4)(5) The apparent improvement in 1973 was due to the raising of the 
school-leaving age (ROSLA) in 1972. This decreased the supply of 
young people on to the labour market. 
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3. Some Explanations 
The changes in the youth labour market over the past few decades are 
usually explained in terms of changes in the demand for, and supply of 
young people. In some models it is assumed that (real) wages are suf-
ficiently flexible to clear the market so that the only unemployment 
that exists is voluntary. In other models, which I believe are more 
realistic, wages are assumed to be inflexible (or at least do not 
adjust instantaneously) and a labour market disequilibrium exists: 
unemployment is involuntary. If, for various reasons, the output market 
does not clear (and there is inadequate aggregate demand) then it leads 
to involuntary unemployment even if the real wage is perfectly flexible (6) 
If the output market is a non-Walrasian market (that is output prices 
are not perfectly flexible and trade takes place at disequilibrium prices) 
producers are rationed in how much they can sell and, hence, they reduce 
their labour demand. During the past few years, there has been a severe 
recession with aggregate output just beginning to overtake the level in 
1979. During this recession, many firms have gone to the wall and fired 
their workers, the forms that survived have decreased their employment 
by firing workers and decreased their hiring of new workers. The public 
sector has also been squeezed and has made people redundant and hiring 
of new workers has decreased. The young are particularly sensitive to 
such changes: as firms fire workers the young are the first to lose 
their jobs. With a decrease in hiring, the young are again affected 
since they are just entering the labour market or because of their higher 
mobility re-entering the labour market. There is much evidence to support 
the view that youth unemployment has risen due to the recession, see 
Junankar and Neale (1985). 
Another explanation of the growth of unemployed young people is that 
there are structural changes taking place in the economy away from "youth-
intensive" industries. Although there is some evidence for this view, 
it is a relatively controversial issue, see Raffe (1984). During the past 
few years there has been a spectacular decline in the manufacturing sector 
(6) See Malinvaud (1977) 
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and, hence, a decline in hiring by that sector. In particular, young 
people (in the past) would have joined the manufacturing industries as 
apprentices and these have also declined. The decline in the manufacturing 
sector has been accompanied by a growth in the service sector. Much of 
the expansion of employment in the service sector has been of part-time 
female (married) workers. Again the young who are looking for full time 
jobs have suffered. 
A possible explanation for the growth in unemployment (but not of the 
fall in employment) may be that, due to demographic reasons, there has 
been an increase in numbers of young people in the past few years with 
the "bulge" peaking in 1986/87. In addition, there has been a marked 
increase in the participation rate of females. It appears that the labour 
market has been unable to absorb the increased supply. (The raising of 
school-leaving age in 1972 led to s dudden fall in labour supply which 
was reflected in a fall in unemployment.) However, this cannot explain 
the fall in employment. 
A currently popular explanation of the problems of the youth labour 
market is in terms of employers not hiring young people because of 
increased wages of young people relative to adults. However, data from 
the New Earnings Survey on relative labour costs of the young show that, 
since the mid-seventies, they have been declining and yet employment has 
been falling (unemployment rising). Junankar and Neale (1985) using a 
disequilibrium about market model show that relative wages are not an 
important variable in explaining employment of young males. The major 
fact explaining the fall of employment is a fall in aggregate demand. 
It has been argued by some that Unions have led to increased unemployment 
of the young by raising their relative wages. As we saw above, there is 
little evidence for increased relative wages. In addition, union member-
ship has declined in the past few years and, in any case, the young are 
relatively under unionised (partly because they are in industries/occu-
pations with low unionisation). A final Monetarist argument is that 
generous social security benefits have fallen very slightly for young 
people. (Due to recent changes in legislation, school-leavers cannot 
claim benefits for the summer and have to wait until September.) 
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In some cross section studies (7) of this labour market, it has been found 
that the poorly educated, unskilled, those with poor parental background 
and the ethnic minorities are more likely to be unemployed. For example, 
according to the Labour Force Survey in 1981, the unemployment rates for 
the under 25s were 19, 38 and 25 per cent for Zhite, West Indian and 
Asians respectively. Lynch (1984) also finds that the longer a young 
person has been unemployed, the less likely (s)he is to find a job 
(so called "state-dependence"). These cross-sectional studies also find 
a large number of the unemployed young are not registered as unemployed. 
This suggests that many of them are not "rational (maximising) economic 
agents" but, due to various social and institutional reasons, prefer not 
to be stigmatised as the "unemployed". Note that, even of the registered 
unemployed (until 1982) many young people are not receiving any benefits 
(unemployment or supplementary). The proportion of unemployed boys and 
girls less than 18 years receiving any benefits, increased from approx-
imately 40 per cent in 1968 to 75 per cent in 1974. Of unemployed young 
people less than 20, the proportion increased from 80 per cent in 1975 
to almost 90 per cent in 1983. This increased take up may reflect the 
increased duration of unemployment as well as a change in social climate. 
Thus, although there is evidence of increasing take up of benefits, it 
is still not universal. 
4. Consequences 
The consequences for the individual are obvious : a loss of income, lower 
likelihood of subsequent employment and a lower profile of future incomes. 
However, a major consequence for the individual is a loss of self-respect 
and an inability to join the consumer society which only respects those who 
demand goods backed by money. A job provides an individual with psycholo-
gical and social satisfaction. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
unemployed are more prone to illness (both physical and mental) and some 
fragmentary evidence linking it to suicides. There is some evidence link-
ing unemployment to crime by young people (8). There is evidence in a 
(7) See Lynch (1984), Main (1981) 
(8) See Junankar (1984). 
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study carried out by Dr Martin Plant of Edinburgh University that unemp-
loyed boys are more likely to use illegal drugs. (Guardian, 7th November 
1985). To quote the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Unemploy-
ment (1982) : 
"We believe unemployment to be among the 
causes of ill-health, mortality, crime or 
civil disorder." (p. 59) 
There is also some work which suggests that unemployment leads to increas-
ing stress within marriages which sometimes Leads to separation and 
divorce. 
besides the costs of social security benefits, youth training programmes 
and loss of tax revenues, society suffers a real output loss. Society 
also loses future real income due to inadequate current work experience 
(inadequate investment in human capital). It also leads to a disgruntled 
generation who may become social misfits in the future. 
5. Policies 
There are four major methods of affecting the labour market: 
(i) increase aggregate demand, 
(ii) decrease labour costs of young people, 
(iii) increase the skills of the young either through formal higher 
education or through training and apprenticeship schemes, 
(iv) affect the incentives of the young towards work/leisure. 
As argued earlier, the most important way of improving the employment 
prospects of young people is by increasing aggregate demand. As the 
economy expands, firms would hire more young people and fires (dismis-
sals) would go down. Given that there is usually a period before changes 
in aggregate demand affect employment, the results of policy changes 
may take over a year before any significant change in employment/unemp-
loyment takes place. Neoclassical economists (especially) argue that 
the relative labout costs of the young must be reduced (by the abolition 
of minimum wages, by weakening trade unions, or by lowering National 
Insurance charges) to increase employemnt. As mentioned earlier, even 
though the under 18s have been getting cheaper, the level of employment 
(unemployment) has been falling (rising). At present the Government is 
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trying to put downwards pressure on wage rates via the Young Workers 
Scheme (which subsidies firms if they pay less than the "going rate")(9). 
Similarly, it is hoped that the low YTS allowance would put pressure on 
wage rates. A decrease of (or exemption from) National Insurance charges 
for young employees should make young people more "competitive". Recent 
budget changes have lowered the employers' National Insurance charges 
for lower paid workers. In addition, the Government has just excluded 
young people under twenty-one from the Wages Councils, in an attempt to 
stimulate employment of the young. However, most estimates of the rela-
tive labour cost elasticities are fairly small. 
The major plank of the Government's policy towards young people has been 
the introduction of the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). The object of this 
is, in theory, to lower the training costs of the firm (employer) and 
to increase the "human capital" of young people. However, if there is 
a lack of demand, all that may happen is that firms substitute YTS people 
for employees (or trainee employees). At the end of the YTS firms can use 
the YTS as a "screening device" and, hence, lower their hiring and firing 
costs. Again, given a shortage of demand, only the "better" YTS people 
would find jobs: the total number of jobs may not change but YTS simply 
selects who is successful in finding a job. There is accumulating anec-
dotal evidence to suggest that some (many?) employers are simply taking 
on YTS people as cheap labour and taking on a new set at the end of the 
so-called traineeship. However, there is no "hard" evidence on the suc-
cess rates of YTS people. A much quoted figure by the Government is that 
60% of the YTS people found jobs or went into further education. How-
ever, this figure has been criticised by many people and organisations, 
in particular. Youth Aid (10). 
(9) Evidence presented in Rajan (1984) suggests a very small impact on 
employment. 
(10) See Guardian Report (17th October 1984) entitled "Clash on claims 
that more youth trainees find jobs". 
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Unfortunately, there hasibeen no proper study of the effectiveness of 
YTS comparing it with a (matched) control group. There is certainly 
anecdotal evidence that some YTS schemes are good and do provide training 
while others are purely disguised cheap labour. A further assessment of 
this must await the results of the Manpower Services Commission follow-
up surveys of the YTS people. 
Neoclassical economists (especially Monetarists) believe that young 
people are refusing job offers because social security payments are 
too generous. They suggest that these benefits should be decreased or 
withdrawn completely. As mentioned earlier, many young people do not 
register as unemployed (or claim benefits) which suggests that, even if 
the argument is true for some young people, the impact on employment is 
likely to be very small. It was mentioned earlier that the lengthy 
periods of unemployment do not suggest people refusing job offers. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we argued that the labour market for young people is in 
a crisis: employment has been falling, unemployment rising and relative 
wages falling. Althouth large numbers are being taken off the unemploy-
ment register via the YTS, we believe that only disguises the problem. 
What is required is a boost in aggregate demand to mop up the large 
numbers of idle young people. The serious problem of growing long-term 
unemployment amongst the young may be storing up social problems for 
the future. Beveridge (1944) said, "(f)ailure to find any use for adapt-
able youth is one of the worst blots on the record of the periods betw-
een the wars." (p. 72) It is a sad reflection on society that forty 
years later the situation is much worse! 
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A POLICY TO CREATE REAL JOBS -
A PREREQUISITE FOR COMBATTING YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT 
JEAN MAGNIADAS 
CG.T., Paris 
This text presents some reflections on measures and proposals presented 
in France as possibly being able to combat youth unemployment. 
I - YOUTH INTEGRATION AND TRAINING SCHEMES AND EMPLOYMENT 
Over the last few years, as a result of persistent, worsening unemployment 
among young people, governments have taken measures (1) designed to pro-
mote youth integration and vocational training. These were officially as-
signed the aim of promoting the recruitment of young people, preparing 
them more adequately to do a job and bringing up to standard those 
many youths who had failed at school and who we know more often than not 
come from the social sectors undergoing the most difficulties. This Last 
aim was later added to the original aims in preparation for technological 
changes bearing in mind the Low skilL leveL in this area in spite of pro-
gress made at school. 
The Longest-standing of these measures, known as "Employment Pacts" have 
been the subject of many anaLyses which today have alL reached the same 
conclusion, nameLy that this scheme has a very low leveL of efficiency. 
For its part the C.G.T. rejected them from the outset on the grounds that 
basically alL they did was keep young unemployed people waiting without 
really helping them to integrate into the working world or obtain a profes-
sional qualification. A recent OECD report (2) on youth employment in France 
stated that many of the young disadvantaged people who had taken part in 
these programmes were sti LI sociaL cast-offs, and had no stable jobs. 
(1) Françoise AMAT : Les mesures en faveur de La formation et de l'emploi 
des jeunes de 1977 à 1985. Formation Emploi no.9 -
Jan./March 1985. 
(2) O.C.D.E. : L'emploi des jeunes en France, Les stratégies récentes -
O.C.D.E. 1984. 
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The report also stated that many of the practical training courses and 
work contracts that were part of the scheme only led to insecure jobs. 
Likewise, the practical training courses did not help combat periodic 
youth unemployment. The training period was not long enough and their 
content was too Limited to al Low these young people to obtain real qua-
lifications that made up, even partiaLly, for the shortcomings of their 
initial training. 
The courses again chanelLed the young people into the same areas but did 
not produce any worthwhile job opportunities and caused much disappoint-
ment among the young people. The OECD quite rightly pointed out that 
"it was an expensive policy in that the automatic subsidies or tax exemp-
tions meant that employers have profited in an unexpected way when they 
would have had to recruit people anyway, and the real impact of these 
measures on job creation is difficult to determine." (1) 
The criticism levelled at the "Employment Pacts" can also be applied to 
later measures. This is the case with the "General Interest Works" 
("Travaux d'Utilité ColLective" (TUO) and the introductory courses to 
the working life for youths which above alL involved insecure types of 
jobs and provided no real training.(2) On the other hand, we have a 
favourable opinion of the vocational training courses for youths in the 
18-21 age band aimed at youths with a very low leveL of schooling or those 
finding it difficult to integrate into the working world. 
It is worth recalling that the data available on trainees on the 16-18 
year old plan concerns those youths most disadvantaged at school, who did 
not go onto apprenticeships, who Left schooL at 15 or 16 as welL as those 
who left school during the lower sixth form. Most of these people had 
fai Led at schooL and came mainly from large families in which nearLy a 
(1) OECD : op. cit. p. 69. 
(2) We are referring here to the courses resulting from the agreement of 
23 October 1983 and institutionalized by the Act of 24/02/84. 
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quarter of their fathers were inactive. Of these, 9.4% were unemployed or 
pensioned off, and 14,5% were absent from home or deceased. 68.8% of the 
fathers were manual workers (mainly unskilled). 
At the time of the survey (1), 45% of the youths (girls and boys) interviewed 
were unemployed and 9.3% were inactive. Only 15.8% had a job. The others 
were sti LI on the scheme (20.9%), on an apprenticeship or on a training 
scheme (7.2%). 2.1% were doing their miLitary service. 
Although they are too recent to be indicative of the overalL effectiveness 
of the scheme, these results clearly show that the programme wilL not 
shorten the long queues on the Labour market that accompany massive un-
employment and that the only answer is real job creation. The question 
will not be resolved by courses even if their actual content is positive 
and job creation would have a decisive impact on making genuine voca-
tional training activities effective. These results also show the dif-
ficulties inherent in overcoming the handicaps resulting from insufficient 
or unsuitable initial training which is caracterized by failure at school 
and social difficulties. 
However, the resuLts of the jobs/training contracts, another measure 
recently modified and which enjoyed strong State backing, showed a much 
higher proportion of recruitment. In 1984, the figure was 75.5% compared 
to 78.2% in 1982. In 1984, 61.5% of the trainees remained in the company 
where they had done their course as opposed to 64.5% in 1982. In 1984 
as in 1982 a Large proportion (93,2%) obtained stable work contracts 
(unlimited term contracts). On the other hand, only 81.5% of the trainees 
who became employees in another company (14% in 1984 and 13.7% in 1982) 
were given a normal work contract in each of the two periods. 
(1) BREF - no. 12 - February 1985 - bulletin produced by the Centre 
d'Etude et de Recherche sur les Qualifications (CEREQ). 
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The results from this measure are therefore quite significant. It would be 
interesting to know what the recruitment behaviour of the companies con­
cerned would have been if the strong recruitment incentive provided by the 
scheme had not existed. The data available does not alLow such an assess­
ment to be made. 
However, when the measures adopted do lead to jobs, these jobs all too 
often do not match the training received and are therefore unstable. 
We shall now take a brief look at the government's Last scheme. 
The General Interest Works (TUO were launched in November 1984. They 
enable certain bodies (associations, public establishments, locaL author­
ities, works councils and Social Security bodies) to recruit young people 
from 16 to 21 (1) for socially beneficial activities, work to improve the 
environment and community projects. They receive a monthly payment from 
the State of FF 1,200. Work on this programme is underpaid since the pay­
ment received by the youths is well beLow the legaL minimum wage. We there­
fore take the view that this programme effectively calLs this legaL mini­
mum wage into question. The youths spend between 3 months and a year on 
the scheme working half­time (20 hours a week). At the end, they receive 
a "work experience" (?) certificate from the institution organizing the 
programme. Attempts have been made to present the General Interest Works 
as reflecting "a strange consensus among young people for job, time and 
income sharing (2). Through the activities of the CGT's ConfederaL Centre 
for Young People we have noted that the young workers had a realistic view 
of the contents of this programme and that they were not expecting to be 
trained or get a job providing then with a ski LI. But they were not re­
signed to this situation and many of them said their main aim was to get 
a stable, skilled job. 
(1) There is now talk of extending the programme to include adults. 
(2) For the opinion of an apoLogist for the Public Interest Works ­
Cf. François Le Bouteux : les TUC et après ? Droit SociaL 
no. 4 ­ 1985. 
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With no training element included in them, these programmes are aimed at 
providing a cheap, insecure work-force for private or semi-State social 
bodies for certain jobs. This point was not lost on the groups of crafts-
men and smalL companies who regard the scheme as a competing sector which 
could lead to job Losses. The General Interest Works are just another 
example of the increasing instabiLity of working and training regulations 
that is seriously affecting young people and is one of the most serious 
human and material wastes. 
Integration programmes, especially when they do not provide a genuine qua-
lification, effectively come up against the obstacle of an insufficient 
number of real jobs to meet demand. In this context, a change has been 
detectable in the general behaviour of companies for some time now in 
terms of their more generaL management strategy. As a result of their new 
methods of employment management, they tend to resort to temporary con-
tracts and lengthen the trial periods. This is what the French National 
Employment Agency's assessment for 1984 shows (1). 
This increased selectivity particularly affects young job-seekers and 
becomes all the more acute as unemployment gets worse. 
As the crisis gets worse, average "employabiLity" requirements tend to 
increase. The differential "employability" of young people which involves 
their insufficient qualifications, but also employer's selectivity stra-
tegies, is bound to be affected by the crisis. It is in employers' inter-
ests for there to be a high proportion of job-seekers on the labour market 
with a particular qualification that they do not want to recognize and 
against which he puts forward the unilateral idea of "abi Lity", which 
is a cover-up for recruitment discrimination practices. However, the 
(1) It highlights the falL in supply and the spread of fixed term contracts. 
Its Director pointed out "We have noticed that as unemployment goes up, 
companies are .less likely to come to the Agency to find employees" -
La Tribune de l'Economie - 23/4/85. 
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vocationaL training and integration programmes, even if they do have real 
training component and are not soLely aimed at transferring unemployment, 
do not effectively combat the destructive effect of this phenomenon. As 
it becomes massive and lasting, unemployment worsens and exacerbates 
inequalities and hits hardest those sectors trying to reintegrate into 
the labour market, thereby strengthening the strategies designed to reduce 
job stabiLity, to be selective and exclusive and which do so much harm to 
young peopLe. 
This tends to be translated by increasingly selective entry requirements 
for the most attractive training schemes. However, at the same time those 
courses providing training in traditional areas with few job opportunities 
are full. There are cases of waiting lists of more than six months for 
courses providing a qualification at the end. 
It seems appropriate to combat these indirect unempLoyment-induced pheno-
mena, to increase the effectiveness of public funds earmarked for training 
and to Link training more effectively to job opportunities, employment 
and the creation of extra jobs. This directLy concerns the contractual pro-
visions associated with pubLic financing but also the strengthening of 
trade union control over employers' practices in these areas. This poi-
gnantly brings up the link between production - employment - training and 
between growth and employment. 
The rapid advance of unemployment tends to destroy those vocational train-
ing and integration programmes that have a sound content and are not just 
a cover-up for unemployment. This lack of effectiveness backs up the argu-
ments of those in favour of pseudo-solutions aimed at curbing wage costs 
under the pretext of increasing employment. 
II - WAGE LEVELS AND EMPLOYMENT 
The General Interest Works are a low-skiILed form of employment that pro-
vide no qualifications and are of Little value in terms of their content 
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and remuneration (1). They have been seen by some people, and quite cor-
rectly in our opinion, as public encouragement for a measure designed to 
reduce wage costs for young people through calLing the legal minimum 
wage into question. 
Before analysing this proposal, it should be pointed out that young wage-
earners are on the whole subjected to low wages, often around or beLow 
the legaL minimum wage. 
According to the last known survey on low wages (2) as defined by the 
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches on income and wages, the proportion of 
low wages by age group was as follows : under 18 years (94%9; 18 to 20 
years (39%). The proportion of low wages overall was 19.3%. 
It is worth pointing out that the law provides for substantially reduced 
minimum wages for young people under the age of 18 and an even more 
greatLy reduced minimum wage for those on an apprenticeship contract. 
Another survey on wages in 1979 (the last available (3) shows that wages 
for young people under 18 years were 64.4% lower than those for 18-20 
year olds 44.7% lower than average wages. For both of these ranges to-
gether the difference was 57.8%. 
Moreover, those branches where wages are beLow the national average employ 
72.3% of young workers from 15 to 19 years oLd, 68% of 20 to 24 year olds 
(1) The pubLic debate in France on whether those people on the programme 
shouLd be included in the unempLoyment statistics is accompanied by 
the argument as to whether they comprise a particular type of worker 
not subject, because of a legal expedient, to minimum wage legislation. 
(2) Study on low wages. Documents du DERC, no.59, 3ème trimestre 1981 p.64. 
A low wage is conventionally defined as corresponding to FF 2,000 net 
per month in 1977. At that time the average wage for full-time wage 
earners was FF 3,138. 
(3) Les salaires dans l'industrie. Le commerce et Les services. Année 
1976-1979 Archives et Documents - no. 107. 
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whilst onLy 63.7% of employees work in these branches (1). 
Low wages for young peopLe are just part of a much wider scenario. 
Accompanying the rise in unemployment over the Last few years there has 
been a resurgence in economic debate of the neoclassical thesis claiming 
unempLoyment is the result of too high labour costs. This argument has 
to a large extent been propounded by the Employers' National Council 
in the form of their demands for "less regulated" jobs, their question-
ing the legaL minimum wage which has been in force in France since 1950 
and above alL their suggestions that it be replaced by a special lower 
minimum wage for young workers. 
We contest the basic tenents of this theory whose application, through 
deregulation practices, leads to serious social decLine and offers no 
other prospects other than to worsen the crisis. 
As regards the relation between wages and employment, if we look for 
empirical evidence of the neoclassical thesis by briefly comparing the 
share of wage costs in totaL costs and unemployment rates, we find there 
is no significant correlation. "Indeed, the Japanese inflation rate is 
much Lower than the OECD average over the last decade whilst the wage 
share is one of the highest. On the contrary in the United Kingdom, 
wage share was Lower than anywhere eLse at the end of the period yet 
unemployment was greatLy above average," as a recent study on the relation 
between wage costs and employment shows (2). 
This same study compares works by various authors on the subject and con-
cludes they are heterogeneous, "rather negative" and "at variance with 
the insistence of many analysts who regard the development of the wage 
(1) If one excludes non-market services in the branches where wages are 
below the national average, the respective percentages would be 
64.28 (15/19 years), 52.4% (20/24 years) and 42.6% (all empLoyees). 
(2) Jacques le Cacheux and Daniel Szpiro, Part salariale et empLoi -
observations et diagnostics économiques, Revue de l'OFCE, no. 8 -
July 1984. 
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share or the real wage gap (1) as being the main factor in determining 
employment Levels". 
A more specific examination of the impact of wage levels on economic acti­
vity, employment and unempLoyment among young people, which is onLy a varia­
tion of the more general thesis according to which unemployment is due to 
the development of wage costs, shows that the studies available from uni­
versity or official institutions do not confirm the neoclassical theory 
either. An analysis of these studies made by the OECD together with studies 
carried out by that organization itself not only do not confirm it but 
moreover show how inaccurate existing knowledge is of the elasticity of 
demand of young workers to changes in wage Levels and the possibility of 
substitution effects between the young people themseLves or between young 
people and other categories of the work­force. These results do not have 
much social significance if the question is viewed from the perspective 
of a fall in unemployment and not from the point of view of managing an 
increasing mass of unemployed people which might be itnerested in the 
structural effects with a view to reducing certain components of aggre­
gate remuneration. The creation of a lower minimum wage just for young 
people might indeed have effects on the structure of unemployment to the 
detriment of other categories of the wage­earning population. We are 
against this because it does not lead to the creation of new jobs and 
because the resurgence of age­based discrimination for wages or anything 
else can only be greatly discouraging, have adverse effects on produc­
tivity and have a negative impact on job opportunities and therefore also 
on employment. 
The OECD's speciaL study on North America and France (2) concludes that in 
France changes in the minimum wage have no effect on the labour market 
for young peopLe, from the point of view of labour demand. As regards 
(1) Real Wage Gap : a concept which describes the difference between the 
theoretical wage share at full employment and the current observed 
share. 
(2) John P. Martin : Effects of the minimum wage on the labour market for 
young people in North America and in France. OECD Special Studies 
Collection ­ June 1983. 
-113-
suppLy, the changes registered would be of littLe scope and have the oppo-
site effect depending upon whether young females or males were being consi-
dered. 
Moreover, these works confirm studies which aim to assess the impact of 
exemptions from employers' contributions which, theoretically, were 
designed to promote employment and reduce the wage bill. These measures 
have been very or totalLy ineffective in creating real jobs but they 
have Led to selectivity resulting in a redistribution of unemployment 
among the various categories of job-seekers, not to mention the other 
indirect effets. 
These attempts directed at the wage biLl are indicative of a refusaL to 
attack the roots of the structural crisis. EmpLoyment and training poli-
cies are onLy rarely related to an explicit analysis of the crisis. And 
when they are, more often than not they are based on the neoclassical 
theories which after having explained youth unemployment in terms of the 
evolution in attitudes, today attribute it to excessiveLy high wages. 
They do not take into account the role of wages, since they only consider 
them as a cost and underestimate their importance for employment and for 
savings. Of course, an improvement in the empLoyment situation could not 
resuLt just from a Keynesian-type boost. The wages factor is not the only 
factor determining employment leveLs as the dead end reached by policies 
based solely on consumption stimulation shows. These policies come up 
head on against management strategies. After the international boost to 
the French economy in 1981, employers did not want to invest, preferring 
to use their profits for financial operations and to export their capital 
(1). The French government's measures to stimulate consumption after May 
1981 were destroyed by the lack of provisions capable of influencing 
the rationaLe behind company management, even in nationalized companies. 
(1) Rapport Annuel sur la situation économique et sociale de la France 
(mai 1981 à décembre 1982) - CGT - Institut Syndical d'Etudes et 
de Recherches Economiques et Sociales. 
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This rationale led to financial imbalances and the continued extraversion 
of the French economy which worsened the dislocation of its productive 
apparatus and led to increased foreign penetration of its domestic market. 
These conditions meant it was very difficult for French growth and employ-
ment to develop independently. 
Very soon after this period came a period of economic austerity (1) with 
a policy designed to reduce consumption and which is now based on social 
and economic deregulation. To justify this policy, it is cLaimed that the 
increases in profits which accompany it will tomorrow generate the invest-
ment for future modernization and employment. This theory is not credible. 
It just serves to perpetuate excessive, permanent capital accumulation, 
which limits job opportunities and increases unemployment. This can be 
seen from developments in many countries, along with France. For example, 
from 1981 to 1984 the share of wages in the value added of all individual 
companies and businesses fell from 58.2% to 56.2% whilst the profit mar-
gins of these companies rose from 37.2% to 39.1% Real wage costs per unit 
of output fell by 3.1% from 1981 to 1984 (2). Nonetheless, unemployment 
continued to rise from 7.8% in 1981 to 10.1% in 1984. 
0 
0 0 
Massive unemployment cannot be isolated from companies' profit strategies 
and teh reduced efficiency of the production system as seen in the increase 
in capital per unit of output. This relationship is not just a question 
of technology as it is all too often made out to be since other product-
ivity factors, particularly the skill-level of the work-force, the process 
of economic growth and job creation must also be taken into account. 
(1) In France in 1983 domestic consumption made a 0.6% contribution to a 
0.9% increase in the rate of GDP whilst in 1984 the figures were 
0.6% and 1.3% respectively. 
(2) These figures come from the provisional and National Accounts for 1984. 
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The CGT's analyses lead it to believe that the only way to start a process 
of recovery from the crisis is to give priority to the creation of real 
jobs, and particularly skilled jobs, in competitive, efficient sectors in 
economic policy and in management strategies. This implies promoting a 
new, more efficient production combination based on capital savings, the 
skill-level of the workers, improved working conditions and new relations 
between labour and management. As opposed to the exclusive profit crite-
rion, management strategies encouraging economies in the use of. physical 
and financial capital should be promoted. These would lead to an increase 
in value added and allowing a greater share of it to be spent on men 
through job creation and vocational training. This would create the job 
opportunities necessary for increasing production and developing useful 
services. Economic policy and especially State encouragement measures 
should take these same criteria into account. 
This is not possible without full trade union participation and full 
recognition of the workers' rights to be involved in economic policy 
and company management. 
In our opinion, these are the conditions necessary for attacking the 
unavoidable question of job creation which is central to finding a 
solution to the crisis. 
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DOES CUTTING YOUTH WAGES HELP YOUNG WORKERS TO FIND JOBS ? 
FERD CRONE 
Union of Transport Workers, Amsterdam 
PREFACE 
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, youth unemployment is far higher 
than adult unemployment. The teenage unemployment rate rose to 40 % 
in the early eighties, whereas the overall rate was 17 % (taking both as 
a percentage of the active labour force). Of course these facts make the 
struggle against youth unemployment a focal point of government policy and 
often also of negotiations between trade unions and employers. 
Government policy has concentrated on cutting minimum wages and unemploy-
ment benefits for under 23 year-olds. It also encourages special pro-
grammes to develop job skills, especially by subsidizing on-the-job-
training. Finally, the government wants to offer newcomers to the labour 
market public sector jobs for only 32 hours a week, instead of the normal 
38 hours. 
This follows the general worksharing trend at present occurring in the 
Netherlands. 
In this paper I will comment on the effects of the minimum wage cuts. 
Then I shall give some brief information about worksharing by means of 
a reduction of the hours worked by each employee, and possible ways of 
solving youth unemployment. 
1. Introduction to Dutch unemployment 
In the media, the unemployment figures get much more attention than the 
employment figures. Usually one is interested in the number of unemployed 
as well as in the rate of unemployment. In table 1 some figures are given 
from which it appears that youth unemployment is indeed very high in the 
Netherlands. 
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Tab^e_1_^_re22stered_unemglo^ment 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
χ 1000 persons 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
% active labour force 
19 
19­22 
23­24 
total 
( 65) 
59.0 71.9 73.0 62.5 
98.7 140.6 175.2 179.4 
40.4 56.9 71.7 77.0 
479.8 654.6 800.4 
30.8 38.9 41.0 35.1 
15.7 22.3 27.8 28.5 
12.2 16.6 20.5 22.0 
10.7 14.3 17.1 17.6 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between youth unemployment rates and 
those of people over the age of 24. The so called relative youth 
unemployment ratios are also given. It will be seen that youth unemploy­
ment has exceeded that of adults since 1971. A peak is reached in 1979, 
whilst in recent years relative youth unemployment falls. 
fÍ2yEE_l_i_BEÍEÍÍ^E_Z°yÜ2_yDE!DEÍ2Z!DEGÍ_EEÍÍ2§ 
youth 
boys 
++++++++++ girls 
¡a 
it 
li 
2.4 
2.2 
2fl 
li 
li 
1.4 
u 
iß 
αχ 
Oj, s 
^ 
J / 
/' yr-
\ 
_ 1 
■ t 
' 
* * 
■ 
l -I 
1 , 
/T" 
i 
t 
' / 
/ 
J ' 
v 
w 
' i 
1 
t 
■' / 
} 
fi 
4 u\ tt 
1 
% cve 
* 
Λ ψ A h 
m > 
i 
1 
η red ich« id 
; 
sign 
M ! i 
ι i I 
­118­
Minimum wage for youth : a quarter less in four years 
In recent years, minimum wage cuts have been very popular in government 
policy. This policy has focussed on the legal minimum wage for youth, 
although theoretically the relationship between youth wagesand unemployment 
is not clear cut. The minimum wage is a particular case, but it seems 
to be an easy instrument with which to achieve employment objectives. 
In 1974, the government of socialists and christian­democrats introduced 
minimum youth wage legislation, five years after the introduction of 
minimum wages for adults (workers aged 23 and over). This youth wage is 
linked to the adults' minimum and is gradually reduced by 7.5 % per year 
(see Table 2). Since 1981 several measures have been caken which reduce 
the minimum youth wage by about a quarter compared to 1974. 
lE9ÍE_i;_i_!!!!ÍQÍ2yE_y§9§_Í2E_y.2yÍ^_i_lÍ^_lQ£E2^ 
age 
23 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
15 
tions ι 
1974 
% 
100 
92 v¿ 
85 
77 V2 
70 
62 VZ 
55 
47 VZ 
40 
3f 1981 
1981 
% 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
52 VZ 
45 
40 
35 
and 1983 
1983 
% 
100 
85 
72 VZ 
61 VZ 
52 VZ 
45 VZ 
39 V2 
34 VZ 
30 
1974 
(1) 
2049 
1895 
1741 
1587 
1434 
1280 
1126 
973 
819 
1981 
(1) 
2049 
1844 
1639 
1434 
1229 
1076 
922 
820 
717 
1983 
(1) 
2049 
1741 
1485 
1260 
1074 
932 
809 
707 
614 
1983/1974 
% 
0 
­ 8 
­ 15 
­ 21 
­ 25 
­ 27 
­ 28 
­ 27 
­ 25 
(1) : gross wages, basis 1983 , HFL. 
At first sight, the minimum wage cuts seem to have been successful, as the 
number of unemployed youth and the share of teenage unemployment in the 
overall figure started to fall. 
-119-
On reflection, I am not convinced that reductions in the minimum youth 
wage will help to diminish youth problems in the labour market. Let us 
focus first on the wage side of the labour market, and then on the question 
of supply and demand. 
Minimum wage : an instrument or a result ? 
As mentioned above,the minimum wage is only a part of the relationship 
between wages and unemployment 
First, it may create some unemployment for those whose productivity is below 
that wage. On the other hand, a reduction in the minimum wage may create 
some new jobs in the lowest-skills sector of the labour market. 
If this had been the case, one would expect that during the periods when 
the minimum was introduced and raised in real terms, the number of jobs 
paid at minimum level would have risen. Because then the share of 
existing jobs with productivity at or around the rising minimum level 
increases too. Empirically, no such clear relationship has been found 
in the Netherlands. On the contrary, since the introduction of the 
minimum wage, the share of minimum earners (adults and youth) dropped, 
except during a short period just after its introduction. So the 
minimum wage plays a less and less important role. 
Secondly, the minimum wage can have an upward effect on the wage structure. 
This effect has not been found empirically, or it is negligible. 
Thirdly, a minimum youth wage can worsen their competitiveness in 
relation to adults. This means that if the relative youth wage, i.e. 
the wages for youth divided by those of adults, rises, the youth lose 
their jobs to adults (substitution effect). 
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In Figure 2, we can see that neither the introduction of minimum (youth) wages, 
nor the recent reductions, gave exogenous "shocks" to the relative 
youth wage (Ljo) : 
- in 1969, the introduction of the minimum wage for adults did not 
Lead to a falling relative youth wage ; 
- in 1974, when the minimum youth wage was introduced, there was no 
acceleration of a growing relative youth wage 
- the reductions in the minimum wage for youth in the early eighties 
did not lead to an exogenous shock. 
My conclusion is that changes in the LegaL minimum wage do not affect 
the development of wages very strongly. I would rather support the 
converse, that the minimum wage Legislation folLows the market. 
Figure 2 lends support to this proposition. So the minimum wage is 
a resuLt, and not a very useful instrument in wage poLicy. 
Fi gure Z_\_ Re Latiye_wa9es_(earned_ger_hou£2_of _y.out h_çomgared_to_adults_(ma Le) 
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What is important, unemployment or employment? 
So far I havefocussed on the wage side of the labour market. The other 
question I will deal with is the relation between the (minimum) wage 
and employment. 
As mentioned above, teenage unempLoyment has falLen. But of course un­
employment is the result of two variables: the employed population and 
the active labour force. It makes quite a difference to the measurement 
of either employment or unemployment if the active labour force is not 
constant. For it is quite possible that the unemployment rate drops at 
a constant leveL of employment, because of a declining labour force. 
So one should a priori make a choice between studying employment or un­
employment. 
Empirically, it is very cLear from the Dutch data that the active youth 
labour force does not remain constant. It is shown in Figure 3 that the 
teenage labour force fluctuates considerably, due to "exogenous" variables 
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L i ke variations in total population and schooL enrollment. There may also 
be an endogenous relationship between active population and (minimum) 
wage Levels, but it seems to be very weak. The government stimulated 
school enrollment by cutting unemployment benefits. 
I prefer to concentrate research on the employment effects of the trend 
in the (minimum) wage. The reason is of course that employers, who are 
assumed to react to a lower minimum wage, can only work through the number 
of employed. Consider the demand curve. (A different question is whether 
the level of unemployment affects their ability to change wage levels.) 
Employment shouLd also be considered from the social aspect, because 
reducing unemployment without creating new jobs does not reduce the pro-
blems of the unemployed if they give up Looking for jobs, and hence are not 
counted as unemployed. In addition, they feeL obliged to accept new forms 
of on-the-job training with no or very low pay and no prospect of a viable 
job. To ensure that training is followed by jobs, a growth of total emp-
loyment is required. 
Does the labour market work? 
The following conclusions can already been drawn: 
On the wage side of the labour market, the minimum (youth) wage has no 
or very little effect on the generaL wage leveL and the reLative youth 
wage. 
On the supply and demand side, the employment, and not unemployment, 
effects should be studied, because they measure the effect of the (minimum) 
wage development more accurately, and the supply cannot be assumed to be 
constant. 
This Leads to two questions. First, whether a minimum wage cut as such 
would create new jobs at productivity leveLs below the former minimum 
wage: the expanding of employment. 
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It appears that the effect is minor and that there are other, more effec-
tive variables. Studies on minimum (youth) wages show only very small 
elasticities of less than -3% change in youth employment per 10% minimum 
wage increase. 
It is increasingly being argued that in countries where there are special 
youth minimum wage systems, the level of this minimum is already low 
enough. There are other variables that have greater influence on youth 
employment, like growth of population, school enrollment and the overalL 
demand for labour. 
FinalLy, in the year when the minimum youth wage was cut by ten percent 
in HolLand (1981), the labour market cLearing was less effective than 
aLL the other years with the higher minimum youth wage. 
The second question is whether the relative youth wage level (although 
it is not affected by the minimum wage) has much effect on the share of 
youth empLoyment in overall empLoyment. I do not know of any Dutch studies 
on this subject, so I undertook one myself last year. I tried to avoid 
the "traps" mentioned above, so I did not use as a variable the number of 
persons unempLoyed. 
The dependent variable is relative youth employment (Ajo), which can be 
taken as a parameter for the market share of youth as the choice between 
offering a job to a younger of older worker is directly influenced by 
the demanding party: the employer. This is the only way that they, through 
their views on wage Levels and productivity, skilL, obedience, etc., 
affect unemployment. 
One independent variable which can explain a falL in the market share of 
youth is the relative wage, which can mean that youth becomes relatively 
more expensive when the relative youth wage rises. Then we expect a 
negative elasticity. 
The second independent variable is the percentage change in relative 
Labour supply, measured by the active labour force. It can be assumed 
that when the relative supply of youth grows, they will form a larger 
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proportion of the applicants and wiLl thus have better employment oppor-
tunities. 
The third variable is the percentage change in total employment. When 
employment faLls, there will be fewer new vacancies, and (older) employees 
wilL tend to stay in their jobs. Opportunities for new arrivals on the 
labour market, especially teenagers, will diminish rapidly owing to their 
lack of skill, experience, etc. 
These hypotheses are tested with a simple singLe equation model, where 
variables are measured in % changes. (See equations (1) and (2)). 
(1) 
(2) 
Ajo = 0,4Ljo + 0,9Bjo + 1,3At 
(1,69) (8,0) (2,54) 
R2 : 0,76 
DW . statistic: 2,29 
Ajo = 0,77Bjo + 1,55At 
(8,8) (3,0) 
R2 : 0,71 
DW . statistic: 1,99 
Number of observations : 13 (1970-1982) 
Ajo = relative employment = employed teenagers/empLoyed persons aged over 
20 years 
At = overall employment 
Bjo = relative active labour force = a.L.f. teenagers /a.l.f. over 20 
Ljo = relative youth wage 
The regression results indicate that overall employment and the suppLy 
of youth do have a dominant influence on youth changes in the labour 
market. Of course the suppLy data give us some implicit information about 
school enrollment, etc. 
It should be noted that the elasticity of the relative youth wage has the 
wrong sign, and the t-statistic is rather low. This indicates that the 
youth wage has no or a very smaLl and not unambiguous effect on reLative 
youth employment. 
-126-
Estimates using the same equations but an age limit of 23 years (where 
one gets adult's minimum wage), give the same regression results. 
This confirms my concLusion that prices do not play a dominant roLe in 
the (youth) labour market. There are probably rather different things 
which make the working of the labour market much more complex than the 
basic theory of supply and demand suggests. 
Sharing working time 
In the Netherlands, there has been a broad move since 1982 towards work 
sharing, in particular through a reduction of weekly and monthly working 
time. For a majority of workers, working time is reduced to 38 hours a 
week (it was 40 hours). At the moment the unions, and also the govern-
ment, wants another reduction of 5% to 36 hours. The employers are 
resisting another collective reduction, and only want measures for spe-
cial groups: youth, oLder workers (voluntary early retirement) and vol-
untary part-time jobs. 
For youth, this means that they wouLd be offered jobs of some 32 hours 
a week. In recent years the situation on the labour market has been so 
bad that this type of job has spread. The trade unions and the youth 
movement, however, are opposed to this development, as it creates a new 
segment on the labour market of unskilled, low paid and uncertain jobs. 
Moreover it threatens the coLlective agreement covering full-timers. 
The trade unions prefer a collective reduction of hours worked by each 
employee. Of course the empLoyment effects depend on the reallocation 
of the working hours which are freed. The unions want special measures 
for unemployed youth, e.g. by giving them a quota in the reallocation 
of freed hours. As is shown above, this wouLd be the most effective 
instrument to promote youth employment, as work sharing is the onLy 
instrument which can lead to a growth of total empLoyment. 
At the moment, a collective reduction in hours worked is the major ob-
jective, in some cases even leading to strikes in several industries. 
A part of it is the speciaL attention to youth, but now it gets a bit 
under-exposed. 
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I personally fear that, in view of the bad labour market position of 
youth, no end is in sight to the part-time job trend for youth and a 
faLling relative youth wage. Nor wiLL this lead to any improvements 
in the situation of unemployed youth. 
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Young People's Pay and EmpLoyment 
Peter Kane 
Trades Union Congress - London 
Introduction 
The dramatic deterioration in the employment prospects of young peopLe 
over the last five years has generated an intense policy debate. The 
TUC and European trade union movement has been at the forefront of this 
debate as there has been a longstanding concern about the economic and 
social consequences of proLonged unemployment. The TUC has in fact 
recently published in conjunction with the Labour Party a major poLicy 
statement 'A Plan for Training'. Not only does this PLan provide a 
response to the current policies of the UK Government, it aLso deals with 
the underlying changes in the UK and world economy which require new 
policies to equip the workforce with the skills needed for the 21st 
Century. In contrast, the UK Government has produced a belated and 
wholLy inadequate response to the problem of youth unemployment. The 
centraL thrust of the Government's strategy is the drive for greater 
wage and labour market "flexibiLity". 
This paper is largeLy concerned with analysing the evidence and rationale 
behind the Government's flexiblity model. It argues that it wouLd have 
profoundly damaging social and economic consequences as it would result 
in a deepLy divided labour market and a low wage-Low productivity economy. 
Background 
The UK Government's youth unemployment policies are dominated by the 
belief that young workers have been priced out of jobs (1). The 
( 1) P.M. January 1984: "We would have more people employed if somehow 
people who are responsible for negotiating wages had not insisted 
on much higher wages for young people". 
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solution therefore Lies in young peopLe pricing themselves into employ-
ment by wage cuts and through the weakening or removaL of 'obstacles' 
which have prevented greater flexibiLity. Young people are not alone in 
being offered this cure as this solution is seen as having general 
application to the wider unemployment problem. However, young peopLe wilL 
often be the first and most severely affected by a range of measures which 
include the reform abolition of Wages Councils, the breaking up of fulL-
time jobs, the use of casual short-term jobs with Less security of employ-
ment, weakening of sociaL security and other forms of income support and 
government schemes such as the Young Workers Scheme. Of central importance 
to this strategy is a weakening of trade unions through restrictive 
Legislation at a national leveL and the return of a 'macho' style of 
management at a company and plant Level. 
Evidence 
The evidence on which to judge the rationale for the strategy can be 
looked at in three ways. 
First, econometric studies of the youth pay-empLoyment relationship in 
the UK have fai Led to find any consistent link between the pay of aLl 
young workers and their employment. A number of serious weaknesses have 
been revealed (1) in the most recent DE study (WeLls 1983) (2) which make it 
impossible to place much weight on the results. Nevertheless, it is 
significant that it confirmed that the key factor affecting youth employ-
ment was the general leveL of employment in the economy as a whole. 
SecondLy, the pattern of real wages and employment since 1979 appears to 
contradict the UK Government's case as youth real wages have faLlen in 
both absolute terms and in relation to adult workers and yet youth 
unemployment has risen continuously. Young males and women aged 18-20 
have experienced a real pay cut of 3% and 2% respectively and young manual 
workers aged beLow 18 have had real wages cut by 6%. The relative decline 
of youth wages is set out in TabLe 1. 
(1) P. Junakar and A. Neale (September 1984): Relative Wages and 
the Youth Labour Market; 1ER Warwick. 
(2) W. WelLs (1983) 'The Relative Pay and Employment of Young People' 
Department of Employment Research Paper No. 42 
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39.7% 
61.0% 
100% 
1979 
56.0% 
74.6% 
100% 
34.9% 
55.7% 
100% 
1984 
48.3% 
67.9% 
100% 
TABLE 1 - Young Workers Pay as a Percentage of Adult Pay 
MEN 1979 1984 
Under 18 
18-20 
21 and over 
WOMEN 
Under 18 
18-20 
21 and over 
Source: New Earnings Survey 
Thirdly, there is little evidence that Government measures which have 
or are likely to be introduced in order to force down youth wages will 
have the desired effect on employment. The Government has already 
acknowledged the failure of the Young Workers Scheme which is specificalLy 
designed to encourage employers to reduce youth wages, as it has announced 
the termination of the Scheme in 1986. The response to the YWS was far 
less than originally anticipated and research (1) has shown that over 
80% of the jobs would have been created in any case or have resulted from 
the displacement of older workers. Similarly, the Government's view that 
Wages Councils need to be reformed or abolished particularly because of 
their impact on youth employment is unsupported by firm evidence. In 
fact a recent NEDO study (2) of the Distributive Trades concluded that 
existing research 'left largely unproven the assertion that the wage 
rates determined by Wages Councils are substantially reducing the employ-
ment prospects of young peopLe'. 
(1) A. Rajan (1984) Young Workers' Scheme; A PreLiminary 
Assessment. IMS Sussex. 
(2) NEDO (1985) Employment Perspectives and the Distributive 
Trades. 
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The NEDO report suggested that the key factors influencing youth employ-
ment prospects were the overaLl Level of demand in the economy and volume 
of retaiL saLes, retailing practices and Local labour market conditions. 
This conclusion is supported by the views expressed by Leading retai Lers 
following changes to employment costs which were likely to impact most on 
low paid workers and women in the 1985 Budget; Marks and Spencer, for 
example, claimed that they would have Little effect as it recruited on a 
longer term basis in line with its investment and sales planning. 
The UK government's strategy of forcing down youth wages and removing 
'rigidities' from the Labour market therefore receives very Little 
empirical support. The clear view which emerges is that the key determinant 
of youth employment is the overaLl level of employment, output and saLes. 
Why, therefore in the face of this evidence does the UK Government persist 
with this approach and what are the implications for the economy if it is 
carried through? The reason why is straightforward: it provides an 
opportunity for the Government to pLace the. burden of the blame for the 
rise in unemployment on others, especially trade unions. Moreover, the 
acceptance of the conclusions reached above would entail the reversal of 
the deflationary macroeconomic strategy in which so much political capital 
has been invested by the UK and other W. European Governments. Given that 
the continuation of this strategy implies slow and sporadic economic 
growth, these governments are forced into depressing productivity and 
wages as the only way of creating more jobs. 
Implications 
The implication of developing a low wage - Low productivity economy are 
most clearly seen by an examination of the long term viability of such a 
strategy for the economy as a whole and of the impact on training and 
skilLs. Although it may Lead to the creation of a small number of low 
grade jobs in the short'term it is untenable in the long term: first, it 
stands sensible economics on its head to suggest that the UK economy 
should enter into a competitive reduction of wages and working conditions -
trying to pass the economies of S.E. Asia on the way down just as they 
are on the way up and proving that improved economic performance goes hand 
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in hand with rising living standards. Secondly, the implied decline in 
the tradeable sector wiLl create major structural difficulties in the 
balances of payments. ThirdLy, even if productivity and output did rise 
in the remaining primary employment sector it would not be sufficient in 
the light of investment and R & D trends to sustain current living 
standards even if redistributive policies were introduced. 
The major part of the population would suffer a sharp decLine in living 
standards and economic and social divisions would widen as may groups of 
workers, such as young peopLe and women, would be marginalised into 
inferior jobs or squeezed out of the labour force altogether. 
The impact of this strategy on ski Lis and training would accentuate 
these divisions. The general skill leveL of the workforce wilL be reduced 
as the type of jobs which wilL be created will be in the Low paid 
'service' (servant?) sector. This wiLl not onLy lead to a continuing 
decline in private training through the traditional apprenticeship system 
which is concentrated in manufacturing. It will also encourage a further 
rundown ih public provision through industrial training'boards, ski LL 
centres and expenditure on quality training in YTS - there is-Little 
'economic' vaLue in training young people to a high leveL in order to 
perform menial tasks. This wiLl mean, however, that the skill 'gap' which 
currently exists between the UK and other Leading industrial economies 
such as W. Germany, the USA and Japan wiLl grow. 
At the company Level, the segmentation of the labour force into a small 
relatively welL paid, secure and skilLed 'primary' group and a low paid, 
unskilled 'secondary' group of workers wiLl also tend to depress the 
level of training and encourage the deskilLing of work processes. 
Although this may produce short-term cost saving to the firm, they wiLl 
be more than outweighed by the higher turnover, weaker job attachment and 
low morale which are often associated with unskilled, unstable jobs. 
Moreover, firms will face considerable difficulties in expanding the 
primary workforce in the event of a marked increase in demand as the 
deskilled secondary labour force will become less and less adaptable to 
change. There are already signs of skill shortages despite the current 
high levels of unemployment. 
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It is clear that skilLs and training do need to be adapted to take 
account of changes in the occupational and industrial structure. Training 
policies should, however, be directed towards the creation of a more 
highly skilLed and flexible workforce which would help to reduce the 
gap with the UK's main competitors. The extension of YTS into a two-year 
scheme is welcome as it provides the potential for a more coherent 
programme of education, training and work experience. However, the future 
credibility of YTS wilL depend on the avaiLabiLity of quality training 
and worthwhile productive employment in which young workers are abLe to 
apply the ski Lis they have acquired. 
The extension of YTS is not however a sufficient response to the current 
economic situation or to the major long-term structural changes in the 
economy. The TUC has called for a larger injection of government resources 
into further education and vocational training which recognises the wider 
benefits of a skilled workforce. At the same time, the trade union 
movement are discussing what changes are required to the traditional 
apprenticeship system to ensure that it is relevant to current needs. 
ConcLusion 
This paper has shown that there is Little empirical evidence to support 
the UK and other W. European Governments' claim that greater wage and 
Labour market 'flexibility' is the route to a significant increase in 
youth employment. The creation of a Low wage - low economy is not onLy 
socially undesirable but also economically untenable in the long term. 
The most effective means of reducing youth unemployment is to reverse 
the current deflationary macroeconomic strategy and to ensure that young 
people are provided with a coherent programme of education, training 
and work experience. 
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YOUTH PAY AND EMPLOYERS' RECRUITING PRACTICES 
THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE 
Isidoro Franco Mariani 
(Confindustria - Roma) 
1. According to the latest figures (January 1985), there are currently 
1,250,000 young people in ItaLy looking for work, representing more 
than half of the unemployed work force and 5.5% of the total work 
force. 
This means that in terms of numbers youth unemployment is large in 
Italy as well. 
Indeed, in some respects, the problem is greater than in other Commu-
nity countries. According to the Latest Eurostat estimates (April 
1984), the overalL unemployment rate for young people under 25 years 
of age is 33% in Italy compared with a Community average of 20.8%. 
For young men the rate is 27.4% (Community average : 19.5%), and for 
young women 39.9.% (Community average : 24.4%). 
None of the other 9 Community countries shows such a high level of 
unemployment for young people under 25. 
The increase in the number of young people registered as unemployed 
in ItaLy from 1978 onwards has been less marked than in most of the 
other countries. However, unlike these other countries (with the sole 
exception of Belgium), the increase has been greater for women than 
for men. As in other Community countries, young women represent the 
majority of young people registered as unemployed, showing the change 
of attitude of younger generations of women towards work compared 
with previous generations. 
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2. From the qualitative point of view, on the other hand, youth unemploy-
ment is considered a less serious problem in Italy than in the other 
countries. 
This is due to the fact that in ItaLy family structures are still 
relatively intact and the family unit stilL plays an important role, 
not onLy in the countryside (more than 12% of the labour force is 
employed in agriculture), but also amongst the urban population. 
Young people tend to remain with their families, even when they have 
become adults, at least untiL they marry (and, in the large cities, 
even after getting married, due to the difficulties of finding housing), 
The possibility stilL exists, then, of taking advantage of the 
material "protection" offered by the family unit, and sharing the 
famiLy income. 
Given this protection, young people who are unable to find stabLe 
employment frequently proLong their studies, whilst others busy 
themselves with intermittent and marginal work which at least pays 
them "pocket money". 
3. This means that from the economic point of view, youth unempLoyment 
does not seem to be a major problem in Italy. 
However, let us not forget the moraL side to the question. Demorali-
zation, demotivation and the risk of deviating into illicit activities 
remain the most important negative prospects for the future, with the 
danger of many young people having to face aduLt life in a permanent 
state of underemployment, if not total unemployment. 
We must also bear in mind that Italy as a country is characterized 
by widespread unemployment - or more accurately, underemployment -
of a structural nature, caused by a series of imbalances : between 
needs and resources, between investment and consumption, and so on. 
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In such a situation, youth unemployment forms part of a larger picture. 
Also, youth unemployment cannot be said to be more important than that 
of heads of fami Lies, of single women, of older adults without adequate 
social security protection etc. 
The specific nature of the problem is shown by the fact that we are 
deaLing with young people who have never worked and who, owing to a 
lack of suitable faciLities, risk not even being able to begin to 
work. 
4. The application in Italy of wage differentiaLs - or, more generaLly, 
of differences in Labour costs - does not in itself appear sufficient 
to encourage the empLoyment of young people. 
In the past, the egalitarian policy pursued by workers' trade unions 
in wage negotiations since the end of the 1960s, had led to the abo-
lition of any differences between young people's and adults' pay at 
the Legal minimum end of the pay scale. 
This tendency has been favoured by legal interpretations which read 
art. 37 of the Italian Constitution, which guarantees equal pay for 
equaL amounts and quality of work, as meaning equality of positions 
and job functions, without recognizing that a younger person is ine-
vitably Less productive than an older one. According to these interpre-
tations, the cost of living allowance in particular (the variable 
element in pay, governed by a sliding scale, which represents, for 
the lowest paid, more than haLf of aggregate pay) should be the same 
for alL, both young people and aduLts. 
5. As a result, collective labour contracts, both for workers and salaried 
staff, do not contain any differences in pay leveLs by age (or by sex); 
differences which can stilL be found, in the case of skilled workers, 
in the minimum leveLs fixed for young apprentices. To these minimum 
pay scales we must add, in order to arrive at aggregate take-home 
pay, the cost of living allowance, the amount of which is greater 
than the minimum wage amounts and, as has already been stated, is the 
same for everyone. 
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In fact, the aggregate take-home pay of an apprentice is 95% of that of 
a qualified worker. 
Whilst employers' social security contributions for apprentices are 
lower than those for adults (which amount to around 40% of wages), 
this difference in costs does not in itself provide a sufficient 
incentive to take on new apprentices. 
6. The onLy statistical surveys available on wage differentials between 
young peopLe and adults are those done by Eurostat on wage structures, 
in 1966, 1972 and 1978. 
In 1972, the pay of male workers under 21 in ItaLy was approx. 22% 
below the average (for skilLed workers the difference was 24-25%, 
whilst differences were Less marked in the case of women). These 
differentials were larger than those of alL other Community countries, 
with the exception of the Netherlands (1). There is reason to assume 
that these differences are due more than anything else to the fact 
that most young people are employed in lower paid jobs (as well as 
the fact that periodical seniority increases are certainly granted 
less regularLy in the case of young workers) and not to differences 
in pay due to age, for which, as has been stated earlier, there is 
no contractual provision for people on the same basic pay leveL. 
7. Generally, experience in Italy shows that the decision whether or not 
to employ young people is connected with factors other than salary 
leveLs. 
In 1977 the Italian Parliament adopted Law no. 285 on the promotion 
of youth employment. 
(1) 
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These measures prescribed that employers taking on skilled young people 
on a fixed-term contract would receive a subsidy equal, in Lira, to 
about 10% of the average contractual pay at that time. However, the 
same law required employers wishing to take advantage of this system 
to take on young people by order of position on an official listing, 
i.e. without any right of choice of candidate. As a result, of the 
647,000 young peopLe originally on these lists, onLy a little more 
than 22,000 were taken on over a three year period by private industry 
( a further 80,000 were given jobs in the public sector). 
On the other hand, Law no. 79 of 1983 made provisions, for an experi-
mental 12-month period, for people to be chosen from the above List 
by name. Within 12 months a further 113,000 young people had been given 
fixed-term contracts involving vocational training. 
After the expiry of this law - which did not provide for employers' 
sociaL security contributions for the young people they took on other 
than a Lower Level of sociaL security contributions aLready provided 
for in Law 285/1977, it was superceded by another (no. 863/1984), 
which, in place of fixed term empLoyment/training contracts, provided 
companies with the possibility of choosing young peopLe individually 
and giving them non-renewable empLoyment/training contracts for periods 
of no longer than 24 months. 
Nonetheless the inflexible nature of the conditions and the proce-
dural compLexities of obtaining government approval to enter these 
contracts have meant that this initiative has met with little success. 
Indeed, in the first six months in which this new law was in effect, 
work and training projects were approved for only one quarter of the 
number of young people who were given work during the same period 
under the employment/training contracts provided for by the 1983 
legi sLation. 
8. The Italian experience suggests therefore, at least in the ItaLian 
situation, that increases in youth employment are encouraged not so 
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much by reductions in pay or work costs compared with those of aduLt 
workers, as by alLowing companies to make their own choice of whom 
they employ, without being too tightly bound as to the duration of 
employment, by administrative procedures, by union controL etc. 
This is not to say that sizeable salary reductions cannot also be a 
useful instrument; and indeed the proposal to introduce a "starting 
salary" for alL young people entering work for the first time has 
been made by Confindustria, the private industrialists' organization, 
in a document dated October 10, 1984. A simiLar proposal was also 
formulated soon after by the Minister of Finance. But, as mentioned 
previously, there are serious Legal obstacles to the introduction of 
salary differentials based on the age of workers (2). 
Currently, salary differentials can only be applied in the case of 
apprentices, who are, however, as mentioned under point 5 above, still 
too expensive in comparison with production workers. For this reason 
there is a tendency to reduce costs : a recent union agreement reached 
in December 1983 in the craft sector provided for overalL pay leveLs 
of apprentices under 18 of between 58% and 85% of that of qualified 
workers and of between 62% and 85% for older apprentices. 
Other instruments Likely to favour a higher LeveL of empLoyment amongst 
young people compatible with the general conditions of the labour mar-
ket and within the context of a growth poLicy aimed at broadening the 
output base are linked with greater fLexibility of contractual formu-
lae for people working in companies (part-time contracts, fixed-term 
contracts, employment/training contracts, training periods inside 
companies, interim work, etc.). Also there is a need to provide fiscal 
and financial incentives in the form of technical assistance for peopLe 
who want to become self-empLoyed as independent entrepreneurs either 
on their own or as partners in cooperatives. 
(2) 
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10. At the end of last April the Minister of Labour announced to both 
Labour and management his intention of encouraging a higher leveL 
of employment by means of series of measures providing, among other 
things, for young people: 1) 40,000 work and training contracts over 
a two year period; 2) incentives to encourage new forms of working 
partnerships in work and production cooperatives as well as in com-
panies, to be set up primarily by young people with financial and 
technical support during the start-up and marketing phase; 3) for 
young long-term unemployed, the opportunity of working for "fixed 
"but significant" periods of time. To this end work projects "with 
long term benefits for the community" (preservation and improvement 
of cultural heritage, of equipment belonging to public services 
and urban areas, and environmental protection) (3). These proposals 
are detailed in a report published in September, on employment 
policies for the next ten years. 
(3) 
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Notes 
(1) Analysis of the results of this research shows that the differences 
in salaries by age of workers in ItaLian industry are not very differ-
ent from those found in France and Germany (but less than those 
recorded in Belgium and the Netherlands). However, in 1966 Italian 
salaries always increased with age, whilst in other countries one 
noted a reduction as age increased. By 1972 this situation had 
changed, evidently as a result of egalitarian policies pursued after 
1968-69, and the second survey shows a situation in Italy more similar 
to that in the other Community countries. Moreover, in 1966 Italy 
was the country in which the salaries of young peopLe under the age 
of 21 were closest to those of people in the middle of their working 
life. In 1972, in the other countries the differential between 
younger groups of workers and those in the middLe of their working 
life appears narrower than in 1966, but in Italy the opposite appears 
to have happened, (cf. GUISEPPE CANULLO: Retribuzione e occupazione: 
differenziali per sesso ed et§, (Work and pay, age and sex-based 
differentials) in "Costo del lavoro e occupazione", surveys carried 
out by R. SchiattarelLa and G. CanulLo, edited by Pietro Alessandrini, 
Il Mulino, Bologna 1978; for observations on the phenomena of the 
reduction of salary differentials between young people and adults 
observed after 1969. See aLso: ALBERTO ZEVI: Differenziali salariali 
e atteggiamenti dei giovani verso il Lavoro, (Salary differentials 
and the attitude of young peopLe towrads work) in "Politica ed 
economia", 1978, no. 4). 
At the time of drafting of the present memorandum the ItaLian results 
of the third Community survey on pay structures (reference year 1978) 
are not yet available. 
(2) One way of avoiding these obstacles is not to link the "starting 
salary" with the worker's age, but to fix it with reference to the 
initiaL period of activity in the company. Another way is to agree 
that young people, for a certain period of time, are either not 
entitled, or only entitled in reduced amounts, ro certain regular 
payments made in addition to the minimum wage (production premiums, 
additional monthly payments etc.) under the terms of company-wide 
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pay contracts. Agreements of this kind have recently been reached in 
certain companies and in certain geographical areas, referred to by 
LINO TERLIZZI in his artici entitled Sconti speciali per giovani 
(special youth deductions), published in "Mondo Economico" no. 18, 
of May 6, 1985. 
(3) In the same document the Minister gave advance notice that the ten-
year plan for empLoyment prepared by the Minister of Labour in line 
with the industrial policy programme of the Minister of Industry and 
in coordination with the Planning bodies, would be presented in May 
to the competent bodies and to Labour and management. 
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THE FIGHT AGAINST YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE NETHERLANDS (PLANS AND IMPACT) 
P.J.L. VAN RINTEL 
Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen 
I - INTRODUCTION 
For the Netherlands 1984 wiLl be a turning point in the fight against 
youth unemployment. 
Since 1980 the Dutch economy has been rather slack. It has been estimated 
that at that time one out of every two jobs in the manufacturing-industry 
operated at a loss. 
Therefore it was hardly surprising that in the subsequent years a subs-
tantial loss of jobs occurred. At the same time about 70,000 school-
leavers a year are unable to find jobs. 
The reduction in empLoyment and the (still) growing workforce causes 
great concern. This concern relates even more strongly in the case of 
young people among whom the unemployment rate is much higher than among 
other, age categories. 
Against this background the employers and trade union federations repre-
sented in the Foundation of Labour reached agreement in November 1982 
on recommendations for the 1983 round of wage bargaining talks at company 
and industry-wide LeveL. 
One of the recommendations was a policy, aiming at a redistribution of 
work to fight youth unemployment. In the ensuing process of free bai— 
gaining employers and unions put forward new initiatives to fight youth 
unemployment. These results however were overshadowed by the results of 
reduction of working time. 
On July 13th 1984 the Foundation of Labour reached an agreement in line 
with the 1982 central recommendations (on recommendation) on imparting 
an extra impulse to the fight against youth unemployment. 
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In Line with these recommendations employers committed themselves to a 
poLicy on tackling youth-unemployment. Therefor it is gratifying, that 
after years of excessive growth of the unempLoyment rate (especially for 
young people), the average number of unemployed peopLe younger than 25 
years, shows a slight reduction in 1984 and that for 1985 a reduction 
of 28,000 is expected. 
Table : Unemployed people younger than 25 years (*1000) 
younger than 19 years 
19 tilL 23 years 
23 tilL 25 years 
Total 
1982 
71.9 
140.6 
56.9 
1983 
73.0 
175.2 
71.7 
1984 
62.5 
179.4 
77.0 
1985 
54.0 
163.9 
73.1 
269.4 319.9 318.9 291.0 
Now, one year after the JuLy 1984 recommendations, we may conclude that 
the aim of these recommendations has been reached. The number of young 
unemployed peopLe has been reduced and about 20,000 young longterm job-
Less have been accommodated in the labour process. 
Reasons for this success might be : 
- The overaLl recovery of the Dutch economy in combination with the im-
provement in industrial profits. 
- The central recommendations of November '82 and JuLy '84 and the related 
results of the collective bargaining process 1983/1984 and 1985. 
- Last but not least the cut in the Legal minimum wages. 
In the folLowing paragraphs we will describe in detail the central nego-
tiations and the results of the collective bargaining process since 1983. 
The paper ends with a look at the reduction of the minimum wages. 
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II - CENTRAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
On November 24th 1982 for the first time in ten years the centraL fede-
rations of employers and trade unions represented in the Foundation of 
Labour reached an agreement on recommendations for the collective bar-
gaining process at company and industry-wide levels. This frame agree-
ment holds recommendations with respect to : 
- Improvement of (trade and industrial) profits. 
- Improved distribution of existing employment through for instance, 
shorter working hours and an increase in the use of part-time Labour. 
- Measures to fight unemployment. 
It was understood between parties that the improved distribution of 
existing employment should not lead to extra costs to the enterprises 
concerned. Within the Foundation of Labour some aspects of a division 
of labour and the fight against youth unemployment could be discussed 
with the intention to make recommendations before 1 January 1983 (for 
the complete text see appendix 1). 
The importance of the agreement is that the central federations of 
employers and of workers accept responsibility for the handling of the 
unemployment problem, and youth unemployment in particular. 
However, it was not possible to arrive at recommendations before 1 
January 1983, On March 4th 1983 Mr. Van Veen, chairman of the Dutch 
employers organisation VNO, wrote a letter to his members about 
"employers recommendations to fight youth unempLoyment". In this letter 
employers showed three possible ways of creating more jobs for young 
peopLe despite the decline in industrial employment. 
These suggestions were : 
- Introduction contracts. 
the employer offers an introduction period during which an unemployed 
young person wiLl be acquainted with the working procedures of the 
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firm. The duration of the period depends on the education and the ideas 
of the unemployed young person. There is no guarantee for the young per-
son that he/she will be taken on at the end of the introduction period. 
- The apprenticeship system. 
During a certain period the apprentice wilL receive professional train-
ing related to the function he/she wiLl fulfil in the future. This 
training often takes place in industrial training centres or on the 
job training. The student must follow a vocational training course 
for at least one day per week. In principle, the employee cannot 
claim a minimum wage, instead he receives an apprenticeship fee with 
compensation, fixed by the partners to the collective agreement. 
For the employer this approach means that young people will be trained 
to become skilled labourers, so the number and the quality of the 
skiLled people within the firm wilL be maintained. For the young 
employee this approach means that he/she wilL have an opportunity 
to acquire professional training and at the end he/she wilL receive 
a certificate, which means a better chance of a job. 
- Accelerated incorporation of young people in the firms. 
The acceleration of incorporation of young people in the enterprises 
can be served by negotiating collective labour agreements with a working 
time of 80% of the normaL working time with adjusted wages. For ins-
tance a firm which requires four more employees can take into service 
5 instead of 4 unemployed people when the future employees wiLl have 
a working time of 80% of the normal working time. If the working time 
is further reduced to 50% of the normal working time, then there are 
possibilities not only for 4 more employees but also the remaining 
time can be used for further education. 
For the employer it is extremeLy difficult to put the recommendations into 
practi ce. 
In spite of the many reorganisations in 1983, which employers had to face 
to secure the continuation of their business, the employers also felt res-
ponsible for contributing to the fight against youth unemployment. Many 
employers at both company and industry-wide leveLs put forward initiatives 
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along these lines in order to reduce youth unemployment. These initiatives 
are temporary Labour contracts, educational training for a specified time, 
combined instruction - and labour agreements, part-time functions and to 
institute training funds. 
These arrangements are not onLy made for employees covered by a collective 
labour agreement. A lot of enterprises take regional initiatives to fight 
youth unemployment. 
In this context the plan made by the employers' and employees organisa-
tions for industry can be mentioned. 
With the cooperation of the government a plan has been made for the years 
1985 and 1986. The main objective of this plan is to prevent a further 
increase in unemployment and at the same time to reduce existing unemploy-
ment because the industrial partners were unabLe to execute the plan alone, 
firstly because it could not succeed without a solid foundation and second-
ly because the partners were facing bottlenecks which could onLy be re-
solved through new legislation, the plan was put before the Foundation 
of Labour in the middLe of May 1984. 
Again on the basis of discussion of the Industry-plan on July 13th 1984 
the Foundation of Labour calLed on the parties of collective contracts 
to make effective agreements on imparting an extra impulse to the fight 
against youth unempLoyment, in connection with policies aiming at a 
redistribution of Labour over the next few years. 
The Foundation of Labour is thinking of both the creation of more jobs 
for young people and an extra effort to accommodate jobless young schooL-
leavers of all types and of alL leveLs of training and to reduce the 
number of young longterm jobLess by about 20,000. An effort by both 
industry and government is required for this. Crowding-out effects on 
others should be Limited as far as possible. 
Bearing in mind the specific characteristics of the various categories 
of young workers, the specific natures and possibilities of individual 
firms and branches, and possible labour market bottlenecks, the Foundation 
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of Labour underscores the importance of a selective and pluriform approach 
in order to attain the set goals. 
Without seeking to be exhaustive, the Foundation of Labour is thinking 
of the foLlowing options besides the creation of extra jobs for young 
workers (including possibly part-time jobs) : 
- reinforcement and expansion of the apprenticeship system so that its 
total capacity wiLl be doubLed as compared with 1982, whereby an opti-
mum matching with Short-term Medium-Level Vocational Training wilL be 
important; 
- training by in-house and branch schools; 
- creation of on-the-job training facilities, notably for young workers 
who cannot (yet) be accommodated in the apprenticeship system; custo-
mary terms of employment shouLd apply in accordance with the degree to 
which the partners to the collective agreements feel that the subjects 
are engaged in productive labour; 
- creation of growth jobs, for which the growth route is determined 
through collective bargaining, also taking into consideration the 
customary working times in the firms and branches concerned. 
In conclusion the Foundation of Labour calLs on alL parties concerned, 
including the government in its roLe of employer to foLlow these recom-
mendations (see appendix 2). 
Soon after the recommendations the cabinet consulted the Foundation of 
Labour on removing possible bottlenecks, which could obstruct the imple-
mentation of youth pLans. These bottlenecks are the Legal minimum wage 
and the social security system. 
a. The Legal minimum wage 
Many of the youth plans contain a combination of training and work. 
In the case of productive labour every employee who works more than one 
third of the normal working time has a right to a Legal minimum wage. 
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Part-time work means payment on a pro rata basis. In the case of training 
there is no Legal right to a minimum wage. 
The distinction between work and training is not always clear and payment 
agreements between employer and employee can be misunderstood. To prevent 
such misunderstanding Social Affairs and Employment Minister J. de Kining 
introduced Legislation, stating that under certain circumstances the 
legal minimum wage does not apply to employees taken into service under 
a youth plan (act of June 27th 1985). 
The circumstances mentioned above are : 
- there has to be a collective labour agreement, which applies to the 
labour relation. 
- the remuneration of the employee has to be fixed by a coLlective labour 
agreement. 
- there has to be a written training or familiarisation contract in the 
coLlective labour agreement. 
In those sectors where no coLlective labour agreements exist, the partners 
will be permitted to reach a collective labour agreement, specific to the 
labour relation of the young employee. The Legislation wiLl be in force 
untiL 31 December 1986; after that the number of employers and employees 
which have made use of this provision will be evaluated. 
b. Social security system 
At present family allowance benefits are payable for unemployed young 
people aged up to 18. 
Family allowance benefits are also payable for young unemployed persons 
aged 18 to 21, who spend the majority of their time in education. 
Other unemployed young persons are entitled to a benefit under the state 
group regulations for unemployed persons. 
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Although there seems to be a clear distinction between unemployed persons 
to whom a famiLy allowance benefit applies and those who are entitled 
to a benefit under the state group regulations, a situation can arise 
in which on the basis of a youth plan a young person wiLl accept a com-
bined Labout and training agreement for 32 hours, which does not provide 
him with enough income to be self-supporting. At present the way in which 
the majority of time is spend determines whether family alLowance benefit 
is payable, or whether the person is entitled to supplementary benefit 
under the State Group Regulation. 
To prevent confusion, SociaL Affairs State Secretary L. de Graaf has made 
provisions to determine which benefit is applicable : 
- young peopLe aged up to 18 and those studying for more than 50 percent 
of their time and aged under 21 are eLigible for family allowance. 
- young people aged between 18 and 21, who work at Least haLf of the agreed 
time (that is at least 16 hours or more out of the 32 hours agreed upon 
under the youth plan) and young persons older,than 21 are entitled to 
a benefit under the State Group Regulations. 
Furthermore the State Secretary cancelled the obligation for young people 
aged 18 to 23 to seek jobs if they participate in a youth plan and are 
entitled to an additional benefit. 
Ill - AGREEMENTS ON SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE 
In the process of free bargaining the partners to the collective agreements 
in the Netherlands have agreed upon several initiatives to fight youth 
unemployment. 
In general there are four kinds of provisions : 
a. agreements to employ more unemployed young persons in part-time func-
tions or on growth jobs. The wages will be pro rata. 
b. more and better vocational possibilities to give the unemployed young 
persons a better start on the labour market. 
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c. familiarisation contracts, which are neither work nor training contracts, 
These contracts are of short duration andare designed to facilitate 
familiarity with working Life. 
d. a combination of a, b and c. 
Examples of these provisions in some major branches of industry and major 
companies are : 
- During the 1983 coLlective bargaining process partners in the Graphic 
Industry have agreed on a youth pLan. This plan aimed at empLoying some 
1,800 young unemployed persons in 1983 and 1984 (about 4,0% of the 
employees, covered by the collective agreement), mainly on a part-time 
basis. For 1985 a training - and youth - pLan have been agreed. 
Some elements are : 
0 the training of 1,000 apprentices and additional 500 unemployed per-
sons each year. 
0 extra education possibiLities. 
0 Labour agreements for apprentices for three days a week (with a payment 
for 2,5 days). 
0 labour agreements for the duration of the training. 
- The partners to the collective Labour agreements for Banking have agreed 
to offer 2,500 young people (about 3% of the employees, covered by the 
collective agreement) a part-time job for 50% of the normal working 
time. 
In addition 400 apprentices wilL be taken into service on a mixed 
training and labour agreement for two years. 
One day a week the apprentice wiLl go to school and 2,5 days a week 
he/she wilL have on'the job training. The wages are 50% of the standard 
minimum wage for young people. 
FinalLy a training agreement for 2 years wilL be offered to a maximum 
of 1,000 pupils. These pupils wiLl get a training alLowance of HFL 500 
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per month. (For 1985 the negotiations did not lead to a collective labour 
agreement.) 
- The partners to the coLlective Labour agreement for Insurance have 
agreed on an extra placement drive for 300 unemployed young persons 
a year during the period 1983-1985. 
The aim of the drive is to give young people a better position on the 
Labour market by providing them with a short foui—month training course. 
In addition vacancies wiLl be fi Lied by young people on a part-time 
basis . With this Last provision the partners expect the creation of 
about 100 additional part-time jobs. 
- The partners to the collective labour agreement of the Construction 
Industry have agreed on a working time of 80% of the standard working 
time for new employees beLow 21 years if there is no training agreement 
and below 22 years if there is a training agreement. 
- The Philips youth-plan. In 1983 Philips made a youth-plan which aimed 
to fight youth unemployment in three ways : 
° part-time labour. 
In principle young people under 23 wiLl get a labour contract based 
on an annual working time of 1,500 hours. 
0 introduction-agreements for one year at the most. Young persons will 
get the opportunity to become more experienced and therefore they wiLl 
have a better starting position on the labour market. 
0 training facilities. 
Together with the relevant labour office Phi Lips wilL introduce a 
number of vocational courses to improve the links between education 
and work. 
For 1985 Phi Lips has agreed to an extra effort to employ about 3,000 
young people (4% of the employees, covered by the collective agreement). 
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The employment of 2% more young peopLe in the Metal Processing and 
Engineering Industry in 1985. 
In 1983 partners to the coLlective labour agreement of the metal pro­
cessing and engineering industry aLready agreed to employ all new 
employees on a part­time basis, based on an average 32­hour week. 
Young peopLe aged less than 23 who already have a job will be given 
the opportunity of a 32­hour working week. Until July 1985 their 
payment will be 90% of their current wage. However this measure proved 
not to be effective and partners agreed that after July 1985 this 
agreement wiLl not be continued. 
The most important reasons are that this measure seems onLy to be 
effective if all firms and branches in the Netherlands have the same 
agreement. Otherwise young people ai LI prefer a fuLl­time job with 
a full­time payment. 
Partners have agreed on a separate coLlective Labour agreement solely 
for the establishment of training­ and development funds. The aim of . 
these funds wiLl be to improve training and distribution of the training­
costs. 
Ahold (chain of retail shops) has extended the number of speciaL shops 
to 16. In these shops only the staff is recruited from inside, the 
other functions are open for young unemployed persons. They will be 
taken into service on so­calLed growth­job agreement. 
civil servants aged up to 25 wiLl be taken intothe civil service on a 
maximum working time of 32 hours per week. When the person becomes 25 
or after 5 years of service and he/she wants a full­time job the govern­
ment wilL consider possibilities for such a post. 
Furthermore the government has agreed on the extension of the number of 
vocational labour places. The government expects that with these pro­
visions an additional 10 to 15 thousand young people wiLl become civiL 
servants. 
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In addition to the youth-plans severaL companies and branches of industry 
agreed to a further decrease in the early retirement age. The increased 
out-fLow of older employees means that more young peopLe can be taken in. 
Now one year after the 1984 recommendations of the Foundation of Labour, 
when we compare the unempLoyment figures for young people for August 1985 
with those of August 1984, it can be said that the aim of these recom-
mendations has been reached. 
- Unemployed people younger 
than 25 years of which 
long-term unemployed people 
younger than 25 years 
August '84 August '85 
342.859 308.888 -33.971 
135.100 115.600 -19.500 
However this does not mean that employers and unions can now relax. 
The unempLoyment rate for young people is sti LL very high and in the 
years to come parties will have to keep a close eye on this. 
IV - THE LEGAL MINIMUM WAGES 
The standard minimum wage provisions are legally enforceable in respect of 
all employees aged between 23 and 64 and working under contracts of 
employment for at least one third of the normal working week. 
The standard minimum wage is currentLy HFL 1987,70 a month. Till 1983 
adjustments to the standard minimum wage were generally made automatically 
twice a year, on January 1st and on July 1st, on the basis of changes 
in the index of collectively agreed wage rates. . 
Since January 1983 no adjustment has been made, while in January 1984 
the minimum wages were decreased by 3% to the current level of HFL 1987,70. 
For younger workers their minimum wage is a percentage of the standard 
minimum wage. Till 1981 the minimum wage of the young employee was the 
standard minimum wage minus 7,5% for each year under 23. 
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On January 1st 1981 and on July 1st 1983 these percentages were legally 
decreased to the percentages mentioned in the table beLow. As the table 
shows,the percentage change during the period 1980 tiLl 1985 is Less than 
the decrease of the youth rates, while up to 1983 the minimum wages were 
stilL automatically adjusted. 
age 
23 t/m 64 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
youth 
1980 
100 
92,5 
85 
77,5 
70 
62,5 
55 
47,5 
per 
in 
centage 
1985 
100 
85 
72,5 
61,5 
52,5 
45,5 
39,5 
34,5 
% change 
1980/1985 
+ 6,7 
- 2,0 
- 9,0 
-15,3 
-20,0 
-22,3 
-23,4 
-22,5 
leveL '85 
(monthly) 
1987,70 
1689,50 
1441,10 
1222,40 
1043,50 
904,40 
785,10 
685,30 
During the period 1980-1985 there was a very strong reduction in the 
minimum wages for employees aged 16 to 19. 
For employees aged 23 to 64 the minimum wages stilL increased by 6,7%. 
Although there is no way of proving that the cut in minimum wages has 
Led to a reduction in the number of unemployed young people it is 
remarkable that when we compare the expected unemployment figures of 
young peopLe for 1985 with those of 1984, that the unemployment rate 
for those aged Less than 19 decreases by 13.6%, whiLe the rate for 
people aged 23 and 24 faLls by only 5%. 
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1984 
(χ 1000) 
1985 
(χ 1000) 
variance 
(%) 
younger than 19 
19 to 22 
23 to 24 
total 
62.5 
179.4 
77.0 
318.9 
54.0 
163.9 
73.1 
- 13.6 
- 8.5 
- 5.1 
291.0 - 8.7 
In spite of the decrease in the unempLoyment rate, the number of unemployed 
young people is stilL very high, 45% of the unemployed peopLe are aged less 
than 19, 26.3% are aged 19 to 23 and 20.3% are aged 23 or 24. The unemp­
loyment rate in the Netherlands is therefore still and will continue to be 
of great concern to everyone. 
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Annex I 
translation of the agreement reached in the Foundation of Labour on 19 
November 1982 : 
The central federations of employers and trade unions represented in the 
Foundation of Labour : 
- considering that for a structural improvement of employment the following 
is essential : 
recovery of economic growth, a stable price Level, reinforcement of the 
competitive power of enterprises and in connection therewith an improve-
ment of profits; 
- considering that for that purpose a positive Lasting sociaL and economic 
policy at all Levels is necessary; 
- considering that even when there is a recovery of economic growth it wilL 
not be possible in the years to come to employ the total laboui—force, 
its increase included; 
- considering that next to the above poLicy a policy approach is commanded 
for the years to come directed to a more equal division of existing 
employment; an approach through which several forms of redivision of 
employment are to be considered such as shortening of working-time, 
part-time work, the fight against youth unempLoyment; 
- considering that the collective agreements should not only contain 
agreements on form, phase and empLoyment effects but it should be 
understood that, taking into account the weak financial position of 
enterprises a better division of existing empLoyment should not Lead 
to an increase of costs; 
- considering that in the year 1983 such a concrete policy shouLd be 
brought forward and that it should be left to the social partners 
at the industry Level to bargain about a different way of spending 
the already agreed upon wage agreements (for 1983); 
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I. call upon the social partners at the industry Level to create the 
conditions to bring about such policy as soon as possible; 
II. are of the opinion that next to such policy the Foundation of Labour 
could discuss some aspects of a division of labour and the fight 
against youth unempLoyment with the intention to make recommendations 
before 1 January 1983; 
III. express the desirability - reserving the opinions and feelings of 
each of the social partners with regard to the poLicy options of . 
the new government - that on the basis of the above considerations 
and objectives the collective bargaining process for 1983 at the 
company- and industry- leveL wilL start at short-term and make an 
urgent appeal on the government to allow the social partners just 
mentioned to conduct their collective bargaining in freedom on the 
basis of the above recommendations. They commit themselves to inform 
the government, in the spring of 1983, about the factual develop-
ment and outcome of the coLlective bargaining process. 
Without seeking to be exhaustive, the Foundation of Labour is thinking 
of the folLowing options besides the creation of extra jobs for young 
workers (including possibly part-time jobs) : 
- reinforcement and expansion of the apprenticeship system so that, in 
conformity with the recommendations from the "open consultation" on 
the Wagner Report, its totaL capacity wilL be doubled as compared 
with 1982, whereby an optimum matching with Short-term Medium-LeveL 
Vocational Training wiLl be important; 
- training by in-house and branch schooLs; 
- creation of on-the-job training facilities, notably for young workers 
who cannot (yet) be accommodated in the apprenticeship system; custo-
mary terms of employment shouLd apply in accordance with the degree 
to which the partners to the coLlective agreements feel that the subjects 
are engaged in productive labour; 
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- creation of growth jobs, for which the growth route is determined through 
coLlective bargaining., also taking into consideration the customary 
working times in the firms and branches in question. 
The employers' and trade union federations represented in the Foundation 
of Labour trust that all the parties concerned, including government in 
its role of employer in common consultation with the trade unions concerned, 
will follow these Foundation of Labour recommendations. They assume more-
over that the Cabinet will soon enter into consultation with the Foundation 
of Labour on removing possible bottlenecks involving government in its 
role of Legislator or financier. 
In conclusion the Foundation of Labour calls on the government to put 
forward clear policy intentions in particular with regard to young long-
term jobless and to enter into consultation thereon with the Foundation 
of Labour in order to verify the coherence and consistency of such policy 
intentions and this appeal from the Foundation of Labour. 
July 13, 1984 
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YOUTH PAY AND EMPLOYMENT, THE EMPLOYER'S PERSPECTIVE 
Peter LOBBAN and Peter INGRAM 
Confederation of British Industry 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the employer's view of the issue 
of youth pay and empLoyment and possible policy for the amelioration of 
the extent of youth unempLoyment. 
One particularly worrying aspect of the dramatic increase in unemployment 
since 1979 has been its disproportionate impact on the young: in 1973, 
males under 20 had an unempLoyment rate identical to aLl maLes, however, 
now their unemployment rate is over twice the alL male rate. The years 
1980-81 were marked by a significant increase in the youth unemployment 
rate. Since then the dimensions of the problem of youth unempLoyment in 
the UK have aroused a considerable amount of concern, not Least among 
employers, in response to the damaging sociaL consequences of youth un-
employment and the adverse effect prolonged unemployement has on the 
career chances of the current young workers' cohort in the Labour force 
throughout their working lives. 
From the point of view of UK employers the recent rise in the level of 
youth unemployment has been caused by several factors. It is worth briefly 
considering each of these in order to outline the possible scope for 
employer related policy responses. 
The first principal influence is one of demography. A major contribution 
to the increase in youth unemployment has been the increasing supply of 
young peopLe entering the labour force throughout the 1970s. The number 
of school Leavers, 2/3rds of whom are 16 year olds has risen considerably 
since 1980, reaching a peak level in 1982-3 at 774,000 as compared with 
726,000 in 1976-7. Correspondingly, the proportion of 16-19 year oLds in 
the total labour force increased from 8% in 1971 to 10.2% in 1983. Over 
the same period however youth employment contracted: the number of 16-19 
year oLds in employment feLl from 7.6% of total empLoyment in 1971, to 
6% in 1983, or from 1,817,000 in 1971 to 1,344,000 by 1983. 
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This increase in supply and seeming fall in employment of young labour 
gave rise to youth unemployment. What factors caused this faLI in demand 
for young workers? 
Concomitant to the increase in the suppLy of young workers to the labour 
force was the sharp downswing in the leveL of economic avtivity. By 1981 
employers faced the fulL forces of the economic recession: in response to 
the depressed leveL of demand, Labour shedding was inevitable. As a 
resuLt 1981 was a record year for redundancies, over half a million 
confirmed redundancies were reported to the DE, nearly three times the 
figure for 1979. Insofar that this operated on a last in - first out 
basis, increased redundancies had a disproportionate impact on young 
workers. 
As labour shedding increased so recruitment felL, with employers freezing 
pLaces so reducing the number of young people taken on. As a resuLt the 
number of vacancies notified to job centres felL from 155,000 in 1977 to 
96,000 by 1981. As the economic recession deepened so the level of cor-
porate profitability reduced. The rate of return on capitaL employed 
felL to 3.4% in 1981 from 6.4% in 1977. This slump in profitability had 
the effect of freezing employers' training budgets so further worstening 
the extent of youth unemployment. 
With employment leveLs contracting throughout the age distribution emp-
loyers' concern focussed on the empLoyability of young workers. Against a 
background of increased competitive pressure, employers perceived the 
quality of the potential young recruit to be unsuitable. From the pers-
pective of employers an important factor affecting the extent of youth 
unempLoyment was their empLoyabi lity. 
TypicaLly the ski Lis possessed by young entrants to the Labour market 
were considered by empLoyers to be of a low standard. Young workers 
were not perceived as an attractive prospect to potential employers: 
Levels of Literacy and numeracy were considered poor; the attitudes and 
approach of young people to their work were thought inadequate; even 
general appearances of young people imitigated against their employabiLity. 
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Indeed, among employers, the quaLity of the average school leaver, indi-
cated inadequacies in the educational system which was widely considered 
to be giving rise to a low skill base relative to other countries. By 
international cross section 96% of those aged 16-18 in Japan are in 
education compared with 86% in W. Germany and only 52% in the UK. 
A related issue determining the employabiLity of young peopLe is their 
Level of pay relative to adult workers. Movements in relative labour costs 
since the Late 1960s suggest that, relative to adults, 16 and 17 year oLds 
have become substantially more expensive to employ. As a resuLt many 
employers took the view that the cost of teenage labour was too high 
reLative to its productivity. Faced with the choice, employers wouLd 
prefer to recruit higher productivity adult workers at only marginally 
increased cost. 
During the early 1980s the combined effect of demographic influences, the 
perceived decLine of young workers' levels of human capitaL relative to 
cost and the effect of economic recession Led to growing Levels of youth 
unemployment. Today however there are signs that these adverse factors 
have abated. The demographic trend, the leveL of redundancies, recruitment 
and profitability and reLative wages of 16-17 year olds have begun to 
move favourably. 
- The demographic composition of the population is contracting in the 
16-19 age range. Since the peak year of 1982-83, the 16-19 cohort in 
the labour force has falLen by 42,000 and wilL continue to contract 
unti I the 1990s. 
- The level of redundancies in the economy has substantially reduced to 
under half the leveL in 1981 and continues to falL annually. 
- Recent evidence shows employers are recruiting again, particularly in 
service industries such as distribution, hotels and catering. The cur-
rent number of vacancies in the economy has increased to 1977 level. 
-164-
- Company profits are recovering. A rate of return on capital employed of 
7% has been predicted for 1984. This had had the effect of increasing 
industrial investment and improving training budgets for expansion. 
- Within schools, more emphasis has been given to the provision of edu-
cation and training that focuses on the requirements of employers 
thereby improving the quality of the average school leaver entering 
the labour market. This has been achieved through the Understanding 
British Industry scheme which has attempted to provide teachers with 
an orientation towards the realities and requirements of the business 
sector. 
- The relative pay of 16-17 year olds after stabi Using in recent years, 
shows signs of faLling with the possible removal of 16 S 17 year olds 
from the remit of Wages Councils. 
Notwithstanding these recent improvements, the extent of youth unemploy-
ment remains a problem. At the height of the impact of the cyclical effect 
of the recession on youth unemployment the principal policy response 
towards the young jobless which offered itself to Government and employers 
was to attempt to increase the skills of young workers through the pro-
vision of vocational training and to reduce reLative wage leveLs of 16-17 
year oLds. 
The challenge facing both Government and employers in introducing an ade-
quate system of vocational training was that of building it into the exist-
ing framework of industrial training whilst maintaining the cost within 
a budget acceptable to firms facing serious competitive pressures and 
within existing Government finances which were similarly constrained. 
The scale of the problem of youth unempLoyment by the early 1980s sug-
gested that a piecemeal approach to the provision of youth training would 
be inappropriate. Government and employers considered that the best 
strategy would be to co-ordinate the provision of training into one 
principal scheme: this become knowm as the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) 
which was intended to provide a guarantee of an offer of training to all 
minimum age unemployed school leavers. 
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The introduction of YTS extended the existing Youth Opportunities Programme 
(YOP) increasing the Government's annual youth training budget for £1 biL-
lion in 1983 to provide 300,000 vocational training places a year for 
teenagers. YTS sought to develop skilL training in such a way as to enable 
young peopLe entering the labour market with different educational attain-
ments to acquire skilLs appropriate to the jobs available and to provide 
them with a basis for progress through further learning. These ski Lis were 
to include literacy, numeracy, basic use of tools and machinery, office 
practice and communication ski Lis. 
Introduced in September 1983, YTS continues to be the main vehicLe of youth 
training today. The role of employers in the provision of YTS involves 
their participation either as Managing Agents or Sponsors. A Managing 
Agent undertakes to deLiver fulL year training programmes from start to 
finish in terms of a contract agreed with the MSC whereby the agent is 
responsible for the design and management of the training programmes, 
maintenance of quality and standards and support of YTS trainees includ-
ing certification of their progress. A Sponsor undertakes to deLiver 
only parts of the programme such as work experience and on-the-job training. 
From the point of view of the employer in order to work effectively, the 
training provided under YTS should serve as a bridge between schooL and 
work. It shouLd be based on the workplace and should be augmented by 
relevant training away from the job. It should be broadly based and not 
necessarily focussed on only one occupation and it should aim to develop 
the competence of young people. A good quaLity scheme should be seen to 
enhance those attributes which the trainees, their parents and their 
perspective employers see as necessary and attractive. Those outcomes 
that are most likeLy to be attractive to prospective employers include 
an ability to be versatile and fLexible in working and Learning, to 
learn by Listening and understanding, to demonstrate a good time keeping 
record and to possess a constructive attitude towards work. 
The dimensions of unempLoyment among the young in the UK today remain high. 
In 1983 17% of a L L unemployed workers were under 20 and 29S of the long 
term unemployed were under 25. 38% of 16 year olds in Britain will leave 
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school during 1985 without jobs to enter, ranging from 29% in the South 
East to two thirds in the North. This year YTS wiLl provide one year's 
occupational training for over 380,000 unemployed schooL leavers. In 
addition the 1985 budget proposals wiLl add an extra 200,000 places in 
the future. These changes include an aim to guarantee an offer of two 
year places for 16 year olds and one year for 17 year oLds with an empha-
sis towards shifting the provision of training to private employers and 
to encourage YTS to become a permanent feature of training provision. 
Hitherto YTS has been greeted with approval from employers. Currently 
60% of young people Leaving YTS are moving directLy into fulL time jobs. 
This success, in part, reflects the improving economic cLimate, giving rise 
to higher profitability, fewer redundancies and increased recruitment in 
industry. However, it also demonstrates the quality of YTS graduate. The 
dialogue between business and schools under the Understanding British 
Industry Scheme by communicating business realities to schools has made 
a favourable impact on the school syLlabus which in turn has been comple-
mented by constructive vocational training through YTS. 
In response to the wideLy held view among employers prior to the introduc-
tion of YTS, regarding the lack of readiness of school Leavers for fulL 
time employment, YTS has been judged a success. By increasing their 
skilLs the scheme has increased the demand for young workers. Further-
more, by providing the trainee with an alLowance of £25 per week. YTS 
has had the effect of decreasing the relative wages of young people out-
side of YTS thus lowering the cost of teenage labour reLative to its 
productivity this promoting the recruitment of young workers. 
The problem of the growth of youth unemployment since the Late 1970s 
represents both a supply problem, generated by increased numbers of schooL 
leavers entering the labour market, reinforced by a demand probLem created 
by the economic recession. The cyclical downturn in the leveL of economic 
activity has had a dual adverse effect on young workers caused by a dis-
proportionate shedding of young Labour and a freeing of recruitment, 
cutting off entry to employment. 
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From the view of the employer these factors were compounded by a per-
ceived reduction in the quaLity of young potential recruits, particularly 
in relation to the increase in reLative labour costs of young workers. 
YTS has been particularly efficacious in response to the latter problem. 
The employability of young peopLe has, according to employers, improved 
and is expected to continue to do so which suggests that a period of 
post school vocationaL training should become a permanent arrangement 
for young entrants to the Labour market. 
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